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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study combines some of the empirical findings from feminist theory with 
Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) in an attempt to explain two rape outcomes:  
past sexually coercive behaviors of males and the propensity of males to rape.  Strain is 
conceptualized as rape-specific and measured in three different ways:  threats to 
masculine status, dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse, and perceived 
unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse.  The feminist theory variables that were 
included in the analyses were rape myth acceptance, benevolent sexism, and hostile 
sexism.   
A closed-ended survey consisting of 136 questions was distributed to 298 males 
in seven introductory sociology courses.  After eliminating the missing cases and those 
who did not fit the age requirements for participation, a total of 190 cases were 
analyzed.  The results indicate that Agnew’s (1992) traditional GST model does not 
function in this study as he hypothesized.  Strain did not lead to increased past sexually 
coercive behaviors or rape propensity in any of the models through negative affect.  In 
total, five variables had direct relationships with the past sexually coercive behaviors:  
traditional values, benevolent sexism, rape myth acceptance, unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse (a strain variable), and coping strategies.  Four variables had direct 
relationships with rape propensity:  being black, rape myth acceptance, negative 
emotional affect, and coping strategies.  All of the relationships were positive, except 
for that between traditional values and past sexually coercive behaviors, and between 
coping strategies and proclivity to rape.   
 x
This research reveals the importance of the feminist theory variables in 
explaining rape.  Although GST did not function in this study as hypothesized, this 
study also reveals that more research should be focused on negative emotional affect 
rather than anger with regard to rape, and that further research should be conducted to 
determine how and why coping strategies are associated with an increase in sexually 
coercive behavior.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This study takes some of the empirical information that has been accumulated 
on rape, which has mostly come from fields such as feminism and evolutionary 
psychology, and combines it with one of the primary criminological theories of our time 
to help explain what some of those other fields have been unable to explain.  Sadly, 
major criminological theories have been used very little, if at all, to explain the crime of 
rape.  Interestingly, three of the modern major theoretical perspectives on crime, self-
control theory, social learning theory, and strain theory, have all purported to be able to 
explain crime generally (Agnew 2006; Akers 1998; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990), yet 
the testing of these theories with respect to rape is inadequate, preliminary or 
nonexistent. 
One of the problems is that rape is a unique act in that its context determines its 
status as a crime in the court of public opinion.  It cannot help but be politicized, as it is 
embedded with notions about how the social world functions:  Is the world a safe 
place?  Is the world a fair place?  Can this happen to anyone?   
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990: 36-7) description of the “typical” rape scenario 
is telling:  “The woman is alone and out of public view.  A lone offender either lies in 
wait or follows and attacks her.  The attack may take place on the spot or after the 
victim has been forced to a more remote setting.”  These authors also state that the 
elements necessary for a rape to occur are (1) the victim must be attractive; (2) the 
victim must be accessible; (3) the victim must be unwilling to engage in sexual activity; 
(4) the victim must be unable to fight off the offender; (5) the offender must be 
  
2
unrestrained (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 37).   Yet what is missing in their 
description is a motivation or rationale that would explain why the offender is male and 
the victim is female.  Thus, ideas that have generally not been included in mainstream 
criminology, such as feminist ideology or biological determinism, must be included in 
an explanation of rape.  The concept of rape is inescapably infused with gender role 
expectations.   Though female rapists and male rape victims exist (Groth 1979; Groth 
and Burgess 1980; Sarrel and Masters 1982), they lie outside the statistical norm.   My 
study will explain the larger sociological pattern that exists:  most of the victims are 
female and most of the perpetrators are male (Ellis 1989).   It is my view that any 
serious study of rape must address why it is a largely gendered crime.  I will address 
this in more detail in Chapter 3.     
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) are also incorrect in their description of what the 
“typical” rape scenario entails.   It is difficult to determine the extent of rape, as it is a 
crime that goes largely unreported to the police.  While 95,136 rapes were officially 
reported in 2002 (Uniform Crime Reports, 2003), 247,720 women claimed they were 
victims of rape in the same year (National Crime Survey, 2003) according to national 
statistics.   The difference may be even greater.  Holmes and Holmes (2000: 179) 
estimate that only 10% of rapes are ever reported to the police. 
In-depth surveys designed to measure the scope and specifications of rape 
suggest that even the National Crime Survey underestimates the extent of rape.  Almost 
all of the studies that have been conducted, however, have been on college women.  
Muehlenhard and Linton (1987) found that 15% of the females in their study had been 
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victims of “date rape,” while another study found that 22% reported date rape 
victimization (Yegidis 1986).  One of the most famous studies was the Ms. Campus 
Project on Sexual Assault conducted in 1982 and funded by the National Institute of 
Mental Health, which found that 28% of college women had been victims of rape or 
attempted rape during their college careers (Koss, Gidcyz and Wisniewski 1987).   
More recently, the National College Women Sexual Victimization (NCWSV) study, 
conducted in 1997 by the National Institute of Justice, used a random sample of college-
aged women and found that 1 in 36 (2.8%) of the respondents had been a victim of a 
rape or attempted rape in the previous 7 months, based upon the following definition:  
“unwanted completed [or attempted] penetration by force or threat of force” (Fisher, 
Cullen and Turner 2002:  277).      
One major reason that studies report such discrepancies in the prevalence of rape 
lies in the differences in the operationalization of the term itself (Ellis 1989).  For 
example, the NCWSV study claimed that penetration could include any act involving 
genitals, mouth or rectum and incorporated the use of objects as well.   Despite the 
discrepancies, however, various studies on college women have found that the majority 
of those sexually assaulted were raped by someone known to them (Abbey et al. 1996; 
Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2004; Koss et al. 1987, 1988)—the percentages ranged from 
80-95%.  In one nationally representative study where women were asked whether they 
had been forced into having sex by a man, only 4% who had been raped said the 
attacker was a stranger:  46% of the rapists were someone with whom the victim was in 
love, 22% of the women were raped by someone they knew well but were not in love 
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with, 19% were raped by acquaintances, and 9% were raped by spouses (Laumann et al. 
1994).  It is difficult to extrapolate lifetime risks from cross-sectional research, but most 
victimization studies have estimated that between 20% and 30% of women in the 
United States will experience at least one rape or rape attempt (Bernard and Bernard 
1983; Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2004; Hall and Flannery 1984; Koss and Oros 1982; 
Muehlenhard and Linton 1987; Yegidis 1986). 
The definition of rape that is used does not impact only statistics on the number 
of individuals who have been victims of the crime.  Rape’s conceptualization is also 
critical in the formation of a theory for why it occurs, as well as for developing 
hypotheses for empirical investigation.  Rape definitions also impact how data will be 
collected and analyzed, and the interpretation of the results that are derived from these 
analyses.   Chapter 2 will describe definitions of rape used across competing fields, as 
well as the definition of rape that will be used in this study. 
My Story 
I approach this topic from the perspective of feminism, although the research 
design is largely quantitative and what most researchers would consider positivist.  
Some researchers have claimed that a study cannot be both positivist and feminist 
simultaneously as the objectivity required for positivism is contradictory to the goal of 
not objectifying subjects (e.g. Sprague and Zimmerman 1993).   Most feminist 
researchers, however, appear to recognize that feminist methods come in many different 
forms.  Reinharz (1992: 243) claims that, “Feminism supplies the perspective and the 
disciplines supply the method.  The feminist researcher exists at their intersection.”  
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Hesse-Biber and Yaiser (2004:  210) claim that what makes research feminist is the way 
that the researcher has framed the research questions.   Feminist empiricists have 
combined feminism and positivism into a “feminist objectivity,” which retains the goal 
of conducting research free of social influence or personal beliefs with the reality that 
no one can actually achieve this goal (Chafetz 2004; Harding 1991).  According to 
Harding (1991), acknowledging the limitations of a researcher’s own objectivity 
actually strengthens a study by providing the unique biases that the researcher brings to 
the analysis. 
In the interest of fully disclosing my own interests and biases, the most basic 
reason I have developed an interest in attempting to explain why men rape is to provide 
personal meaning to my own experiences.  From the ages of fifteen to eighteen, I stayed 
in a relationship with an adult male who physically and verbally assaulted me, and 
restricted my physical activity because he was extremely jealous.  Three days after I 
turned eighteen, I married him to prove to him that I really loved him.  Just a few weeks 
into our marriage, I left him, but he followed me to my new home one night and 
sexually assaulted me.  I ended up pregnant due to that incident, and I thought having 
his baby would really prove to him that I loved him and the abuse would stop.   It 
didn’t.  When he intentionally, in his words, tried to induce me to have a miscarriage, I 
finally left him forever.  Without the pregnancy (and the danger to my baby he was 
posing), I wonder if I ever would have had the courage to leave him at all.  I grew up 
with several female friends who were raped by their friends, dates, and boyfriends.  I 
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never thought it would happen to me.  I didn’t call what my ex-husband did to me rape 
for several more years—I am one of the “hidden” rape victims. 
These events have led me to my current study.   I depart, however, not from a 
perspective that blames offenders entirely for these actions.  As a sociologist that has 
studied others’ research in this area, I recognize that a social structure that ignores and 
occasionally encourages such acts can powerfully influence individual behavior.  
Therefore, I conducted this research from a humanist perspective, despite its 
methodological constraints, with the hope that understanding will bring change. 
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Chapter 2 
What is Rape? 
 
Muehlenhard (2000) contends that rape has political, legal, and scientific 
definitions.   I would also add that a social and cultural definition exists that is 
independent of these three other definitions and that is both informed by and informs 
them.   This is the concept of rape held largely by members of the general public.  In 
this chapter I will explore the political, legal, social, and scientific definitions of rape 
that currently exist (and are sometimes at odds with one another) in the United States.  
It is necessary to understand the construction of rape as a concept prior to understanding 
how it has been used theoretically.  Examining the similarities and differences between 
these definitions will provide a historical exposition that will be useful not only for 
understanding how rape is constructed, but also for providing a context to the definition 
that I will use in this research.        
The Political Definition of Rape 
 Here I will outline some of the basic principles to demonstrate how feminists 
have defined rape, as Chapter 3 will contain a much more extensive analysis of the 
broader hypotheses of feminist theories of rape.  The feminist redefinition of rape has 
succeeded in altering the legal definition, in impacting the social definition, and, 
according to some scholars, in becoming the dominant scientific definition, as will be 
discussed later.  Thus its importance as a political force cannot be understated.   
In her groundbreaking book Against Our Will:  Men, Women, and Rape, 
Brownmiller (1975) claims that rape is the product of a patriarchal social structure.  By 
definition, in a patriarchy, males are socialized to dominate females and to perceive 
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them as objects to be conquered (Brownmiller 1975; Griffin 1975).  Part of that 
socialization includes the concept of masculinity as an embodiment of virility and 
aggressiveness.  In contrast, females learn that femininity involves passivity and 
subservience.      
 Sexual scripts are extensions of these socialized roles, and provide the basis for 
a male to exploit a female sexually (Warshaw 1988).  As Beneke (1982) points out, 
even the language used to describe sexual encounters is violent and aggressive, thus the 
confusion between “sex” and “violence” in mass media and in determining the 
difference between “seduction” and “rape.”  Elements such as these contribute to the 
reification of these social roles into a larger “rape culture,” in which it is not 
psychologically ill men outside the mainstream who commit rape, but men who are 
hypermasculine and have merely embraced the tenets of the larger gendered culture to 
an extreme (Jackson 1978; Scully 1990).  Therefore, rape is not only a product of a 
patriarchal social structure, but because sexual aggression is normalized (Scully 1995), 
it also serves to reinforce patriarchy; rape is “a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of fear” (Brownmiller 1975: 6).   
 Feminists have had better luck implementing changes that have not required 
individuals to accept sexual assault as a structural normality.  Therefore, the most 
successful changes have been procedural rather than theoretical.  Changes in the legal 
definition of rape have occurred, but the social definition has been slow to catch up to it 
(Snow 1999).  The definition of rape in all arenas prior to the infusion of feminist 
ideology most closely resembles the current social definition, as will be discussed later.   
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Yet the legal changes that did occur were made possible based upon constitutional legal 
grounds invoking Fourteenth Amendment equal rights clauses; the law does not have to 
concern itself with the “messy” question of embedded male dominance in the larger 
society to grant rape victims more protection (Smart 1989).  Social definitions involve 
more risk to individuals, however, as they require individuals to entertain differing 
worldviews that may actually put monumental legal changes into effect. 
The Legal Definition of Rape 
The English common law definition of rape that comprised the United States 
definition until the 1960s conceptualized rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman not 
one’s wife by force or against her will” (Epstein and Langenbahn 1994:  6). In 1962, the 
United States Model Penal Code was established and the definition of rape was 
modified slightly:  “A man who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is 
guilty of rape if he compels her to submit by force or threat of force or threat of 
imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, he has substantially 
impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing 
without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose or preventing 
resistance, the female is unconscious, or the female is less than 10 years old” (Model 
Penal Code §213.1(1) 1962).   In addition to maintaining the idea that rape cannot occur 
between a husband and wife, this code also had a strict continuum that treated rape by a 
nonstranger as less serious than rape by a stranger.   
The rape law reforms that began in the 1970s were designed to target many 
areas in their eradication of gender bias in the prosecution of rape.  As mentioned, one 
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major target was the definition of rape itself.  Reforms sought to expand the definition 
of rape to incorporate sexual offenses that had long been normalized, to grant equal 
protection to victims who before would have been treated as “unrapable,” to equalize 
the standards for evidence in rape cases to those in cases of other violent crimes, and to 
standardize judges’ decision-making power so that case outcomes would be more 
predictable (Marsh, Geist and Caplan 1982).   
More specifically, many changes took place regarding the definition of rape.  
States replaced the word “rape” with “sexual assault” and “sexual abuse” to create an 
umbrella term that emphasized the wide variety of acts that could be prosecuted and to 
shift the focus more onto the violent rather than the sexual nature of the acts (Bourque 
1989).   Also, the definition of sexual assault now included a spectrum of acts 
depending upon factors such as the “degree of force used, nature of the sexual acts 
committed, age differential between victim and offender, or relationship between victim 
and offender” (Bourque 1989: 111).  Other aspects of the definitional changes impacted 
who could be raped according to the law.  For the first time, males and females were 
both described as possible victims and possible offenders (Borque 1989).  Also, changes 
were made regarding the statutory age and many states instituted new laws reflecting 
the idea that a spouse can be raped (Bienen 1980). 
Other areas targeted for revision were those that affected the processes by which 
rape victims were treated in the courtroom, particularly regarding evidentiary standards.    
In trials, women in most states no longer had to prove that they had resisted or provide 
corroborating evidence in order to demonstrate that they hadn’t consented (Galvin 
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1986; Horney and Spohn 1991).  Harsher penalties for rape were also instituted, as 
longer  sentences became popular for a wider variety of sexually coercive acts (Bienan 
1980).  
These massive reforms were expected to influence change at several stages:  the 
report, arrest, conviction, and sentencing levels were all expected to increase due to 
several factors (Bachman and Paternoster 1993).  First, women would experience less 
harassment at the hands of the criminal justice system and, therefore would be more 
likely to report rape.  Second, more arrests would result because a wider array of 
women’s actual experiences would be classified as sexual assault.  Third, biasing 
information about the victim would be less likely to enter the trial and influence the 
judge or jury which, as a result, would lead to more convictions.  Finally, because most 
of the reforms were aimed at changing how “simple rape cases”—those in which the 
offender and victim know each other and no weapon is involved—were perceived in the 
courtroom, sentencing disparities would decrease as the criminal justice system began 
treating these rapes as serious incidents (Spohn and Horney 1996).  
  Research indicates, however, that most of these changes have not materialized, 
and when they have, the results have been minimal.  Polk (1985), who examined data 
for the state of California from 1975 to 1982, found that rape convictions were more 
likely to result in a prison sentence after rape law reforms occurred, yet arrests and 
indictments remained unchanged.  In a more thorough comparative study examining six 
urban jurisdictions (Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston, and Washington, 
D.C.), only two showed any differences before and after rape law reform.  Both Detroit 
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and Houston data revealed an increase in the reporting of sexual assault; Detroit also 
showed an increase in indictments for rape, and Houston data revealed that sentences 
there for rape were longer post-rape law reform (Spohn and Horney 1996).    
An important national study by Bachman and Paternoster (1993) examined 
reported rapes using both the Uniform Crime Reports and the National Victimization 
Study comparing what occurred in the criminal justice system not only before and after 
rape law reform, but in comparison with other crimes in the criminal justice system.  
Their findings were consistent with other research examining the outcomes of rape law 
reform, which showed there had only been slight success in the intended changes.   
Over the course of approximately twenty years, there was only about a 10% increase in 
the proportion of women who reported being victimized by rape.   When convicted, 
offenders were slightly more likely to be sent to prison and the treatment of 
acquaintance rape cases is more similar to stranger rape following rape law reform, 
although the authors note what they call a “large acquaintance discount” (Bachman and 
Paternoster 1993:  570).   The authors are pessimistic about their results:   “[R]ape law 
reform has not had a very substantial effect on either victim behavior or actual practices 
in the criminal justice system.  We found no large increase over time in the proportion 
of victims who reported being raped, and a very small change in the likelihood that 
individuals who raped an acquaintance would be imprisoned” (Bachman and 
Paternoster 1993:  571).   
Many legal scholars have attempted to explain the minimal impact of rape law 
reforms by focusing on the legal loopholes that prevent rape law reforms from being  
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effective (e.g. Galvin 1986; Snow 1999).  One problem cited is that there is no national 
uniformity in the rape reforms or rape shield laws.  Different rape shield laws exist in 
various states that allow different types and amounts of sexual conduct evidence against 
the complainant into a trial at the sole discretion of the judge (Galvin 1986).  
Galvin (1986) divides the state statutes into four categories based upon the 
evidentiary standards:   
(1) the “Michigan” standard—because the other twenty-four states that had rape 
shield laws before the Federal Rules of Evidence were modified modeled their own 
code after Michigan—has some exceptions that are the only exceptions to the rule.  
Some of the exceptions that can be allowed as evidence include the woman’s past 
sexual behavior with the defendant and sexual behavior meant to show “the origin of 
semen, pregnancy or disease” (Snow 1999: 247);  
(2) In twelve states, the sexual behavior of the accuser can be used if it is 
deemed relevant, at the discretion of the judge (unlike in the “Michigan” standard where 
there is no judicial discretion).  The benefits of using the sexual behavior of the accuser 
during a trial must outweigh the possible harm it may do in prejudicing the jury.  
Whether the benefits outweigh the harms is also decided by the judge in the case.   
(3) Seven states are specifically modeled on the federal rape shield law and they 
also have some exceptions as outlined in the federal rape shield law, but they allow for 
a judge to admit “unexcepted” sexual conduct if he or she believes it would be 
unconstitutional (i.e. tread on the rights of the defendant) to do otherwise.  In this 
model, again, judicial discretion is allowed but for different legal grounds.   
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(4) The final approach is used in the remaining states that have rape shield 
laws.1  It consists of separating sexual conduct into two distinct types of evidence:  
substantive and credibility evidence, the former being that which can be used to 
determine whether or not a woman consented to the sexual act, and the latter being that 
which can only be used to attack a woman’s credibility.  In no state is evidence allowed 
that is solely used to attack a woman’s credibility, yet Galvin (1986) claims that the 
problem is that sexual conduct evidence cannot be discretely placed into these two 
categories; it is easy to use evidence that looks like it will prove consent to also attack a 
woman’s credibility, either directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally.    
Research has established that the more discretion that is left to judges, the more 
evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the defendant is admitted during trials 
(Galvin 1986; Horney and Spohn 1991; Snow 1999).   In states where rape shield laws 
are the most restrictive—where there are rigid standards for what can be allowed in with 
no exceptions, as in Michigan—evidence such as a prior relationship between the 
victim and the defendant is still allowed half of the time, and evidence that is of 
“questionable relevance” was allowed in states that allowed judges more discretion 
(Horney and Spohn 1991).  
 Defense attorneys, knowledgeable of the restrictions surrounding them due to 
the rape shield laws, work in damning evidence in imaginative ways, such as through 
clothing.  In the trial of William Kennedy Smith of 1991, Roy Black, Smith’s attorney, 
wanted to introduce into evidence the victim’s bra, which was adorned with lace and 
pearls, stating that if the victim’s claim that she had been tackled, pinned down, and 
 
1 Only one state—Arizona—does not have a rape shield law. 
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raped was true, the bra would have been damaged (Felsenthal 1997), although as Snow 
(1999) points out, this is not necessarily correct.  The judge allowed the bra to be 
admitted into evidence, but the bra also served as a different type of evidence; by 
introducing the victim’s clothing to the jurors, it allowed them to judge her as a 
deserving or an undeserving rape victim, based upon whether a “good girl” would wear 
such clothing, particularly on a date (Snow 1999). 
Discrediting the victim is also simple to accomplish through a distinct line of 
questioning by a defense attorney.  Snow (1999) demonstrates how courtroom dynamics 
make it virtually impossible for a female victim to escape being discredited by the 
defense.   If the defense attorney is elaborating on a common rape myth, her own 
attorney might not object to the questioning because he or she may not recognize it as 
inappropriate.  Even when the attorney does object, the judge may overrule it if the 
judge finds nothing unusual in the line of questioning because the judge does not 
recognize the line of questioning as prejudicial.  Further, even if a judge does not 
overrule it, it has already been spoken aloud in court and will likely prejudice the jury.  
The judge will be unlikely to declare a mistrial over it.   
Even in cases where the judge has overruled statements or evidence, defense 
attorneys have intentionally used tactics that have biased jurors against the victim, 
which may be even more troubling, not only because of the intent but because of the 
impact.   In studies in which clear attempts were made to determine the impact of legal 
characteristics on juror behavior, findings suggest such information to be as important 
as or more important than jurors' preconceived biases about rape in determining the 
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jury's verdict (Borgida and White 1978; LaFree, Reskin, and Visher 1985).  In one case 
of an acquaintance rape, a judge ruled that only part of a diary that the alleged rape 
victim kept was admissible because it contained entries detailing both her physical and 
mental health around the time of the rape.  Yet, because the diary also had entries about 
her sexual experiences, the media had played up the journal as a “sex diary” and the 
defense attorney made reference to it as such during the trial.  The prosecuting attorney 
objected, and the judge chastised the defense attorney and later instructed the jurors to 
strike the comments from their minds.  When later interviewed, however, the jurors 
admitted that it was impossible to do so, and the defense attorney’s comments had 
likely had some impact on their decision—the defendant was acquitted (Warshaw 
1988). 
A complainant’s credibility can also be damaged through non-sexual evidence  
 
as well.  There are no restrictions on attacks on a woman’s drug and alcohol use, past 
 
criminal behavior, motherhood and family background, mental illness, or employment 
history, among other things (Larcombe 2002).   In rape cases, it appears that any 
behavior that may cause a woman to fall outside of a stereotypical female gender role 
may be used to damage her credibility as a witness.  Torrey (2001: 226) claims that 
“while undermining the credibility of the victim is a common tactic of defense lawyers 
in a variety of criminal cases, it is more prevalent in rape trials.  In many rape 
prosecutions, the victim, for all practical purposes, becomes a “pseudodefendant.”      
It is not only the questioning itself, however, that can be detrimental to the 
prosecution in a rape case.  After analyzing cross-examinations of rape victims in 
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several different trials, Matoesian (1993) argued that the process of cross-examination is 
patriarchal and allows a defense attorney to take apart a victim’s testimony and 
reconstruct it to fit male norms.  In a rape scenario, this means that the defense attorney 
can take a woman’s version of events, pick words and phrases that might sound like 
consent in a male narrative, and put the story back together for the jurors, who will 
accept the attorney’s version because he or she is considered the “expert.”  “The 
subjective account of the woman is “corrected,” reinterpreted through the subjectivity of 
a man, and then offered to judge and jury by the defense as “objective” truth—a value-
neutral description of facts” (Snow 1999:  253).   The defense is able to manipulate the 
female victim’s gestures, pauses, tone, demeanor and other attributes to indicate 
confusion, which undermines her credibility.  In the William Kennedy Smith trial, the 
defense attorney was able to take every response the victim gave to a question about her 
interest in both Smith and his house and turn it into a narrative of sexual interest: 
                          [F]emale difference in sexual preference is transformed into a 
sameness:   that   she   wanted   him  or was interested  in him   
sexually  the  same  way  that  men  ‘want’  women.   At  each 
each  moment of linguistic sameness, the  possibility  that  the   
victim  could    have   been   altruistic,    friendly,   or   merely  
interested   in  the  house  or  in   the  defendant as  a person is  
cast  into  doubt.   At   each   stage   of   linguistic   difference,   
the  female  culture  of  sexual   desire   is   transformed    into    
an illogical form of knowledge  
                                                                     (Matoesian 1997: 89). 
 
It is apparent that a cross-examination during any trial would contain the same 
patriarchal structure, and the victim’s narrative would be broken down and 
reconstructed to fit the attorney’s version of events, fitting male norms that dominate 
the legal system:  “Our current adversarialism [in criminal trials]… is modeled after 
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male ‘ways of speaking’ in everyday life.  Just as those ways of speaking mute the 
female voice in business, education, and politics, so do they mute that voice at trials” 
(Taslitz 1999: 154).  This reconstruction, however, is particularly crucial for the 
outcomes of rape trials in which women are the victims due to the fact that the unequal 
gender dynamics that led to the rape have followed the woman into the courtroom and 
will likely increase her chances of an unequal outcome at the trial as well.   
Further, although defense attorneys will always cross-examine plaintiffs 
zealously, some research demonstrates that rape victims endure harsher questioning 
than victims of other crimes (Snow 1999).   Brereton (1997) found evidence that rape 
complainants spent more time on the witness stand and were subject to more sensitive 
lines of questioning.   Thus, some “legal loopholes” that may exist in any trial continue 
to devastate female victims in rape trials, and others exist only in rape trials.   In 
summary, rape law reforms, although well-intentioned, have not been successful.  This 
is largely because the social definition of rape cannot be kept out of the courtroom, 
regardless of the steps that have been taken to remedy this issue.  The social definition 
of rape is particularly narrow and, ultimately, damaging to female victims of the crime. 
The Social Definition of Rape 
          Embodied within the social definition of rape is the question of whether it is a 
normal or abnormal practice.   Rape is one of the most abhorred crimes in United States 
culture, yet it is one of the most commonly committed violent crime.  It also remains 
narrowly defined socially around the idea of a stranger violating a woman whom he 
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does not know, which does not appear to be the norm statistically (Abbey et al. 1996; 
Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2004; Koss et al. 1987, 1988; Laumann et al. 1994).  
Ideas that lock us culturally into a script about how a “typical” rape proceeds 
become what are known as “rape myths” (Burt 1980) and serve to reinforce a restrictive 
and mostly incorrect cultural definition of rape. An early definition of rape myths 
described them as “prejudiced, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and 
rapists” (Burt 1980: 217).  Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1995, 1994), however, point out 
that these types of definitions mask the most important element of a myth—its function.  
Some of these functions operate at the individual level.  Ledray (1986: 13) claims that 
rape myths “[allow] people to feel safe by believing that rape does not really happen or 
at least not often, or that if it does, it is because the women secretly wanted to be raped.  
The myths enable us to maintain our belief that we live in a just world.  They allow us 
to believe we can prevent future rapes.”   
Other functions of rape myths, however, operate not at the individual level, but 
at the societal level to reinforce social and cultural patterns that currently exist 
(Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1995, 1994) and to reassure a society’s participants that social 
change is unnecessary (Peterson and Muehlenhard 2004).  Lonsway and Fitzgerald 
(1994) further claim that the veracity of rape myths is not relevant to their societal 
functions because some of the myths may actually contain trace elements of truth that 
are embellished to justify a society’s actions.  The “truth,” therefore, is not important; it 
is only important that people believe in the myth, regardless of the reality.  Lonsway 
and Fitzgerald (1994) define rape myths as “attitudes and beliefs that are generally false 
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but widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual 
aggression against women” (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994: 134).  Thus, it is important 
to recognize that the individual and the societal functions of rape myths are linked.  
Without widespread individual belief in the myths, the societal patterns could not be 
maintained.  At the same time, because they are maintained, they reinforce individual 
personal beliefs that the world is a just place where if women are raped, they themselves 
must have personally made an error in judgment or done something inappropriate. 
Rape myths have several dimensions, including “rape as a deviant act,” “male 
intention,” “motivation for rape,” “victim precipitation,” “victim’s responsibility for 
prevention of rape,” “victim miscommunication,” “victim credibility,” and “rape as a 
trivial act” (Briere, Malamuth, and Check 1985; Feild 1978; Payne 1993).  These myths 
translate, roughly, into cultural stereotypes about male and female behavior:  she was 
asking for it by doing something she did; she was raped because some aspect of her 
behavior or demeanor did not fit the cultural prescription for a female gender role; he 
cannot control his sex drive because he is a man; she gave him mixed signals; he did not 
mean to do it; no harm was done, or it was not rape because “real rape” rarely occurs 
and/or she is lying.  These myths have varying degrees of support behind them.   
Rape as a Deviant Act 
The “rape as a deviant act” myth claims that rape is a rare event.  As previously 
established, although rape is rarely reported, it appears to be a fairly common crime 
(Fisher, Cullen, and Turner 2000; Koss, Gidcyz and Wisniewski 1987).  Because most 
women who are raped are victimized by someone known to them (Abbey et al. 1996; 
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Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2004; Laumann et al. 1994; Koss et al. 1987, 1988), stranger 
rape, the pillar upon which “real rape” (Estrich 1987) rests, appears to be uncommon, 
while rape by someone known to the victim appears to be the normative form of rape.   
Many studies document the importance of victim-perpetrator relationship in a 
determination of its seriousness.  In studies using a vignette where the relationship 
between the fictional parties was manipulated from strangers to dating partners, the 
respondents were less likely to rate incidents in the vignette as rapes, to rate them as 
psychologically damaging, and to rate them as violation of the victims’ rights (Bridges 
1991; Gerdes et al. 1988; Goodchilds et al. 1988; Monson, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 
and Binderup 2000).  Additionally, the longer the couple had been dating, the less likely 
it was to be labeled rape.  One study, however, found no differences between a “first 
date” scenario and a vignette in which a couple had been dating for three months 
(McLendon 1994).  A major difference between this and the other studies is that it 
provided two versions of the same incident—the “male” version and the “female” 
version.  This methodological difference may have led to the difference in results 
between dating lengths.   
Although all 50 states have currently outlawed marital rape, approximately 20 
states have exemptions qualifying it as a less serious offense, provide for less severe 
penalties, or designate it as rape only under certain conditions, such as if the spouses are 
separated (Sitton 1993).   Therefore, it is not surprising that individuals also view 
marital rape as being the least serious form of rape of all:  it was less likely to be 
counted as a rape, to be thought of as a violation of the victim’s rights, and to be 
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considered psychologically damaging to the victim than stranger rape or date rape no 
matter how long the couple had been dating (Monson et al. 1996; Monson, 
Langhinrichsen-Rohling, and Binderup 2000).       
             Yet, studies that examine the relationship between the victim and the 
perpetrator find gender differences, with women being more likely to call the incident a 
rape no matter what the relationship (Bridges 1991; Dull and Giacopassi 1987; 
McLendon et al. 1994; Monson et al. 1996; Monson, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, and 
Binderup 2000), more likely to think the perpetrator should be held legally accountable 
(McLendon et al. 1994), and to attribute the rape to bad luck (Calhoun, Selby and 
Warring 1976).   Overall, however, both males and females are less likely to view rape 
between nonstrangers as “real rape” than that between strangers, buying into the myth 
that rape is, indeed, an uncommon, statistically deviant phenomenon. 
Male Intention and Motivation for Rape 
            Two myths fall under this category, both about males and male sexuality:  (1) 
males who rape are pathological; (2) males rape because they are so overcome with 
sexual passion that they are unable to control their behavior.  Both of these myths are 
individual-level explanations for why rape occurs, but they are very different.  To say 
that males rape because they are pathological implies that there is something distinct 
about rapists that distinguishes them from non-rapists.   
Research demonstrates, however, that substantial numbers of college men 
indicate that they have committed rape (Koss et al. 1985) or that they would if they 
thought they could “get away with it” (Malamuth 1981).   The psychological model 
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posits that rapists have psychological or personality disorders (Groth 1979), which may 
be true in the case of most stranger rapes.  Yet, because of the commonality of rape, of 
which most occurs between acquaintances, as previously established, it is unlikely that 
pathology is the complete explanation for it and that one-quarter to one-third of all 
males are psychologically ill.  Nonetheless, pathology continues to be seen as one of the 
strongest causes of rape (Cowan 2000; Cowan and Campbell 1995).   
In one survey, 63% agreed with the statement “rapists are seriously mentally ill” 
(Gilmartin-Zena 1987).  Male respondents, however, do not perceive any differences 
between type of rape (stranger, date, acquaintance, or partner) and male pathology, 
whereas women perceive the partner rapist as less pathological than the other three 
types of rapists and as less pathological than male respondents do (Cowan 2000).  The 
myth that a rapist is mentally ill is “particularly dangerous because potential victims 
may feel that they can identify a rapist or that they are safe with someone they know” 
(Cowan 2000: 809).   
The second myth under this heading differs from the first in that it makes an 
assumption about all males rather than distinguishing between male rapists and male 
non-rapists.  This second myth assumes that any man could easily commit rape due to 
his inherent sexual nature, yet it does not explain why some men are better able to 
control their sex drives than others.   Although this rape myth seems to place the blame 
for the rape squarely on the male perpetrator, it actually reduces the blame on the male 
as he cannot be at fault for something he cannot control.  Ultimately, it becomes the 
woman’s responsibility not to provoke the male into raping her (Burt 1991; Cowan 
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2000).  Most individuals reject this myth (Gilmartin-Zena 1987), but the differences 
between those who accept it vary by age, gender and ethnicity.  High school males are 
more likely to rate this as a probable explanation for rape than high school females 
(Cowan and Campbell 1995); the reverse is true for college males and females but only 
for whites (Cowan 2000).  Among Hispanics, males are more likely than females to 
accept this as a likely explanation for rape no matter what the age group (Cowan 2000; 
Cowan and Campbell 1995).      
Both of these myths are about male perpetrators and differ in their application, 
but serve the same purpose:  to excuse the perpetrator’s actions or reduce his culpability 
for them.  In doing so, the responsibility for preventing rape is shouldered more heavily 
by the potential rape victim, who must be careful not to incite a “mentally unstable” or 
“easily excitable” young man. 
Victim Precipitation 
Many of what Gilmartin-Zena (1987) calls the “obvious” myths are rejected by 
college students, particularly in the area of victim characteristics.  For instance, a 
majority of the students in her study rejected the idea that women are responsible for or 
deserving of being raped because of their own moral characters, demeanors, or physical 
attractiveness.  Yet, this may be because it is less acceptable to make such explicit 
statements today.   Early experimental studies that attempt to measure bias against the 
victim using vignettes report mixed results.   Luginbuhl and Mullin (1981) varied the 
rape victim’s social status and found that respondents were more likely to attribute the 
attack to chance when the victim was a nun or a married social worker and more likely 
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to attribute it to “the type of person she is” when the victim was a divorced topless 
dancer.  Feldman-Summers and Lindner (1976) found that individuals blamed the 
victim in a vignette more when she was divorced as opposed to married or single.  Jones 
and Aronson (1973), in contrast, found that divorced victims were blamed the least out 
of the three, and Paulsen (1979) found no differences by marital status.   
Another victim characteristic that has been measured is physical attractiveness.  
Seligman, Brickman and Koulack (1977) and Tieger (1981) found that when victims are 
described as “unattractive,” they are ascribed more blame, particularly by male 
respondents.  Deitz, Littman, and Bentley (1984) further found that male respondents 
rated unattractive female victims as less psychologically harmed.  In contrast, however, 
Gerdes, Dammann and Helig (1988) and Jacobson and Popovich (1983) found that 
varying victim attractiveness did not alter victim blame.  
 Clothing is another topic that has been studied using vignettes.  Typically, in 
these studies, subjects are given a vignette with an accompanying photograph of either a 
“conservatively” dressed woman or a woman in revealing clothing or clothing that fits 
close to the body and told that the photo is a picture of the victim.  Those who are given 
the picture of the “provocatively” dressed woman are less likely to perceive the incident 
as a rape (Cassidy and Hurrell 1995), more likely to indicate that the perpetrator’s 
actions were justified and to indicate that she is responsible for the rapist’s behavior 
(Cassidy and Hurell 1995; Kanekar and Kolsawalla 1981; Lewis and Johnson 1989; 
Muehlenhard and MacNaughton 1988).  These findings correspond with the myth that 
men cannot control their sexual urges.  One study did find, however, that using a 
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photograph of the woman did not affect attributions of blame for the rape no matter how 
she was dressed (Johnson 1995).  The photo also included a picture of the so-called 
perpetrator as well, unlike the other studies, and contained other factors in the scenario 
that may have outweighed the effect of clothing:  whether it was a planned or an 
unplanned date, for example.   
Another factor that affects judgments about rape is when a dating couple has 
previously engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.  In this situation, research subjects  
are less likely to view incidents in experimental studies as rape (L’Armand and 
Pepitone 1982; Monson, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, and Binderup 2000; Shotland and 
Goodstein 1992).  In studies using an audiotaped date rape vignette, those who were 
told there had been previous sexual contact between the victim and perpetrator took 
longer to decide when the man should stop his advances on the woman in the scenario 
(Marx and Gross 1995; Van Wie, Gross and Marx 1995).  
Even when a woman has no previous sexual history with the perpetrator in the 
vignette, any sexual history at all with anyone will encourage respondents to blame the 
victim.  Most studies indicate that as information about a woman’s sexual history 
changes from “no history” to “many casual sexual encounters,” respondents are more 
likely to hold the victim responsible (Borgida and White 1978; L’Armand and Pepitone 
1982).  Cann, Calhoun and Selby (1979) found that there was no difference between 
these two categories of sexual history, but they found that including a statement about 
the victim being unwilling to discuss her sexual history made respondents more likely 
to attribute blame to her.   Luginbuhl and Mullin (1981) point out, however, that so 
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much of a woman’s character is determined by her sexuality, that even studies that 
hinge on a woman’s social status or attractiveness are a proxy for her sexuality, 
although this correlation has not been adequately studied by researchers. 
As with the other rape myths discussed, there are clear gender differences, with 
males being more likely to rate female precipitation, including characteristics, the 
highest of any of the causes of rape (Cowan 2000; Cowan and Campbell 1995).  Victim 
precipitation is related to another myth—victim responsibility for the prevention of 
rape; women who precipitate their own victimization are not perceived as cautious 
enough, whereas cautious women would never do things that might invite victimization.  
The two are intricately linked.   
Victim’s Responsibility for Prevention of Rape 
What separates “victim responsibility for the prevention of rape” from “victim 
precipitation” is that the former involves behavior while the latter involves status or 
demeanor (occasionally based upon behavior), such as clothing or attractiveness.  There 
are two important myths involved with victim prevention:  (1) victim alcohol 
consumption; and (2) victim resistance.  One of the most insidious ideas involved in the 
set of myths about victim blame is that a woman who drinks either deserves to be raped 
or is responsible for the incident.  Several studies have documented the presence of 
alcohol during an incident of sexual assault.  Muehlenhard and Linton (1987) asked 
college students to describe their worst experience of unwanted sexual activity, ranging 
from kissing to sexual intercourse, and compared that with the sexual activities that 
occurred during their most recent date, also reporting the consumption of alcohol.  They 
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found that alcohol consumption was more likely to be correlated with unwanted sexual 
activities and speculated that it “reduces men’s inhibitions against violence, provides an 
excuse for sexual aggression, and reduces women’s ability to resist” (p. 194).  Yet 
because they allowed respondents to report on any unwanted sexual activity, it is not 
clear that there is heavier alcohol use among those who experienced forced sexual 
intercourse as opposed to other activities such as kissing (Richardson and Hammock 
1991).  Slightly over half of females (55%) in one study claimed they had been involved 
in an incident of sexual assault after drinking (Frintner and Rubinson 1993).  George, 
Gournic and McAfee (1988) found that an intoxicated female is viewed as more 
sexually disinhibited than a sober one, so the fact that a woman drinks may be viewed 
as an invitation for sexual activity. 
In studies involving vignettes where either the victim or the perpetrator or both 
have been drinking, respondents are likely to perceive the rapist as less blameworthy 
when drunk than sober and just the opposite for the victim (Critchlow 1985, 1983; 
Hammock and Richardson 1997; Norris and Cubbins 1992; Richardson and Campbell 
1982; Stormo, Lang and Stritzke 1997).  Therefore, “alcohol served as an excuse only 
for the rapist; the victim was seen to be more responsible when she was drunk” 
(Richardson and Hammock 1991:  89).  Norris and Cubbins (1992) also found that the 
incident was less likely to be labeled a rape at all when the perpetrator was drunk, 
especially if the victim had been drinking as well, although Stormo, Lang, and Stritzke 
(1997) found that almost everyone labeled the incident a rape.  They also found that the 
amount of alcohol consumed in the vignettes mattered as well.  Evaluations of the 
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victim and perpetrator were similar when they were portrayed as drinking, but 
nonintoxicated.  Once they are described as being moderately or highly intoxicated, 
however, the evaluations diverge and the victim is assigned more blame and the 
perpetrator less—as long as they are equally intoxicated.  If the perpetrator is described 
as being less intoxicated than the victim, he is ascribed more blame.   
Another common myth that falls under this theme is that women who do not 
physically resist as much as possible are to blame for being raped.  Several studies 
investigating this idea have varied how much the woman has resisted in the vignette.  
Wyer, Bodenhausen and Gorman (1985) found that respondents blamed the victim for 
the incident, described her as being less harmed by it, and described her as being less 
credible about her desires and motivations the less she resisted.  When the incident was 
described as a stranger rape, only males held these same judgments.  Shotland and 
Goodstein (1983) found that both males and females were less likely to define an 
incident between acquaintances as rape when the female did not resist, even if the 
perpetrator used physical force.  Yet in two early studies, males attributed less fault to 
the victim who had resisted while females attributed more (Krulewitz and Nash 1979) 
and males recommended a longer sentence for the perpetrator when the victim resisted, 
while females recommended a shorter sentence (Scroggs 1976).  It appears that males 
blame the victim less when she resists, while it is unclear what female judgments 
indicate, although their position appears similar to males when it comes to acquaintance 
rape (Pollard 1992).   The underlying premise appears to be “the idea that any healthy 
woman can resist a rapist if she really wants to, particularly if the rapist is someone she 
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knows  The corollary is that if she got raped, she must not have resisted enough, and 
therefore she wanted it or consented to it” (Burt 1991).     
Victim Miscommunication 
Studies ranging over a period of almost forty years indicate that young males are 
significantly more likely to claim that rape is justifiable if a female leads a male on than 
older males or females (Anderson, Simpson-Taylor, and Herrmann 2004; Burt 1991; 
Cowan 2000; Goodchilds et al. 1988; Kanin 1967).  This is dangerous for females, 
because men who have been convicted of raping women they did not know claim that 
the women were behaving provocatively and wanted to have sexual intercourse (Scully 
and Marolla 1984).  Abbey (1982, 1987) has demonstrated that a woman’s friendly 
behavior is often perceived as sexual interest by men.  This perception has been 
correlated with sexual coercion (Abbey 1991; Muehlenhard and Hollabaugh 1988).   
Muehlenhard and MacNaughton (1988) found that when the victim’s behavior 
was described as “suggestive” (i.e. putting her hand on his knee, pulling him closer and 
kissing him), she was seen as more responsible, as wanting sex, and as leading the 
perpetrator on.  Even if a woman changes her mind, a man might be perceived as 
justified in raping her.  Shotland and Goodstein (1983) found that the later during 
foreplay a woman waited to protest in a series of vignettes given to respondents, the less 
the perpetrator’s actions mattered, even when he was described as forcing her to have 
sex, and the less it mattered whether she resisted or not in determining whether or not 
she wanted sex.  They were more likely to hold her accountable for what happened the 
longer she waited to protest.    
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This rape myth can be seen in news articles about the Mike Tyson and Kobe 
Bryant rape cases, where the implication is that the young women involved gave the 
two men a “wrong signal” with their actions:   
…[I]f the young woman [Kobe] Bryant is accused of  assaulting  did   
decide  to cry rape just for the heck of it, the more pertinent question   
is why did she  go  to  his  room  in the first place? 
                   (Johnson 2004). 
 
Tyson  was  wrong   if   he   raped   his   accuser.    But   the   beauty    
pageant contestant was wrong for going  to  his  hotel room at 2 a.m. 
                         (Banks 1992). 
 
Related to victim prevention is victim miscommunication.  The two rape myths 
work in conjunction:  prevention is perceived as communication, whereas someone who 
is perceived as being imprudent is communicating a message that she desires sexual 
intercourse or “deserves” what happens to her.   “There is no parallel for this in other 
crimes.  If someone walking in a bad neighborhood is robbed, or if someone does not 
lock an apartment door and is burglarized, no one denies that the crime happened, even 
when it is clear that the victim used poor judgment” (Burt 1991).   
 In a vignette, when the woman asked the man out or when she went back to his 
apartment with him, date rape was rated as more justifiable by men than in scenarios 
where these things did not occur (Muehlenhard, Friedman and Thomas 1985).  When 
the man and woman go on an unplanned date (i.e., a woman is “picked up” from 
somewhere), a rape is more likely to be viewed as a rape than when they go on a 
planned date, and the perpetrator is viewed as more responsible and more violent 
(Jenkins and Dambrot 1987; Johnson 1995).  However, Jenkins and Dambrot (1987) 
found this result only for female respondents when the planned date involved monetary 
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investment.  Yet, males viewed “forced sex” as more justifiable when a man pays all the 
expenses on a date (Muehlenhard, Friedman and Thomas 1985).  One study found that 
the amount of money spent had no effect on the attributions of blame (Johnson 1995), 
and Korman and Leslie (1982) found that women who share dating expenses with the 
man were more likely to have endured a sexual attack.   In summary, a variety of 
behaviors serve to introduce the idea that the victim is “sending a signal” that she 
desires sexual intercourse.   
Victim Credibility 
Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, a British judge in the 
18th century, is generally credited with providing the first legal expression on rape, 
which influenced common law toward the crime:  “Rape is an accusation easy to be 
made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused though ever so 
innocent” (quoted in Soshnick 1987:  646).  For over two centuries, judges in rape trials 
read his words to the jurors in order to caution them of a potential lying woman who 
may have wanted to seek vengeance against a man who left her or who wanted to cover 
up the “crime” of an illegitimate pregnancy (Burt 1991).  According to police records 
from a 1970s study, however, false reports of rape do occur, but they are no more 
common for rape than for any other crime (Lear 1972).  Though false reports do occur, 
it is improbable that these comprise the norm of all police reports.  A comparison of 
official statistics and social research demonstrates that it is much more likely that there 
is underreporting to the police than overreporting. 
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 Nonetheless the myth remains deeply entrenched.  In surveys that ask 
individuals about the likelihood of women lying about rape, almost equal percentages 
agree that they are likely to lie as disagree (Burt 1980; Gilmartin-Zena 1987; Lonsway 
and Fitzgerald 1995). 
Rape as a Trivial Act 
 There appears to be very little agreement with the idea that “rape” is not serious.  
The degree of seriousness, however, varies by the type of rape that occurs (Burt 1980; 
Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald 1999).  For example, many people assume that rape 
between acquaintances, particularly spouses, is not rape or has not harmed the woman.  
However, research does not support this assumption.  Date rapes do not appear to 
produce less harmful effects than stranger rapes (Koss and Burkhart 1989; Koss et al. 
1988).   
In line with other rape myths, these beliefs may also rest on the status of the 
woman or her behavior.  For example, one popular myth is that a prostitute cannot be 
raped (Burt 1980).  However, explicity asking if “a prostitute can be raped” reveals that 
89% agree (Gilmartin-Zena 1987).  Silber (1988), however, documents the difficulties 
with attempting to overcome bias in getting justice for street prostitutes who have been 
raped.  It appears that many individuals may either consciously filter through their 
biases on surveys about rape to give what they believe to be the socially appropriate 
responses, or, perhaps, surveys about hypothetical situations do not transfer to real-life 
situations very accurately. 
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 Almost all studies that have examined rape myths and/or the identification of 
whether a rape occurred have found males more likely to blame victims than females, 
especially among younger males and females  (e.g. Blumberg and Lester 1991; Dull and 
Giacopassi 1987; Feild 1978; Geiger 2004; Gilmartin-Zena 1987, 1988; Jenkins and 
Dambrot 1987; McLendon 1994; Muehlenhard and Linton 1987).  In contrast, a few 
studies found no sex differences (e.g. Blumberg and Lester 1991; Cassidy and Hurell 
1995; Krahe 1988).  In a few areas, there appear to be inconsistencies—notably, in the 
area of female resistance where women rated the victim as deserving of more blame if 
she resisted in some studies and less blame in others (Krulewitz and Nash 1979; 
Scroggs 1976; Shotland and Goodstein 1983; Wyer, Bodenhausen, and Gorman 1985).     
There are also noticeable age differences, with younger individuals, particularly 
younger males, endorsing more rape myths (Anderson, Simpson-Taylor, and Herrmann 
2004; Blumberg and Lester 1991; Geiger, Fischer, and Eshet 2004; Hutchinson et al. 
1994; White and Humphrey 1991).  In addition, African-Americans (Dull and 
Giacopassi 1987; Feild 1978; Giacopassi and Dull 1986; Williams and Holmes 1981) 
and Hispanics (Cowan 2000; Cowan and Campbell 1995; Feild 1978; Fischer 1987; 
Williams and Holmes 1981) appear to be more accepting of rape myths than whites.  
Yet the relationships between race, age, and rape myth acceptance are presumed to be 
related to third variables, such as education, religiosity, cohort effects, and social 
pressure (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1995).    
These myths contain distinct components, yet statistical analyses through 
structural equation models have revealed that rape myth acceptance was best 
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characterized not as a unidimensional model or as a multidimensional model, but as a 
hierarchical model in which each component revealed in the cluster analysis helps 
contribute to the overarching construct of “rape myth acceptance” (Payne, Lonsway, 
and Fitzgerald 1999).  The result is that women are often trapped in “double binds” in 
which any status or behavior they exhibit disqualifies a rape from being classified as 
such.  For example, by juxtaposing two rape myths—the idea that only women who 
dress “inappropriately” are raped and that women who dress “inappropriately” deserve 
to be raped—one can find an inherent contradiction:     
The first item suggests a rape script that does not include modestly dressed women; 
thus, if a woman is not skimpily dressed, the rape script might seem not to apply.  The 
second item, however, says that if she was dressed ‘suggestively,’ the rape was her 
fault.  Thus, if she was not dressed suggestively, it was not rape; if she was dressed 
suggestively, it was her fault. 
       (Peterson and Muehlenhard 2004:  143-144).   
 
Thus, if a proposed incident does not fit the cultural rape script (and many times, 
even when it does), it is either not considered rape or it is the victim’s fault.  Any 
appropriate rape myth can be applied to manage the details (for at least one rape myth 
can apply to every rape scenario) to ensure one or both of these two conclusions is 
ultimately reached by the majority of individuals in order to reassure individuals that 
they are safe and that there is no need to change their behavior (Ledray 1986; Lonsway 
and Fitzgerald 1994; Peterson and Muehlenhard 2004), that it is the victim who must 
change her behavior.  Yet, because any behavior can be construed as inviting rape 
(Scully and Marolla 1984), there is no safe change a woman can make to be free of the 
risk of rape.  Ultimately, then, the goal of rape myths appears not to be change at all, but 
maintenance of the social order.     
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The Scientific Definition of Rape 
 Scientific research about rape is not free of the social and political concerns that 
have also plagued the legal system.  Indeed, the paradigms of all scientific ventures 
depend upon the biases of those who work behind the protective cloak of “science” 
(Sprague and Kobrynowicz 1999).   It is, therefore, important to examine the uses of the 
term “rape” in scientific literature, as scientists, who are viewed as “experts,” may 
benefit or harm rape victims with their definitions by promoting particular images of 
what rape is (Muehlenhard et al. 1992).   
One recent approach taken by scholars is to let female subjects use their own 
definitions of rape (Kelly 1988).  This is problematic, however, because the respondents 
may not conceptualize an experience as rape and therefore not define it as such in the 
study, or some women may be counting particular experiences as rape that others are 
not.  Most researchers do provide a definition of rape, and, as previously mentioned, a 
difference in definitions is a major reason for the discrepancies in results.  One of the 
earliest definitions was put forward by LeVine (1959: 965), who claimed that rape was 
the “culturally disvalued use of coercion by a male to achieve the submission of a 
female to sexual intercourse.”  One problem with the definition is that it is not gender 
neutral.  It also restricts the definition of rape to sexual intercourse.  However, the main 
problem with it is that it lacks the subjective interpretation of the victim to determine 
his or her violation.  In other words, if his or her culture does not determine what 
occurred to be a rape, then a rape did not occur.    
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Cultural definitions of rape versus self-definitions of rape are important, for they 
can determine the validity of research on rape.  Rozee (1993) points out that cross-
cultural research often ignores the experiences of the female involved and examines 
only cultural practices to determine if rape has occurred.  Her own research provides a 
model for conceptualizing rape that injects the concept of female sexuality into a 
typology of rape so that there are actually two types:  unchosen normative genital 
contact and unchosen non-normative genital contact.  This implies that there are some 
types of rape that are against the will of the woman but do not violate social norms for 
acceptable behavior (Rozee 1993).   These include marital rape, status rape (the rape of 
females by more powerful males, as in the case of slaves), and exchange rape, where 
women are used as bargaining tools or gambling bets.  The unwillingness of the women 
to engage in these behaviors is noted in the ethnographic studies, yet the practices are 
condoned in the societies where they occur.   
Muehlenhard et al. (1992) conducted a study on how various research studies 
that examined rape had operationalized the term “rape” and found that a majority of the 
research they examined used traditional definitions of rape that focused exclusively on 
“penile-vaginal intercourse” based upon the idea that “real sex” involves penile-vaginal 
intercourse:  “[E]verything else is devalued as foreplay.  This script reflects a 
phallocentric bias.  The penis is the organ most relevant to male sexuality” 
(Muehlenhard et al. 1992:  29).     
 Feminist researchers typically use definitions that are more inclusive, such as 
that provided by Burt (1991: 26):  “penetration, however slight, of any bodily orifice, 
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obtained against the victim’s will by using force, or threat of force, of any part of the 
assailant’s body or any object used by the assailant in the course of the assault.”  By 
expanding the definition of rape to include a wider range of sexual behaviors and 
explicitly claiming that rape is an act that occurs against someone’s will or when 
someone chooses not to, these definitions improve remarkably on Levine’s 1950s 
definition.   
Still, there are several problems with these definitions as well.  Muehlenhard et 
al. (1992) claim that attempts to operationalize the victim’s state of mind, (e.g. “against 
the victim’s will”) are meaningless because they measure something which only the 
victim and not the perpetrator can know.  Another major problem is that these 
definitions leave out all of the ways that a perpetrator can use other means to rape a 
victim by law in many states, such as when she is drinking or otherwise incapacitated.  
Finally, the word “force” involves major issues as well.  It may put more of a burden of 
proof on the victim to prove that force was involved (i.e. by providing evidence of 
bruises, scratches, and having to show evidence that she tried to resist).  It also does not 
appear to reflect the reality of most rapes:  according to both men and women, the most 
common method of coercing unwilling women to have sex is ignoring their refusals 
without the use of physical force (Muehlenhard and Linton 1987; Rapaport and 
Burkhart 1984).   
 Scientific definitions are important because of the authority that science has to 
convey knowledge and define reality (Muehlenhard et al. 1992).  It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that a universal definition does not exist.      
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Defining Rape 
Though it is impossible to create a definition of rape that will satisfy all 
researchers, in defining rape it is important to look the reality of the crime, including its 
multiple dimensions, as well as at other attempts to define it.      
 For the purposes of this research, rape will be defined as follows: 
1.  The act of oral, vaginal or anal penetration with any body part or object 
without verbal or non-verbal consent and/or after one party has protested.   
a. Verbal consent may include saying things such as, “Do you have a 
condom?” or directly answering yes when asked if certain activities may 
take place.   
b. Non-verbal consent may include things such as handing over a 
condom or placing one’s hand on the partner’s genitals or the partner’s 
hand on one’s genitals.  
c. Protest may be either verbal (e.g. saying “Stop”) or non-verbal (e.g. 
pushing or attempting to push the partner away). 
My definition keeps with the feminist tradition of broadly defining the range of 
activities that fall under the term rape.  I have also attempted to improve upon previous 
definitions offered both by feminists and others.  First, my definition does not focus on 
physical force, the relationship between the parties, or any characteristics of either 
party.  Second, it also allows for either verbal or nonverbal consent to be given.  Studies 
indicate that nonverbal consent or a combination of verbal and nonverbal signals are 
more common than verbal consent signals alone (Hall 1995).  Further, women are more 
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likely to use indirect verbal signals to show consent and men are more likely to use 
nonverbal signals to show consent, but the gender differences are small (Burrow 1997; 
Hickman and Muehlenhard 1999).   
Therefore, this definition does not allow for the idea that “not saying no” is 
consent, even if consent does not have to be explicitly verbal.   Lorber (1994:  75-6) 
describes sexual activity ideally as a continuum of consent:  “Points along the 
continuum would include mutually expressed desire; seduction or invitation and clearly 
expressed consent; psychological coercion and reluctant agreement; and physical 
coercion eliciting either active resistance or passive giving in.” 
What Lorber does not consider is the difficulty that many young women have 
with saying no to or protesting activity once they perceive it is leading to sex (Kitzinger 
and Frith 1999).  This difficulty may be attributed to low self-esteem or lack of 
assertiveness (McConnon 1990; Stere 1985), but it is also part of the traditional female 
script to acquiesce to male needs and desires and to remain passive, particularly when it 
comes to sexuality (Murnen, Perot and Byrne 1989).  One study found that women were 
concerned that they would get a reputation of being “frigid” or “lesbians” if they did not 
comply with male sexual demands (Muehlenhard and Cook 1988).  They may also have 
internalized a cultural script that causes them to worry that they have already gone too 
far and no longer have the right to say no (Goodchilds et al. 1988). 
Kitzinger and Frith (1999: 310) claim, however, that not saying no to sex is not 
abnormal; conversation analysis of patterns in the United States dictate that individuals 
rarely give a direct “no” to anything:   
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If there is an organized and normative way of doing indirect refusal, which 
provides for culturally understood ways in which (for example) ‘maybe later’ 
means ‘no,’ then men who claim not to have understood an indirect refusal (as 
in, ‘she didn’t actually say no’) are claiming to be cultural dopes, and playing 
rather disingenuously on how refusals are usually done and understood to be 
done.  They are claiming not to understand perfectly normal conversational 
interaction, and to be ignorant of ways of expressing refusal which they 
themselves routinely use in other areas of their lives.   
 
Therefore, in the definition that I use, consent is not naturally assumed.   
Miscommunication about the fact that a partner does want sexual activity may play a 
role in some types of rape, but it is unlikely to be a major contributing factor (Hickman 
and Muehlenhard 1999).  Therefore, a third component of my definition involves 
resistance and protest in recognition of the idea that a direct “yes” or a direct “no” may 
not be forthcoming.  There do not appear to be gender differences in the use or 
perception of signals relating to nonconsent (Burrow 1997; Hickman and Muehlenhard 
1999).  In one study, both male and female respondents ranked “fondling male’s 
genitals” as the number one method of communicating consent, and “clear verbal 
consent” as the second ranked method (Byers 1980).  In one study by Malamuth and 
Brown (1994), three hypotheses were tested on sexually aggressive men regarding the 
perceptions of women’s communication:  (1) that the men are not competent to decode 
women’s negative emotions; (2) that the men fail to make distinctions between 
friendliness and seductiveness; and (3) that the men are using a “suspiciousness” 
schema and don’t take the women’s rejection seriously.  They found support for the 
latter hypothesis and claim that most of the time, perpetrators understand the victim’s 
lack of consent, they merely doubt its veracity. 
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Ultimately, this definition is an “ideal” definition; it would work best under 
ideal conditions, including those in which men and women could approach a sexual 
encounter with equal societal resources or capital.  In many cases this may not happen, 
however.  Females and males may not feel equally empowered either to act on their 
desires or to say no to a partner.  For instance, the sexual scripts that a society maintains 
for males and females may favor one sex over another in the encounter—in this 
research about rape, this would translate into potentially putting a female in danger or 
giving her fewer options if she is attacked or even after she is raped.   One school of 
thought claims that because women still fare worse on average than men economically 
but are primarily responsible for the care of children, the most desirable or sometimes 
the only option for survival for women is to attach themselves to men.  Therefore, under 
these structural conditions, all heterosexual sex can be indirectly construed as coercive, 
or at least not freely chosen (Dworkin 1989, 1997).   This scenario does not meet my 
definition of rape.  I do believe, however, that there are structural level components to 
rape that must be taken into consideration in any serious examination of its existence.  
This will be taken up in the following chapter.   
One final note is that Ellis (1989) recommends using terms such as sexual 
assault and sexual coercion instead of rape in order to avoid confusion with the legal 
term “rape.”  I will be using the three terms interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Primary Feminist Theories about Rape 
 
Richard Gelles (1993: 41) claims that the feminist theory is “becoming the 
dominant model for explaining violence toward women,” and Hans Eysenck claims that 
the feminist theory of rape should be referred to as the sociological theory of rape 
(quoted in Ellis 1989).  While acknowledging the overlap between feminist and 
sociological perspectives on rape, Ellis’s own fear appeared to be that referring to a 
theory as “feminist” makes it suspect, as it may become associated with the political 
goals of feminism which calls its objectivity into question (Ellis 1989).     
Feminist researchers, however, have challenged the idea that scientific 
objectivity can truly exist, and that what masquerades as neutrality is actually the 
background assumptions of privileged white males.  According to this line of reasoning, 
positivist science without reflection can actually harm research by skewing the results 
because it allows the researcher to hide his or her own bias behind the guise of 
“scientific objectivity,” (Reinharz 1992; Sprague and Kobrynowicz 1999).  Feminist 
researchers advocate an acknowledgement of bias for this reason.  Therefore, ironically, 
what is missing from the bold statement that feminist theories of rape have become the 
sociological theory of rape is a discussion about how feminist theories vary (e.g. there is 
an assumption that feminist theory on rape is uniform) and what feminist theories might 
omit on the subject.   
Because all of the hypotheses to come out of feminism have not been entirely 
consistent, understanding the limitations of feminist theory is important.  Feminist 
theories on rape have been criticized not only for general bias (Gilbert 1991; Smith and 
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Bennett 1985), but for focusing too much on the gendered power structure at the 
expense of other factors (Larragoite 1994).  They have generally been able to offer 
reasonable and empirically sound explanations for macro-level causes of rape (e.g. 
Check and Malamuth 1985; Chicoro et al. 2004; Malamuth 1996), yet feminist theories 
have, overall, had less success in explaining why some males rape and others do not.   
Major criminological theories have not fared much better at explaining rape, and 
have, in fact, long ignored suggestions and findings from feminist literature (see Daly 
and Chesney-Lind 1988; Flavin 2001; Naffine 1996; Simpson 1989; Smart 1976).  
More specifically, anomie/strain theorists, social learning theorists, and self-control 
theorists have largely disregarded the feminist literature despite important findings 
indicating the importance of gender in crime.  When they consider it at all, mainstream 
criminology theories treat rape similarly to other crimes, ignoring the blatantly gendered 
nature and position of its usual perpetrator and victim.  Though males also dominate as 
the offenders in other crimes such as homicide or robbery, it may be easier to deny the 
importance of gender in crimes such as these because of the diversity in the 
demographics of the victims.  Feminism has made clear that, if nothing else, rape 
cannot be ignored as a gendered crime, although feminist criminologists argue that 
crime itself is gendered (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Naffine 1996).   Morash (1999), 
however, claims that feminist theories and mainstream criminology are both equally 
guilty of ignoring the central findings of the other’s work to the detriment of both.   This 
chapter will examine the major premises to emerge from feminist theories concerning 
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rape (Table 1), supporting evidence and competing theories, and the overlap that exists 
between feminist theory and mainstream criminology.  
[Table 1 about here] 
WHY RAPE EXISTS – MACRO LEVEL 
(1) Rape is a manifestation of a male-dominated society. 
 Feminist theories claim that sexual coercion is part of the package that 
accompanies the subordination of women under patriarchy (Baron and Straus 1989; 
Clark 1982; Russell 1975).  Because women have less access to social, economic and 
political resources, their powerlessness makes them vulnerable to victimization, 
whereas men’s overprivilege empowers them to feel that it is their right to control 
women and treat them as if they are property (Clark 1982).  Schwartz and DeKeseredy 
(1997: 62) refer to a society in which this arrangement exists as a “courtship 
patriarchy,” where it is socially acceptable for a male to force a woman to have sexual 
intercourse because he is entitled to it and she has not lived up to her end of a particular 
social role or social arrangement.  In these situations, women do not have the legal or 
the social right to refuse sex.  In support of the importance of male dominance, Sanday 
(1981) found that in societies where the distribution of power was mostly equitable, as 
noted through the amount of importance placed on the roles of women and the number 
of women found in positions of high power, rape was absent or nearly absent. 
 These accounts, however, do not explain why rape itself happens to be a 
manifestation of a male-dominated society.  Brownmiller (1975: 14) emphasizes the 
gendered nature of the crime through an emphasis on physical bodies:   
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 What it all boils down to is that the human male can rape.  Man’s structural capacity to rape and 
woman’s corresponding structural vulnerability are as basic to the physiology of both our sexes 
as the primal act of sex itself.  Had it not been for this accident of biology, an accommodation 
requiring the locking together of two separate parts, penis into vagina, there would be neither 
copulation nor rape as we know it.  
  
 For Brownmiller, rape is a biological reality.  Thus the experience is rooted not 
in social forces, but in the inevitability of physiological differences that render women 
incapable of raping in the way that men can.  More recent feminist theorists have 
challenged this notion, claiming that rape is an experience that occurs to individual 
bodies.  Yet, because bodies themselves, particularly female bodies, are socially 
constructed, what makes rape a gendered experience is not the physicality of male and 
female bodies, but the set of meanings that are attached to the feminine experience of 
rape, as compared to the masculine experience of rape (Cahill 2001; Mardorossian 
2002).  Females are continually encouraged to protect themselves against rape as part of 
their daily lives.  Rape continues to be a crime that is largely perpetuated by males 
against females, and it serves a social differentiating social function through its 
generation of fear, which will be discussed in more detail later (Cahill 2001). 
 Regardless of whether the act of rape is one that results from the development of 
physical bodies or from social structural arrangements, the assumptions behind the 
hypothesis that rape is a manifestation of a male dominated society are two-fold.  First, 
the assumption is that male domination exists.  Second, the assumption exists that it has 
a correlation to sexual violence.  Evolutionary psychology does not challenge the idea 
that male domination exists, although scholars in this field claim that it can be traced to 
the evolutionary mate preferences in male partners of females, rather than to either of 
the arguments posited by Brownmiller or Cahill (see Buss 1989, 1994).  That is, women 
 desire males with more resources and better access to these resources.   Evolutionary 
psychologists also agree with feminists that rape is a gendered crime, yet their 
hypotheses about the reasons for its existence conflict with those of feminist theories 
(see Daly and Wilson 1983; Ellis 1989; Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Thornhill and 
Thornhill 1983). 
 For evolutionary psychologists, rape is “natural and biological.”  In a treatise 
denouncing feminist theories about rape, Thornhill and Palmer (2000) raise two very 
different hypotheses about rape’s existence:  (1) rape is a by-product of high male 
sexual desire and a preference for multiple sexual partners; and (2) natural selection 
produced genes in the male brain that render men capable of rape if they cannot find 
willing partners with whom to reproduce.    
 Biologists and social scientists, however, have both condemned the assumptions 
behind these hypotheses.   Primarily, these assaults amount to the critique that the 
hypotheses are merely “adaptive storytelling,” or “constructing an explanation as to 
why a trait is adaptive from the initial assumption that the trait is adaptive” (Shields and 
Steinke 2003: 99).  These critiques result from examining the methodology used to test 
the hypotheses.  Some of the areas that scholars find fault with include the 
unfalsifiability of the by-product hypothesis (Coyne 2003), the authors’ static, one-level 
view of genes and their assumption that most natural selection occurred during the 
hunting and gathering era (Gowaty 2003; Kimmel 2003; Vickers and Kitcher 2003), the 
use of self-report data asking about feelings and attitudes as a measure of “ultimate 
causes,” as well as inferring causation from mere correlation (Sheilds and Steinke 
2003).  Additionally, scholars criticize treating human behavior no differently from 
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 other animal behavior—in other words, ignoring the impact of culture completely 
(Coyne 2003; Tobach and Reed 2003; Vickers and Kitcher 2003), not acknowledging 
either the role of a raped woman in the decision to choose whether a fetus or child 
conceived from rape survives or how the absence of the father would affect the survival 
rate pre-modernity (Coyne 2003; Vickers and Kitchner 2003).  Other criticisms include 
a lack of ability to explain why all men who are rejected by women do not rape—in 
other words, more time is spent explaining what makes rape attractive than what 
actually separates rapists from non-rapists (Vickers and Kitchner 2003), and making 
various controversial claims about victims of rape, including that most victims are of 
reproductive age, that those who are of reproductive age are the most traumatized, and 
that the more violence that occurs with the rape, the less traumatized the victim is—all 
of which are either unsupported by data or require further inquiry to be scientifically 
sound claims (Koss 2003).    
Therefore, although evolutionary psychology and feminist theorists agree that 
male dominance exists and that it is correlated to rape, they disagree about the 
underlying causes behind these phenomena.  For evolutionary psychologists, both male 
dominance and rape are products of biological and genetic influence.  For feminist 
theorists, male dominance is a cause of rape, or at least an enabling condition.   
(2) The entire culture is a “rape culture” that condones and encourages rape. 
 A related hypothesis to the previously stated one is that rape is excused by the 
larger society through all of its social institutions under particular conditions that foster 
male dominance.   This hypothesis is a broader one.  Instead of merely claiming that a 
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 lack of power and resources causes females to be vulnerable to victimization, this 
hypothesis focuses more on how rape emerges from a male-dominated society.   
 Buchwald, Fletcher and Roth (1993: vii) first defined a rape culture as “a 
complex set of beliefs that encourages male sexual aggression and supports violence 
against women.  It is a society where violence is seen as sexy and sexuality as violent... 
A rape culture condones physical and emotional terrorism against women as the norm.  
In a rape culture both men and women assume that sexual violence is a fact of life.”  
The presence and popularity of rape myths appear to support this idea (Russell 1984).  
Check and Malamuth (1985) established that rape is a widespread and normalized 
practice in the United States and that belief in rape myths is linked to acts of sexual 
aggression against women.  In one study, convicted rapists explained their actions using 
a variety of justifications which appeared to draw on rape myths through which they 
denied that they had raped anyone.  These included the claim that the women they raped 
actually seduced them, that when women say “no” they really mean “yes,” that women 
really enjoy being raped, that the women whom they raped weren’t “good girls” and, 
therefore, couldn’t be raped, and that what they had done wasn’t a major violation—that 
they hadn’t actually done anything wrong (Scully and Marolla 1984).    
 These rationalizations are similar to many of the techniques of neutralization 
specified by Sykes and Matza (1957), such as the denial of responsibility, the denial of 
injury, and the denial of victim.  Sykes and Matza, however, argue that individuals use 
these techniques to bend the rules or laws of the larger culture, as these rules and laws 
are usually known to be flexible.  This idea appears to contradict the idea that a rape 
culture operates to encourage and condone rape.  Many scholars have grappled with the 
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 contradiction that rape can be such an abhorred crime in almost all societies, yet be such 
a widely-committed crime with low reporting and low conviction rates (Schwartz and 
DeKeseredy 1997).  One explanation is that, traditionally, rape has not been defined 
according to the lack of consent by and harm to the female victim, but by the norms and 
laws of the society (Rozee 1993).  Therefore, convicted rapists can use the language of 
the larger victim-blaming rape culture to avoid taking responsibility for their own 
behavior because there are plenty of exceptions available from mainstream ideology to 
describe their own actions as “not rape.”
 Some scholars link the acceptance of rape with the acceptance of violence in 
general or with the acceptance of or availability of pornographic materials (Baron and 
Straus 1989; Dworkin 1979, 1987; MacKinnon 1984; Morgan 1980).  Most of the 
analyses that have attempted to test these hypotheses have been at the macro level.  
Baron and Straus (1989) claim that subculture of violence theories, although they have 
attained influence in explaining criminal violence, have not been adequately tested 
because an independent measure of the culture was usually lacking.  They created a 
Legitimate Violence Index, containing indicators such as circulation of mass media 
violence, laws permitting corporal punishment in schools, violent sports, the issue of 
hunting licenses, military expenditures, and the use of capital punishment, finding that it 
varied significantly from state to state, and that it was the highest in the West and the 
South.  They did not find, however, that the average rape rate was correlated to the 
amount of violence in an area.   
 The evidence to support the idea that pornography and rape are linked is more 
mixed and, hence, more controversial.  Baron and Straus (1989) also examined state 
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 rape rates with the circulation of pornography, which they defined as “written, pictorial, 
or audiovisual materials that are produced for the purpose of sexual arousal” (p. 113).  
They found a high bivariate correlation of .64 in comparison with the low correlations 
for other violent crimes such as homicide, aggravated assault and robbery.  Scott and 
Schwalm (1988) also examined the relationship between men’s magazine circulation 
and rape rates, including a wider variety of men’s magazines and also including general 
readership magazines such as Newsweek and Time.  The correlation between the 
pornographic materials remained, and they found that the “softer” and nonviolent 
magazines such as Playboy yielded higher correlations than the sometimes more violent 
and “hardcore” magazines such as Hustler.   
 Yet Baron and Straus (1989) claim that these results may not be due to a cause-
effect relationship, because they also found that high circulation of the magazine 
Playgirl was correlated to rape.  They speculate that a third variable, such as the 
average age of readership of pornographic materials and the average age of rape 
offenders, may be confounding the data.   Studies examining the effect of the wider 
availability of pornographic materials after Denmark’s obscenity laws were repealed 
demonstrated that the rape rates remained unchanged (BenViniste 1971; Kutchinsky 
1971).  A time series analysis that includes not only Denmark, but also the United 
States, West Germany, and Sweden, also revealed either no increase or a decrease in 
rape rates after an increase in the circulation of pornographic materials (Kutchinsky 
1991).   
 Other types of studies use experimental methodology to examine the link 
between pornography and rape.  These studies are problematic, however, because 
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 although these studies are better able to determine causal relationships than structural 
level studies, they are obviously unable to use the dependent variable “rape” for ethical 
reasons.  Therefore, many of these studies use “aggression against women” in 
laboratory settings as a proxy for many types of violence against women, including 
rape, in the “real world.  These experimental studies typically expose males to various 
types of pornographic and non-pornographic material and then measure which of the 
groups of males are more likely to administer shocks to women who are verbalizing 
direct insults.  Despite the caveat, the results are interesting:  exposure to “softer” forms 
of pornography actually reduces aggression, while violent pornography increases 
aggression.  However, violent pornography does not appear to increase aggression any 
more than depictions of R-rated violence against women do (Baron 1974; Baron and 
Bell 1973; Linz, Donnerstein and Penrod 1987; Zillmann 1986; Zillmann and Bryant 
1984).  It is also worth noting, however, that some experimental research has found that 
men’s reported propensity to rape increases and their sympathy for rape victims 
decreases after exposure to violent pornography, nonviolent pornography, and 
nonpornographic R-rated scenes of sex and violence (Linz, Donnerstein and Penrod 
1984; Malamuth 1981). 
 In summary, it appears that there are some common cultural beliefs about 
rape—rape myths—that are highly correlated to rape, and that it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about causal connections between the transmission of these beliefs and 
rape, particularly through mass media depictions of sex or violence. Depictions of 
violence and of sex, forced or not, may be related to the transmission of these cultural 
beliefs, if not to rape itself. 
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 WHY RAPE EXISTS – MICRO LEVEL 
(1) Rape occurs as a result of gender role socialization. 
A long tradition exists in the feminist literature of claiming that rape is a 
manifestation of traditional male and female gender roles (Baron and Straus 1989; 
Berkowitz et al. 1994; Griffin 1975; Russell 1975, 1984).  According to this argument, 
gender role socialization shapes males into dominant aggressors and females into 
passive victims.    One method through which gendered norms are maintained and 
reinforced is through sexual scripts (Simon and Gagnon 1984, 1987), which are 
culturally shared beliefs about what are defined as acceptable sexual thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors for each gender (Gagnon 1990); sexual scripts are methods of “doing 
gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) through sexual channels.   
The female “sexual script” has long made females the moral guardians of 
sexuality, which puts them in a vulnerable and disadvantageous position.  It is costly 
and involves risk to deviate from the script.  Women who do so risk invalidation of their 
experiences and negative social sanctions (Laws and Schwartz 1977; Tolman and 
Higgins 1996).  Yet, adherence to the script also involves risk, as it puts women at a 
higher risk of sexual violence by socializing them that they should be compliant and 
passive in sexual situations (Kitzinger and Frith 1999; Tolman and Higgins 1996). 
 The male sexual script, in contrast, encourages men to denigrate everything that 
is feminine, avoid sex in committed relationships, and to treat women as if they are 
objects (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).   Kilmartin (1994) described traditional 
masculine sexuality as aggressive and goal-oriented, as not concerned with emotion, 
and as objectifying women in order to keep them at an emotional distance using 
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 Brannon’s (1976) four themes of masculinity:  antifemininity, status and achievement, 
inexpressiveness and independence, and adventurousness and aggression.  Russell 
(1984: 118) found in her study that rape and aggression were closely linked for many 
men:  “Being aggressive is masculine; being sexually aggressive is masculine; rape is 
sexually aggressive behavior; therefore, rape is masculine behavior.” 
 Some research has reported that gender role attitudes may be correlated to rape.  
Forbes, Adams-Curtis, and White (2004) have differentiated between first- and second-
generation measures of sexism, in which the first-generation measures generally gauge 
only negative attitudes toward women and gender roles which have improved since the 
first sound measure was developed in 1972, in the Attitudes Toward Women Scale 
(Spence and Helmreich 1972).   Though the decline in negative scores on the scale 
appears to indicate more positive attitudes toward women on the surface, alternative 
explanations for why the scores on this scale have declined suggest otherwise.  For 
example, blatantly sexist responses on the scale may no longer be socially acceptable, 
although attitudes supporting them may still be present (McHugh and Frieze 1997).  
Alternatively, Swim et al. (1995) suggest that a more subtle form of sexism may have 
replaced the overt form of the past and is not captured in the Attitudes Toward Women 
Scale.  
 Other scales, such as the Adversarial Sexual Beliefs Scale (Burt 1980) and the 
Hostility Toward Women Scale (Check et al. 1985) were developed to capture different 
but related concepts about women and sex-roles.  Each of these scales has been found to 
have a correlation to rape myths and to male sexually coercive behavior (Burt 1980; 
Check et al. 1985; Forbes et al. 2004; Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1995).  Lonsway and 
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 Fitzgerald (1995), however, point out that these scales have such low construct validity 
that they both primarily measure hostility toward women, and even Burt’s rape myth 
acceptance scale (1980) is a measure of hostility toward women.   
 Within the last ten years, researchers have developed second-generation 
measures of sexism to attempt to address the complex nature of sexism.  One of these 
measures is the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1996).  Ambivalent 
sexism measures two components of patriarchal dominance as expressed in both 
negative and what appear to be positive attitudes toward women:  hostile and 
benevolent sexism.  The former manifests itself in traditional gender roles and 
deprecating treatment and characterizations of women.  Benevolent sexism, in contrast, 
is expressed through the idealization, protection, and assistance of women.  Benevolent 
sexism may appear to be benign or even constructive, yet it derives from sexist beliefs 
that women are fragile, less capable, and less competent.   
 Though hostile and benevolent sexism may appear contradictory, the two types 
of sexism are actually correlated (Glick and Fiske 1997).  Ambivalent sexism theory 
contends that this correlation derives from the relationship that males have with women 
at the micro level:  “Although men hold structural power in patriarchal societies, 
women have appreciable dyadic power through men’s dependence on them as wives, 
mothers, daughters, and as romantic and sexual objects” (Forbes et al. 2004:  239).  In 
order to resolve ambivalence toward a particular woman, men categorize women as 
“good” or “bad” according to how well they conform to gender norms.   They then 
provide the “benefits” of benevolent sexism to women whom they view as “good” (or 
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 dependable as someone who fulfills the feminine gender role), and behave in a hostile 
manner toward women whom they categorize as “bad” (Glick and Fiske 1997).  
 The virgin/whore dichotomy that represents the two-dimensional approach to 
women’s sexuality in American culture (Martin 1996; Tolman and Higgins 1996) is 
apparent in the two aspects measured in the ambivalent sexism inventory.   Women who 
conform to traditional sexual stereotypes are “good girls” who are more likely to be 
believed if they are raped.  In contrast, women who do not conform to sexual norms not 
only disturb gender roles, but also disturb the rape scripts inherent in rape myths.   
Therefore, women with a “bad reputation” do not receive credibility or protection 
because they embody rape myth scripts that blame the victim rather than the perpetrator.    
This relationship is more than theoretical; both hostile and benevolent sexism in 
men and women are correlated with the acceptance of rape myths (Forbes et al. 2004; 
Viki and Abrams 2002; Glick and Fiske 1997).  Cowan (2000) specifically measured 
women’s hostility toward women and found that the more hostile women were toward 
women as a group, the more they believed victim-blaming rape myths as well as that 
rape was caused by pathology in men and that men couldn’t control their sex drives, 
two other popular rape myths.  Although Forbes et al. (2004) found no relationship 
between benevolent sexism and the acceptance of rape myths, the correlation between 
benevolent sexism—which is important because it is the construct of sexism that earlier 
instruments did not tap—and outcomes for rape victims, however, is difficult to deny.  
Though hostility toward women appears to be the type of attitude most highly 
correlated with sexually coercive behavior (Forbes et al. 2004; Malamuth et al. 1995), 
individuals with a high degree of benevolent sexism assigned less blame to and 
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 recommended a shorter sentence for the perpetrator in a study involving an 
acquaintance rape compared to those with lower scores on the benevolent sexism scale 
(Viki, Abrams, and Masser 2004). 
Gender role attitudes and sexism are thought to be socially learned; the process 
may be similar to that for learning criminal behavior.  In Sutherland and Cressey’s 
(1978) view, criminal behavior is learned through interacting with other people 
primarily in groups.  If an individual is surrounded by more people who think favorably 
of the criminal act than unfavorably, he or she is more likely to engage in it him/herself.  
The effects of the associations with other individuals are also qualified by several 
factors, such as the length of time the associations persist, the intensity of the 
associations, when (how early) the associations begin, and the frequency with which 
they occur.  Akers (1998) refined the theory, looking at whether individuals are 
positively or negatively reinforced by the people they are around, and adding in the 
important concepts of “imitation,” and “reinforcement” for the behaviors individuals 
engage in, and also that an individual may model sources with which he or she does not 
have direct interaction.  Recent research indicates that men who have peers who support 
emotional and physical violence are more likely to admit to committing sexual assault 
than men who do not (DeKeseredy 1990; DeKeseredy and Kelly 1995; Schwartz 1991; 
Schwartz et al. 2001; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997; Schwartz and Nogrady 1996).   
Akers (1998) measured the extent to which differential association, differential 
reinforcement, and modeling impacted the likelihood of committing rape.   There were 
significant correlations between many of these variables and the likelihood that males 
self-reported that they also engaged in sexually-coercive behavior or that they were 
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 likely to do so in the future.  Men who predicted that they would get more pleasure than 
trouble from sexually assaulting a woman and who had been exposed to violent 
pornography were more likely to engage in rape.  Men who had friends who engaged in 
sexual assault, who felt that their friends would view them positively if they did the 
same, and who had favorable attitudes toward sexual assault were likely to engage in 
both nonphysical and physical coercion (Akers 1998).   Akers (1998, 276) also found 
that 54% of the variance in explaining “self-reported probability of committing rape or 
using sexual coercion” in the future could be explained using this model.   
 Learned gender roles, perhaps female roles in particular, appear to play an 
indisputably important role in sexual coercion.  What in unclear, however, is what 
distinguishes the males who do rape from the males who do not.   
(2) Rapists are overconformists to masculine gender roles and to patriarchal 
culture.  
 Connell (1995) explains that one form of masculinity dominates all other forms 
in all societies, which he terms “hegemonic masculinity.”  In Western society, this is 
exemplified by the tough, athletic archetypal masculine image portrayed in action films 
and in sports.  Very few men, however, are able to live up to this hegemonic ideal, and 
must secure other methods of proving their masculine identity.  Some men may form 
oppositional masculinities and choose to live with the consequences of being perceived 
as deviant by the larger culture.  Others may “fake it” or live in conflict about the 
appropriate norms in various situations (Jefferson 1994).   
 What is most troubling about this research for the issue of rape, however, is that 
in certain subcultures, sex with women is perceived as “doing masculinity,” whether it 
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 comes in the form of coercing or forcing women into sex, having sex with unconscious 
women, or pressuring unwilling women into sex.  Termed the masculinity mystique, 
Russell (1984: 118) claims that “sex may be the arena where… notions of masculinity 
are most intensely played out, particularly by men who feel powerless in the rest of their 
lives and whose masculinity is threatened by this sense of powerlessness.”  Inherent in 
this idea is the notion that rapists are very similar to other men—they have simply 
overindulged in the masculine role.  According to this ideology, though rape could not 
occur without gender role socialization, it is those who have embraced the tenets of 
masculinity to an extreme who actually carry it out.   
 Scully (1990) found in her study of convicted rapists that they had higher scores 
than other felons on a “Compulsive Masculinity Scale” that measured toughness, 
fearlessness and fighting, preoccupation with developing an athletic physique, sexual 
athleticism and the concept of women as conquest objects, and defiance of authority.  It 
is important to remember, however, that her study is based mostly upon men who raped 
strangers. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the proponents of a General Theory of Crime, 
would argue that this is likely an accurate representation of rapists:  
The common contemporary image, influenced by media depictions of atypical 
events, involves one of the following scenarios:  (1) A family member or close 
friend forces himself upon the victim.  The victim reacts to the violence and 
humiliation without invoking the criminal justice system.  The scenario is 
variously labeled, in popular literature, “family violence” or “date rape.” (2) A 
woman is attacked by a group of males, in a public place, and suffers serious 
physical injuries in addition to those inflicted by the rape itself.  Such “gang” 
rapes evoke an official response.  According to the data, both of these scenarios 
are relatively rare (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 36). 
 
Gottfredson and Hirschi offer no evidence to refute their claims that these 
scenarios are rare or false, except for the official statistics they cite.  The Uniform 
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 Crime Reports, however, capture only events reported to the police.  In their effort to 
support the idea that stranger rape is the most common type, they further claim that 
“[F]amily members and close friends apparently rarely jeopardize long-term relations 
by committing… rape” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 36) which appears either to 
contradict premises in self-control theory that a criminal can delay gratification or resist 
simple rewards (which not sexually assaulting those whom the rapist has easy access to 
would require), or to suggest that criminals have no friends or family members.      
In terms of empirical studies, Kruttschnitt et al. (2000) found mixed support for 
self-control theory’s effects on rape.  Analogous low self-control behaviors such as 
criminal history and drug use predicted offending.  However, when sex offenders on 
probation had both stable work histories and received treatment, their probability of 
reoffending declined.  The latter contradicts self-control theory’s assertion that 
offending is stable over the life course.  Yet, one of the major principles of self-control 
theory has more support in rape studies.  This is the idea that offenders are not likely to 
specialize; because they lack self-control in general, they will engage in a variety of 
behaviors, both criminal and non-criminal, that help them satisfy immediate desires 
(Britt 1994; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990).  Some studies of rape have found support 
for this idea.  In one self-report study, men who rated themselves as “sexually 
aggressive” also rated themselves as more likely to rob and murder (Malamuth and 
Ceniti 1986).  In another study, half of the convicted rapists had a previous arrest 
record:  20% of the records were for property offenses and 23% were related to public 
order (Amir 1971).   In Scully’s previously cited research on incarcerated rapists 
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 (1990), the criminal history differed very little between the two groups of sex offenders 
and the control group of other convicted felons: 
This background profile of convicted rapists does not suggest a unique category 
of criminal offender.  Instead, it reveals a typical felon with no remarkable 
history to suggest a greater likelihood to rape.  That is, the backgrounds of these 
rapists contain those factors known to be associated with non-white-collar 
crime generally, but provide little insight into rape specifically (Scully 1990: 
91).   
  
This appears to contradict feminist research theorizing that the patriarchal social 
structure condones conditions that make rape a crime that is different from any other.   
In many empirical self-control studies, however, “stranger rape,” the least common type 
of rape, was the type of rape under examination.  In one example of how rape differs by 
type, Scully and Marolla (1984) found that acquaintance rapists selected their victims 
carefully, but acted spontaneously, whereas stranger rapists planned their rapes for at 
least a few hours before the crime occurred.   Stranger rapists are also usually aware 
that their actions are criminal and go through some process to hide or shield their 
behaviors, whereas in the case of acquaintance rape, rape consists of acts “in public” 
with someone the rapist knows and may like (Belknap 1989).  It is unclear if self-
control theory would be supported in other types outside of stranger rape.    
WHAT MEN GAIN FROM RAPE- MACRO LEVEL 
Rape is a method of social control. 
 This hypothesis likely originates with Brownmiller’s (1975: 15) statement that 
“Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men 
keep all women in a state of fear.”  As Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1983) point 
out, although she indicts all men with this statement, she later claims that rapists are the 
“shock troops” that do the dirty work for all men.  This perspective implies intent on the 
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 part of men:  “All systems of oppression employ violence or the threat of violence as an 
institutionalized mechanism for ensuring compliance. ‘Inferior’ peoples—whether they 
be blacks in South Africa, peasants in South America, or females in the United States—
are kept in place by fear, which is generated by periodic displays of force” (Sheffield 
2004: 164).   
 In contrast, evolutionary psychologists have not had favorable responses to the 
idea that males intentionally keep females controlled through rape:   “Simple-minded 
views of a conspiracy by one sex or the other have no foundation in reality” (Buss 1996: 
310).  This point of view, however, misunderstands how cultural norms and informal 
social control may operate.  There is no need for a conspiracy when meaning about a 
particular event or phenomenon is socially constructed so that almost all individuals’ 
social roles and responsibilities are organized in such a way that the meaning’s 
existence is sustained without conscious effort.  Even evolutionary psychologist David 
Buss (1996: 301), in arguing that the control of female sexuality is the result of male 
insecurity about the paternity of children, says, “We are all descendants of a long line of 
ancestral men whose adaptations (i.e., psychological mechanisms) led them to behave in 
ways that increased their likelihood of paternity… This does not imply, of course, that 
men were or are consciously aware of the adaptive problem of compromised paternity.”  
Buss, of course, argues that biological forces are operating unconsciously on 
individuals, while feminists argue that social and cultural forces are doing so.  To 
pretend that all feminist theory has argued or needs to argue that a “conspiracy” is afoot 
is disingenuous. 
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  In fact, most feminist theorists are silent on whether the social control of women 
through rape is purposeful or merely a by-product of rape in societies that have high 
rape rates.  This begs the question about whether rape at the macro level is a cause or 
effect of male domination.  Although this question has not been adequately resolved 
(perhaps it is both), there is ample evidence to support the idea that women are more 
fearful of crime than men, and that a fear of rape does have an effect on women’s 
behavior and restricts their actions (Fisher and Sloan 2003; Gordon and Riger 1989; 
Warr 1985, 2000).  Women are more fearful of being raped than of any other crime, 
even murder (Ferraro 1995, 1996; Hickman and Muehlenhard 1997), and tend to restrict 
their actions to “safe activities” in which contact with strange males is either limited or 
occurs under protected conditions (Riger and Gordon 1981).   
 Ferraro (1995, 1996) developed the “shadow of sexual assault hypothesis” to 
describe women’s confrontations with offenders:  when females are personally 
victimized, their fear that they may be sexually assaulted is ever-present and “shadows” 
the fear of the actual crime that occurred, regardless of the real risk of rape.  Thus, due 
to the “extraneous” fear of rape, women are more fearful of crime in general.  This 
hypothesis is supported by research measuring the fear of rape and its relationship to the 
fear of other offenses (Fisher and Sloan 2003).  Furthermore, college women are more 
likely to perceive themselves as potential crime victims in general (Fisher et al. 1995), 
although females are far less likely than males to be criminal victims, particularly by 
strangers (Schwartz 2005). 
 That rape operates as a social control mechanism appears indisputable:  it limits 
women’s actions and distorts their thoughts about crime and about relationships.  What 
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 remains unclear is why women are more scared of and prepared for the type of rape that 
is the least likely to occur, and why rape prevention strategies remain focused on 
women removing themselves from or restricting themselves in public life when they are 
not likely to encounter rape from strangers (Campbell 2005). 
WHAT MEN GAIN FROM RAPE- MICRO LEVEL 
Rape is motivated by a desire for sex and dominance.   
  Early feminist theorists claimed that rape was primarily motivated by a desire 
for dominance over the victim (Brownmiller 1975; Groth 1979; Scarpitti and Scarpitti 
1977).  One typology of rape formed through clinical analysis of convicted rapists 
characterized it as, “the use of sexuality to express… issues of power and anger” and 
claimed that sexual coercion came in three types:  (1)“anger rape,” which is 
characterized as something the offender does strictly to harm the victim; (2) “power 
rape,” which is done to possess the victim sexually; and (3) “sadistic rape,” in which 
aggression becomes eroticized (Groth 1979).  Research indicates that hostility toward 
women and attitudes that promote violence toward women do have a high correlation to 
rape (Malamuth 1996).   
 Cahill (2001) explains how early feminist theorists developed and built on the 
theories of one another.  Brownmiller’s (1975) concern was that too much emphasis had 
been placed on the sexuality of the victim.  Therefore, by removing sex from the event 
entirely, the focus could shift to the violence, and hence, away from the victim.  This 
approach, however, was flawed because it failed to recognize how the experience of 
rape had sexual meaning for female victims, i.e., through an avoidance of consensual 
sexual activity after being victimized, for example (Cahill 2001).   
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  Activists such as Dworkin (1979, 1987) and MacKinnon (1989) attempted to 
correct this by acknowledging that rape was, in fact, so sexual that the spectrum of 
sexual coercion extended to what appeared to be consensual sexual activity.  They 
pointed out that there was little difference between the dominance of men in rape and 
the dominance of men in compulsive heterosexuality (Cahill 2001).  This approach was 
also flawed because it denied women any sexual agency:  “To define rape as primarily 
violent is to fail to address the particular sexual meanings that rape holds for women; to 
define rape as primarily sexual is to adopt a totalizing theory of power and to 
understand the feminine body and subject not only as constructed, but as only 
constructed” (Cahill 2001: 12). 
 More recent feminist theorists have conceded that rape appears to be motivated 
by a combination of both sex and violence, particularly because both concepts are 
socially constructed (Muehlenhard, Danoff-Burg, and Powch 1996; Cahill 2001).  
Scully’s (1990) research on convicted rapists convinced her that rape was both a violent 
and a sexual act.  She found that the men had used rape to gain revenge or for 
punishment, but they also used it for sexual access to women whom they perceived 
were “off-limits” and to fulfill fantasies about having impersonal sex.  The motivation, 
however, may vary depending upon the relationship between the offender and the 
victim.  To my knowledge, there is no research which examines the motivational 
differences of sex offenders according to their relationship with the victim. 
EFFECTS OF GENDER EQUALITY ON RAPE- MACRO LEVEL 
Trends toward gender egalitarianism are associated with less rape victimization 
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  As feminist theorists contend that violence against women is the result of a 
male-dominated society, so they also proclaim that a reduction in gender inequality 
would decrease such violence (Bograd 1988).  To Schwendinger and Schwendinger 
(1983: 151), a woman’s participation in social production affects her status because it 
“informs us about who owns or controls women’s ability to labor.”  Her independence 
in the labor force cannot be separated from her position in the family, where an 
inequitable division of labor keeps males dominant at both the macro and the micro 
levels.  Attitudes in the United States appear to have become increasingly egalitarian 
(Thornton, Alwin and Camburn 1983; Helmreich, Spence and Gibson 1982).  It is 
difficult, however, to determine if rape rates have subsequently fallen.  While the rates 
of reporting rape to the police have increased since the 1970s, this was most likely due 
not to an increase in rape itself, but to an increase in willingness of women to report 
rape as well as the change in the legal definition of rape (Borque 1989; Finkelhor and 
Yllo1982).   Self-reports and social science research indicate that the rate has probably 
remained relatively stable. 
 To test structural level gender inequality and its relationship to violence against 
women, Yllo (1983) developed the “Status of Women Index.”  In an analysis that 
included 30 states, she found a curvilinear relationship, with high rates of violence 
against women in states where gender inequality was at its highest and its lowest levels.  
Straus (1994) replicated the study using all 50 states, however, and found that higher 
rates of gender equality resulted in lower rates of violence against women.  Baron and 
Straus (1986) also found in a state-level study that more equality for women was 
correlated with lower rates of sexual assault specifically.   
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  Not all studies are supportive of the hypothesis that gender equality will lower 
the rape rate, however.  One study by Ellis and Beattie (1983) that compared women’s 
social, economic, and political gains in 26 United States cities found that rape rates 
were unrelated to women’s status.  This may be, however, because of the particular 
cities examined in the cross-sectional method.   Another study that used panel data and 
examined 109 cities across the United States found that in the short term, a low status 
for women is related to low rates of rape, but that over time, a low status for women is 
related to high rates of rape.  Furthermore, changes in gender equality are associated 
with changes in the rape rate over at least a ten year period (Whaley 2001). 
 Cross-national studies also support the finding that a low status for women is 
related to a high rape rate.  Sanday’s (1981) study of 156 societies found that in the 
rape-free societies, women and their roles were more highly valued and they had more 
rights than in rape-prone societies.   By combining data from the United Nations with 
data from the International Crime Victims Survey on 27 countries, Yodanis (2004) 
found that higher educational and occupational status for women was correlated with a 
lower rate of sexual violence.    
 In summary, most macro-level studies at the city, state, and national/societal 
level support the idea that, over time, gender equality reduces the rate of rape, although 
some findings are mixed.  Mixed findings appear largely due to the results of using 
cross-sectional analysis 
EFFECTS OF GENDER EQUALITY ON RAPE- MICRO LEVEL 
Attempts to equalize the sexes will result in a higher rape rate.  
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  Some feminist theorists hypothesize that gains for women will anger some men 
who will perceive this rise in equality as a serious loss of status, power, and even 
identity (Russell 1975).  Contending that equality for women will result in an increase 
in the rape rate, however, appears to contradict the macro-level premise that gender 
inequality will reduce the overall rape rate.  Studies in support of the former have 
primarily been conducted at the micro level.  Early studies indicate that rapists who 
were married had, on average, one year of education less that their wives (Garrett and 
Wright 1975).  Studies about spousal abuse are mixed:  some indicate that male 
violence appears to be more prevalent in marriages in which men are dominant (Tang 
1999), while others indicate that the interpersonal or occupational status of the wife 
appears to be greater than that of her husband in relationships where she is abused 
(Allen and Straus 1980; Hornung, McCullough and Sugimoto 1981).   
The hypothesis that gender equality will result in rape is supported by Agnew’s 
General Strain Theory (Agnew 1992).  Agnew revived the nearly-defunct strain 
theories, which had long been criticized for many things, among them, being unable to 
explain why all individuals who experience strain do not engage in deviance.  In order 
to resolve this dilemma, General Strain Theory altered strain from a social structural 
variable to a social psychological variable (Broidy 2001), defining strain as 
“relationships in which others are not treating the individual as he or she would like to 
be treated” (Agnew 1992:  48).   
In making this change in the strain variable, the theory takes a more 
individualized conception of goals into account, rather than assuming that everyone 
strives for the same one.  In addition to becoming strained because of failing to achieve 
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 positively valued goals, strain may also be caused by the removal of positively valued 
stimuli or the presentation of negative stimuli.  General Strain Theory also claims that it 
is not necessarily the strain that leads to the deviance, but negative emotional states 
resulting from strain—most notably anger and frustration, and that an individual’s 
coping strategies can moderate the effects of the emotional states and explain why not 
everyone who is angry or frustrated engages in delinquency (Agnew 1992).  Other 
factors that play a role are social support and social control.   
Agnew (2001) speculates that one reason why some strains lead to crime and 
others do not pertains to broader issues of the failure to achieve autonomy through 
threats to a male’s masculine status.  Other researchers document the importance of 
masculinity to males’ crime (Anderson 1999; Broidy and Agnew 1997; Messerschmidt 
1993).  Researchers who study gender have pointed out that the concept of 
“masculinity” can only be defined in contrast to “femininity” (Connell 1995).  
Therefore, one way to identify oneself as masculine is through heterosexuality as 
represented by successful and acceptable relationships with women; if a man is unable 
to attain those, he may feel strain due to the threat to his masculine status.   Most studies 
that have attempted to measure what factors contribute to rape have not operationalized 
masculine status or threats to it. Threats to one’s masculinity (a negative stimulus) is 
one way that strain may manifest itself and lead to narrow definitions of rape or 
possibly rape itself.   
Although there appears to be support for the idea that, at least in the long term, 
gender equality decreases the rape rate, perhaps strain, exemplified as a threat to 
 69
 masculine identity, is one way of explaining why it increases in the short term, and why 
some males may continue to rape while others do not. 
Limitations and Contradictions in Feminist Theory 
 
Empirical studies testing some of the more measurable of the feminist claims 
have found them supported.  For example, Check and Malamuth (1985) established that 
rape is indeed a widespread and normalized practice in the United States, that it is not 
only  committed by males who are psychologically ill individuals, and that beliefs in 
rape myths are linked to acts of sexual aggression against women.   Other research has 
found other correlations to rape, including hostility toward women, gender role stress, 
and attitudes that promote violence against women (Malamuth 1996).  Chicoro et al. 
(2004) found that the correlation between males’ acceptance of rape myths and their 
likelihood to rape is mediated by how much they believe they would enjoy sexually 
dominating the victim, which appears to indicate that rape is about more than just sex.    
Feminist theories, then, have been very good at explaining social conditions under 
which rape is likely to exist and some characteristics that male rapists are likely to have.   
 An analysis of these major feminist hypotheses and theories about rape, 
however, reveals several contradictions and unresolved dilemmas.  First, “Is rape a 
result of male dominance over women or does it result in male dominance over 
women?”  Because the questions in this dissertation are focused at the micro level, the 
answer to this question remains outside the scope of this study, yet it is a conundrum 
that plagues feminist theory and deserves further study.  In suggesting that male 
dominance, whether or not it is part of a larger rape culture, results in a society in which 
women are vulnerable to rape, it may be possible to suggest that rape also leads to the 
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 further reinforcement of that male dominance through the heightened social control of 
women.  Yet the question of which predated the other historically remains an 
unanswered one, although some scholars have hypothesized about this (Brownmiller 
1975; Griffin 1975).   Another unresolved question in feminist theory is, “Are rapists 
‘regular guys’ or hypermasculine predators?”  If rapists are just normal men who 
acquire the gender role dictated to them by their culture, then feminist theorists have the 
responsibility of explaining why some men rape and others do not.  In contrast, if 
rapists are hypermasculine predators, an explanation as to how some men become 
hypermasculinized while others do not is still necessary.   
Finally, feminist theorists appear torn about whether gender egalitarianism will 
increase or decrease rape.  This may be because there is little understanding at the 
micro-level of why individual men rape; instead, there is a broader perspective of what 
may cause or be related to rape at the societal level, such as gender roles, rape culture, 
and male dominance.  Attempts to understand why individual men rape have mostly 
come in the form of social learning theories and have sometimes been vague—that is, 
they do not explain how a broader rape culture can translate into learning at the micro 
level.  Furthermore, researchers using this theory are sometimes charged with a broader 
social learning theory critique of being unable to adequately determine with the data 
they have collected whether the rapists are actually learning anything from their 
environments or whether they have merely sought out others who reinforce their 
ideology (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).   
Nevertheless, some important results have come out of the social learning field 
that will be highlighted more in the following chapter.  Social learning theory will not 
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 be the focus of this study primarily because one of the most important questions that 
remains to be answered have yet even to be asked:  If rape is of such great benefit to 
men at both the personal and social levels, according to both feminist theory and 
evolutionary psychology, then why don’t more men engage in it?  Unlike early feminist 
theorists, I do not believe that rape is a biological inevitability; rather, I contend, as do 
more recent feminist theorists, that male and female bodies are constructed through 
social discourse to be opposites, and female bodies are constructed to be feminine, 
which is perceived of as, either metaphorically or literally, weak, and thus vulnerable to 
rape (Campbell 2005).  
Social learning theories and self-control theories have had some success 
explaining some aspects of rape, they do not resolve the circular reasoning questions.  
Because I am interested in understanding the crucial question of why some males rape 
and other males do not and in resolving some of these ambiguities in feminist theory, I 
will be combining Agnew’s General Strain Theory (1992) in this research with some of 
the previous findings from the feminist literature on rape.  By examining General Strain 
Theory, I will be able to examine some of the micro-level hypotheses that have not yet 
been tested in either a feminist model or a General Strain Theory model in order to 
understand how masculinity as a social strain impacts rape, and how individuals feel 
and what they do when they cannot live up to what they have been socialized to do.   A 
benefit to using General Strain Theory is that it can also incorporate social learning by 
taking into account how males are socialized to be masculine, how important this is to 
them personally, and the amount of peer support they have for their actions as part of a 
coping strategy.  Therefore, using General Strain Theory will allow for some 
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 incorporation of social learning.  In the next chapter, I will specifically examine General 
Strain Theory in the context of rape and feminist literature, and put forward the 
hypotheses I plan to test. 
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 Chapter 4 
General Strain Theory, Masculinity, and Rape 
 
Strain theories have had little to say since their emergence about the subject of 
rape directly.  The underlying premise of early strain theories was that individuals are 
socialized to desire the “American Dream” through various social institutions, yet 
inequalities inherent in the social structure prevent equal opportunity to achieve it 
(Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Merton 1938).  This disparity between 
available means and the desirable goal produces anomie, which results in deviance.  
There is little here that is relevant to the issue of rape, as strain theories propose that 
everyone is striving for the same goal of financial success either directly through 
monetary gain (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Merton 1938) or indirectly through middle 
class status (Cohen 1955).  Therefore, neither sexual satisfaction nor power derived 
through sexual conquest could be construed as goals, nor could rape be perceived as the 
means to achieving the main objective.   
Agnew’s (1992) revised “general strain theory” (GST) allows for a broader 
interpretation of goals.  For Agnew, any goal that is positively valued but unable to be 
achieved can cause one strain.  Yet, this is only one method through which strain may 
be experienced.  Strain can also result from two other distinct mechanisms:  when 
something positively valued, such as a significant person, is “taken away” from the 
individual, or when something negatively valued is introduced into the individual’s 
environment, such as insults, abuse, threats, or criminal victimization.  For Agnew, 
deviance results because individuals attempt to achieve obstructed goals through 
illegitimate means, regain something or someone that has been lost, escape or avoid 
something negative, or retaliate against the person who introduced the strain.   Without 
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 the negative influence of others, individuals would not be pressured into deviant acts 
(Agnew 1992, 2005). 
Agnew (1992) hypothesizes, however, that it is not the strain itself that causes 
individuals to engage in this deviant behavior of retaliation, escape, or other types of 
illegitimate action.  Instead, it is negative emotional affect resulting from the strains that 
causes people to engage in deviance.   Negative emotionality induces a strong incentive 
for emotional relief and crime may be one avenue for achieving this relief.  The most 
salient negative emotion resulting in deviance may be anger (Agnew 1985, 1992; 
Brezina 1998), although emotions such as depression and fear may also incite deviance, 
particularly non-violent criminal behavior (Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 2000; Hay 2003; 
Piquero and Sealock 2000; Sharp et al. 2001; Sharp, Brewster and Love 2005).  Yet the 
results are mixed concerning whether anger and other negative emotions actually 
mediate the relationship between strain and crime.  For example, anger appears to 
mediate the effects of strain on assault or aggression (Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 2000; 
Mazerolle and Piquero 1997; Piquero and Sealock 2000), but not on property or drug 
offenses (Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 2000; Piquero and Sealock 2000).   
One possible explanation for the mixed results may be how the negative 
emotions, particularly anger, have been measured.  Dispositional anger (as opposed to 
situational anger) has been the type of anger that has primarily been used in the 
literature (e.g. Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 2000; Brezina 1996, 1998; Capowich, 
Mazerolle, and Piquero 2001; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Mazerolle and Piquero 1997, 1998; 
Piquero and Sealock 2000, 2004).  Dispositional anger, or trait anger, is thought to be a 
personality trait, so that people who possess this trait are more likely to get angry in 
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 particular situations (Mazerolle, Piquero, and Capowich 2003).  Situational anger, in 
contrast, is an emotional state that is caused by a particular event or phenomenon.  
Mazerolle, Piquero, and Capowich (2003), however, demonstrated that although trait 
anger does predict situational anger, angry individuals are also more likely to engage in 
deviance regardless of strain.  In another study, Agnew et al. (2002) found that negative 
emotionality as a personality trait significantly predicts reacting to strain with deviance.  
It is clear that more research should be conducted to determine the relationships 
between strain, anger, and crime.  
Research does indicate that not all strain and negative emotional affect leads to 
crime, however.  Those strains that are most likely to lead to crime are those that are 
perceived as unjust, that are high in magnitude (that is, strains that are large, happen 
frequently or recently, or that threaten goals, values or needs), that are associated with 
low social control, and that are less easily resolved through legal means (Agnew 1992, 
2001; Brezina 2000; Broidy 2001).  Yet whether or not an individual responds to strain 
with crime is not only dependent upon the type of strain he or she experiences.   
Particular characteristics of the individual and his or her social environment can also 
affect whether or not a person will respond to the strain with crime.  One of these 
characteristics is the range of coping strategies an individual has developed to manage 
negative situations.  These can include behavioral coping strategies, which are attempts 
to alter the outcome of a strain, cognitive coping strategies, such as changing one’s 
perception on an issue, and emotional coping strategies that assuage negative emotions 
(Agnew 1992).  There are both criminal and noncriminal coping methods, but 
individuals who have developed better coping methods will be less likely to turn to 
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 criminal ones (Agnew 2005).  Broidy (2001) found that the type of emotional response 
affects whether legitimate coping strategies are used:  anger is much more likely to 
incite criminal or illegitimate coping.  Other factors that may influence a criminal 
outcome are individuals’ levels of social skills, problem-solving skills and social 
support (Agnew 1992, 2005; Paternoster and Mazzerole 1994; Wright and Cullen 
2001). 
 Although Agnew’s theory has opened up new avenues for strain theory, it has 
also been criticized for being too broad and being difficult to measure (Jensen 1995).  
Many studies have only been able to test parts of the theory at a time and some parts 
remain untested, such as racial prejudice and discrimination, resulting in a lack of 
knowledge about their relationship to crime (Agnew 2001).  The research that has been 
conducted, however, appears to find a relationship between certain types of strain and 
certain crimes, particularly verbal and physical assault, even when controlling for social 
control and learning variables (e.g. Agnew and White 1992; Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 
2000; Mazerolle and Piquero 1998; Paternoster and Mazerolle 1994).  Yet, much of the 
previous research on strain has been cross-sectional, and the longitudinal data that has 
been conducted does not appear to support GST (e.g. Agnew and White 1992; 
Hoffmann and Su 1997; Paternoster and Mazerolle 1994).  Agnew and White (1992) 
point out, however, that the effect of strain on deviance is fairly proximate, so it is 
unsurprising that the elapse of a long period of time between data points shows 
insignificant effects.  
 Most tests of General Strain Theory are tests of general delinquency, and no 
study has attempted to test sexual assault in a strain theory model.  Agnew (1992, 2001) 
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 argued that it is the cumulative effect of several strains that leads to delinquency.  Yet, 
because a variety of different types of strains are usually combined to measure a variety 
of different types of delinquency, little is known about which strains may lead to which 
types of delinquency.  Research has been able to sum up nicely the types of strains that 
are more likely to lead to general delinquency:  “assaults by parents, spouses/partners, 
teachers, and probably peers… parental rejection, poor school performance, and work 
problems, including work in the secondary labor market” (Agnew 2001: 325).  Studies 
are just beginning to show, however, that some types of strains may be more likely than 
others to lead to specific crimes (Agnew 2005).  For example, violence is found in 
many studies to be incited by physical provocation or insults, having property stolen, 
and one’s girlfriend being propositioned by someone else—yet these same strains do 
not appear to lead to property or drug crimes.  In contrast, property crimes appear at 
least partially motivated by the temporary need for money (Agnew 1990; Tedeschi and 
Felson 1994; Tunnell 1992; Wilkinson 2002; Wright and Decker 1997—all cited in 
Agnew 2006).   
Agnew’s General Strain Theory lends itself to a study of rape in at least three 
important ways based on many of the ideas advanced by feminist theories.  The 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining how GST can accommodate 
what we already know about rape to help advance a better theory about its cause. 
Masculinity, Crime, and Rape 
GST has begun to take the gendered social structure into account to explain why 
males and females have different rates of offending (Agnew and Brezina 1997; Broidy 
2001; Broidy and Agnew 1997; Piquero and Sealock 2004; Sharp et al. 2001; Sharp, 
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 Brewster and Love 2005).  Broidy and Agnew (1997) indicate that men and women 
experience different types of strain.  Women experience discrimination and are often 
the targets of harassment and abuse, and men are more likely to experience conflicts 
with others, particularly concerning material success and property.  Males are also more 
likely to experience interpersonal strain (Agnew and Brezina 1997), negative life events 
(Hoffman and Cerbone 1999), and physical punishment (Hay 2003) than females.  In 
addition to differing types of strain, males and females also have differing emotional 
responses to the strain.  Females experience more internalized emotions such as 
depression and guilt in addition to anger.  Therefore, they are more likely to engage in 
self-destructive deviance and may also lack the confidence or self-esteem to engage in 
more outwardly-directed deviance.  In contrast, males are not as likely to experience the 
internalized emotions along with anger (Broidy and Agnew 1997; Broidy 1997; Piquero 
and Sealock 2004; Sharp et al. 2001; Sharp, Brewster and Love 2005).   
Agnew (2001) further speculates that one reason why some strains lead to crime 
and others do not pertains to broader issues of the failure to achieve autonomy through 
threats to a male’s masculine status.  Other researchers document the importance of 
masculinity to males’ criminal behavior (Anderson 1999; Messerschmidt 1993).  
Actions that have been identified as “accomplishing masculinity” are “work in the paid 
labor market, the subordination of women, heterosexism, control, competitive 
individualism, independence, and aggressiveness” (Messerschmidt 1993:  82).  When 
males cannot achieve masculinity through these traditional outlets, they may respond 
with crime.  Although there is not one single gender-role standard for all men, one study 
identified five patterns of masculine ideology based on Brannon’s (1976) “blueprint for 
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 manhood:” (1) moderately traditional; (2) high status/low violence; (3) nontraditional; 
(4) high violence/moderately traditional; and (5) traditional (Fischer and Good 1998).  
The researchers hypothesize that men most likely to commit sexual assault would derive 
from the two groups that combine traditional masculinity with violence.   
There have been many studies that relate masculine ideology itself to sexual 
assault.  Murnen, Wright and Kaluzney (2002) performed a meta-analysis on thirty-nine 
studies using a total of eleven different scales to measure aspects of masculine ideology 
and understand how they are related to rape.  They found that all but one of the scales 
had statistically significant relationships with sexual assault.  The strongest predictors 
were “hostile masculinity” (Malamuth 1989a, 1989b; Malamuth et al. 1991) and 
“hypermasculinity” (Hamburger et al. 1996; Lackie and deMan 1997; Mahoney et al. 
1986; Mosher and Anderson 1986; Murnen 1988; Smeaton and Byrne 1987), which 
both include acceptance of aggression against women and negative beliefs about 
women.  “Sexual conservatism” had no effect on rape.  The weakest predictors were 
those in which gender-role adherence was measured (e.g. “Sex Role Stereotyping,” 
“Adversarial Sex Role Beliefs,” and “Instrumentality”).   
What is unknown, however, is how strongly the threat to the components of a 
masculine status is related to rape.  If males perceive that masculinity is clearly 
something distinct from femininity, they may feel that loss or perceived loss of 
masculine identity is a social strain, even when they are not particularly hostile toward 
women or prone to violence.  Examining perceived threats to masculine status rather 
than masculine ideology removes the focus of the previous studies from a personality 
variable to a social psychological variable.  This social psychological variable reveals 
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 the interactions between a man’s masculine identity with the social world and how he 
may feel strain when others do not treat him in a way that he feels he should be treated, 
based upon his status as a male.   
Availability of Sexual Partners 
Clark (1982) suggests that rape is the consequence of a male’s inability to 
legitimately acquire sexual intercourse.  A question that is unaddressed by this claim is  
what the actual injustice is.  Is the sex viewed by the rapists as something to be gained 
for its own sake for physical gratification, or is it viewed as a proxy of masculine 
status?  It is, therefore, possible to construe a separate but related strain to threats to 
masculine status through a failure to achieve sexual intercourse with women.   
In a patriarchal society where males are socialized to be sexually aggressive, one 
way to identify oneself as masculine is through heterosexuality as represented by 
successful and acceptable relationships with women.  Some males may experience a 
breach between their expectations and the reality of how women respond to their sexual 
advances or how much sex is available to them.  Therefore, if a man is unable to attain 
successful sexual relationships with women, he may feel strain due to an inability to 
“accomplish masculinity.”  Although there are no studies that examine the effect of 
social competence or intimacy with women as a predictor of rape in particular, in one 
study examining attitudes toward rape of convicted “johns,” the lower men perceived 
their social competence with women to be, the more they endorsed rape myths (Gamper 
2004).   Many rape myths, as previously noted, absolve the perpetrator for the rape.  
Agnew (2001) notes that those who are more likely to engage in crime due to strain are 
also more likely to blame others.  Though men who solicit prostitutes may not be 
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 representative of all men, they were used in Gamper’s (2004) study because previous 
research indicates that males who solicit prostitutes are more likely to report having a 
pattern of failed interactions with women and having a more difficult time establishing 
intimacy in outside of a prostitute relationship (Holzman and Pines 1982; Jordan 1997).       
Perhaps the availability of sexual partners affects rape merely through a 
frustration of sexual aspirations.  As Agnew (2001: 329) points out, the perception of 
injustice in an individual is likely to be influenced by interpretations provided by others 
and “(sub)cultural” beliefs associated with it.   If the rapists, therefore, felt that the 
distribution of sexual intercourse was unfavorable to them, it may have caused them to 
feel frustrated so that rape seemed like an acceptable way to correct the perceived 
imbalance.  After reviewing a series of studies that examined the possibility that lack of 
sexual access to females may result in rape, Pollard (1994) concluded that this did not 
have an effect on sexual coercion.  Malamuth (1996), however, found that males who 
felt their sexual access to women was restricted, in conjunction with hostility toward 
women, was correlated with a proclivity to rape.   
One researcher interviewed 71 self-described college date rapists who admitted 
they had forced a woman into sex at least once; only six had had charges brought 
against them and none had been convicted or penalized for their behavior (Kanin 1985).  
He also interviewed a control sample of men who claimed never to have forced women 
to have sex.  The rapists were more likely to lie, threaten, and give women drugs or 
alcohol in order to obtain sex than the control group.  Kanin (1985) explains this using 
relative deprivation theory:  the rapists claimed to have had significantly more sex 
during the previous year, but were much less satisfied with the amount of sex that they 
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 had had in the year of the study.   What appears to have made the difference between 
the control group and the rapists was peer influence:  85% of the rapists reported that 
their friends exerted a great deal, considerable, or moderate amount of influence on 
them to be sexually active, while only 37% of the control group reported pressure from 
friends at the same levels.  Furthermore, 93% of the rapists who felt this degree of 
pressure from friends thought rape could be justified under certain conditions; the 
rapists whose friends exerted little to no pressure to be sexually active (15%) were 
much less likely to justify rape (45%). 
Akers (1998) replicated the study, and found, similarly, that men who placed a 
high value on sexual access to women, but had a difficult time obtaining it, experienced 
a loss of self-esteem.  He also found, however, that these men who felt highly pressured 
to be sexually active and who felt sexually deprived were less likely to commit rape—
not more likely.    It is clear that the issue of dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual 
intercourse should be teased out further to understand its implications in the crime of 
rape. 
Situationally Impeded Attempts at Sexual Intercourse  
  A third way that strain may manifest itself and lead to rape is situationally.  
Situational anger has been found to be a much more powerful precursor to some forms 
of deviance than trait anger; even those who are dispositionally angry are more likely to 
be strained in certain situations and to become situationally angry (Mazerolle, Piquero 
and Capowich 2003).  When it comes to rape, Willan and Pollard (2003) discovered that 
in a particular situation if a man expects that sex will occur, for some men it is more 
likely to lead to frustration which is related to a greater likelihood to rape.   
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 Furthermore, two factors that affected the likelihood of rape were hostile beliefs about 
women and belief in rape myths.  In fact, the researchers found that the best predictor of 
acquaintance rape proclivity was the extent to which the man perceived that the woman 
had the intention of engaging in sexual intercourse.  Further, the men believed that the 
women had given their consent at very early stages in the script—either when she 
kissed him or when she agreed to go out with him.   At these stages, the men had 
already formed the expectation that sexual intercourse was going to occur, setting 
themselves up for strain and frustration.   
 There are, as presented then, a multitude of ways that strain may operate in 
conjunction with feminist theories to produce rape:  perceptions of threats to masculine 
status, dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained, and perceptions 
of unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse.   
Why Rape?   
In response to the micro-level feminist conundrum posed at the end of Chapter 
3, “Are rapists ‘regular guys’ or ‘hypermasculine predators,” it appears that GST 
would predict that rapists are neither “regular guys” nor “hypermasculine” predators.  
GST would likely claim that men who rape experience a particular form of strain that 
induces them to be more likely to rape.  Because “regular guys” may at times feel these 
strains, characteristics such as coping strategies that constrain most of them from 
engaging in rape are what distinguish rapists from non-rapists.  Yet, because 
masculinity itself predisposes men to these particular strains, they do not need to be 
“hypermasculine” in order to be vulnerable to the strain that causes the deviance.     
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 Feminist theory has made clear that, if nothing else, rape cannot be ignored as a 
gendered crime.  Strain theory agrees, as there are several factors pertaining to 
masculinity that not only make it particularly salient to crime, but to the crime of rape.  
Males who are unable to achieve masculinity through other means may respond with 
rape.  Furthermore, males who experience strain due to a lack of sexual access to 
women or thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse may attempt to exert their masculine 
status through rape, as sex with women is one way that males prove their masculinity. 
 Unlike goals of educational and occupational success, masculine status goals 
are not always associated with high levels of social control; individuals who attempt to 
achieve masculine status may not necessarily be attached to conventional people or 
values (Agnew 2006).  Masculine status achievement is also not necessarily related to 
lowered social control, because the achievement of masculine status is not perceived as 
wrong, nor are many methods for achieving it.  What does appear to be related to the 
achievement of masculine status is exposure to deviant groups (Matza and Sykes 1961), 
particularly when it comes to rape (Schwartz et al. 2001; Schwartz and Nogrady 1996).    
Campus fraternities are notorious for sexually victimizing women (Bohmer and Parrot 
1993; Sanday 1990; Warshaw 1988) because of the focus on male bonding and 
conformity (Boumil, Friedman and Taylor 1993; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997) and 
because of a narrow conception of masculinity, group secrecy, and the objectification of 
women (Martin and Hummer 1989).  Fraternity men, overall, are more likely to 
sexually abuse women (Schwartz 1995).  What is unknown is whether individuals self-
select into fraternities precisely because they provide these types of environments or 
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 whether they learn the attitudes and behaviors after joining the fraternities (Muir 1991; 
Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).   
The social learning of rape as an appropriate response to strain helps to explain 
why rape exists as a particular response to particular strains.  The strain may in fact 
foster the social learning of criminal behavior—that sexual assault is acceptable and 
justified under certain conditions.  Both masculine status and sex can be easily achieved 
through rape by people who believe that sexual assault is an appropriate means of 
gaining them.  Ultimately, however, criminal coping is more likely when the costs of 
crime are low (Agnew 1992), and the costs of rape continue to be low for rapists, who 
stand a minimal chance of arrest, conviction, and sentencing, or even of accusation, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  This low cost can be contrasted with the idea that rape is 
justified under particular conditions—when a man is not being treated as he wants to be 
treated (is under strain) and holds rape myth attitudes that rationalize the woman’s own 
victimization.  When men feel that the strain they experience is unjustified, they are 
more likely to engage in rape.  Some perceptions that affect whether the strain felt is 
unjustified are whether the process used to inflict the strain was unjust, if the treatment 
is different than that others receive or different from what they have received in the 
past, or if the treatment violates social norms or values or is perceived as disrespectful 
or inconsiderate (Agnew 2006).  Therefore, men who feel women are capricious in their 
sexual attention by giving it to them at one point in time, but not at other points in time, 
or by giving it to some men but not to others may feel that this female behavior 
unjustified, particularly if they feel it also violates social norms that a woman does not 
really have the right to say no once she has said yes.   
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 There are, then, many ways that GST may specifically explain how rape is a 
direct response to specific types of strain related to masculinity.  One potential problem 
with this thesis, however, is a result found in a test for GST by Agnew and White 
(1992).  The researchers found that unpopularity with the opposite sex, as measured by 
whether the respondents were “very bothered” by the fact that they are not good looking 
and are not popular with the opposite sex, was found to have an insignificant 
relationship with delinquency.  Respondents were asked about general delinquency 
items such as stealing, breaking into buildings, assault, running away from home, and 
cutting school.  However, there was no item on the scale pertaining to sexual coercion.  
Furthermore, Agnew (2001) states that the reason why unpopularity with peers is 
unlikely to relate to delinquency is that it increases social control by increasing time 
spent with parents and that it does not create much pressure or incentive for crime.  This 
is not necessarily true in the case of unpopularity with the opposite sex, and, in fact, it 
may lead to both the social learning of deviance and social pressure to relieve the strain 
as peers tease the male for being unmasculine or share techniques for coercing an 
unwilling female.  One researcher describes overhearing a disturbed male 
undergraduate discuss a date with his friends, in which he took a woman out for dinner 
who later refused to have sex with him, and some of his friends claim that he should 
have physically forced her to have sex (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).  Similarly, in 
the recent film The 40-Year Old Virgin, once the main character’s co-workers find out 
that he has never had sexual intercourse, they immediately begin to provide him with 
strategies for finding a sexual partner, one of which includes plying women with 
alcohol at bars.  Although these examples are anecdotal, it remains highly likely that 
 87
 unpopularity with the opposite sex—measured as a rape-specific strain—may be related 
to sexual coercion.   
Hypotheses 
In combining GST with feminist theories to explain rape outcomes, I propose a 
test of the following hypotheses: 
H1.  Men who are under rape-specific strain (perception that their masculinity is 
threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained, or 
the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse) are more likely 
to feel strain-induced negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional 
values, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth 
acceptance constant. 
H2.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will experience higher 
levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional values, coping 
strategies, benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant.  
H3.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will experience higher 
levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional values, coping 
strategies, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant.  
H4.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will experience 
higher levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional values, 
coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism.  
H5.  Men who experience rape-specific strains and subsequent negative 
emotional responses are more likely to report past sexually coercive behaviors, 
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 holding demographics, traditional values, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, 
hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant. 
H6.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will be more likely to report 
past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, traditional values, 
strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and rape 
myth acceptance constant.   
H7.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will be more likely to 
report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, traditional 
values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and 
rape myth acceptance constant.     
H8.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will be more likely 
to report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, traditional 
values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and 
benevolent sexism.   
H9.  Men who experience rape-specific strains and subsequent negative 
emotional responses are more likely to report a proclivity to rape, holding 
demographics, traditional values, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, hostile 
sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant. 
H10.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will be more likely to 
report a proclivity to rape, holding demographics, traditional values, strain, 
negative emotional states, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and rape myth 
acceptance constant.  
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 H11.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will be more likely to 
report a proclivity to rape holding demographics, traditional values, strain, 
negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and rape myth 
acceptance constant.   
H12.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will be more likely 
to report a proclivity to rape holding demographics, traditional values, strain, 
negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and benevolent 
sexism. 
H13.  Men who report higher levels of strain (perception that their masculinity is 
threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained, or 
the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse), negative 
emotional affect (anger or negative emotionality), benevolent sexism, hostile 
sexism, and rape myth acceptance will be more likely to report past sexually 
coercive behaviors, holding demographics, traditional values, and coping 
strategies constant. 
H14.  Men who report higher levels of strain (perception that their masculinity is 
threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained, or 
the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse), negative 
emotional affect (anger or negative emotionality), benevolent sexism, hostile 
sexism, and rape myth acceptance will be more likely to report a proclivity to 
rape, holding demographics, traditional values, and coping strategies constant. 
Figure 1 contains a theoretical model of the hypotheses in this study.  Because  
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 of the specific nature of masculine status, no measures of social control are being tested.  
Social control does not appear to be effective for reducing actions that are socially 
acceptable to some degree, as previously discussed.  The idea that men learn the 
behavior from their social environments is only measured indirectly through the 
feminist theory variables (as measures of sexism and rape myth acceptance that men 
acquire).  Peer support variables are generally unable to establish time order for whether 
individuals learn sexually coercive tactics from friends or seek out friends who will 
accept their sexually coercive attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997), 
a problem that is beyond the scope of this study, and are therefore not included in this 
research.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 Chapter 5 
Methodology 
 
 Originally, this dissertation was scheduled to include data from females as well 
as males.  Therefore, the discussion of the methodology section will include some 
information in the protocol about data collection from females, although the data 
collected from females are not analyzed or discussed in this project.   
Pilot Study 
 A pilot study was conducted on 39 respondents, 18 males and 21 females 
enrolled in a Sociology Capstone course (senior seminar course) in April 2005.  The 
original survey design asked male respondents to rate how well they knew the women 
whom they had sexually coerced, yet several students commented that this format was 
confusing, and that it made the section too convoluted.  Therefore, I removed the 
questions pertaining to victim-offender relationship hoping that it would make the 
section cleaner and therefore more inviting to respondents, and, therefore, fewer would 
leave it blank.  Because this is a preliminary study testing the viability of General Strain 
Theory combined with feminist theories as an explanation for rape, I did not view this 
decision as detrimental to this particular study, although future studies, perhaps those 
using fewer questions, should attempt to include the important details about the 
relationship between offender and victim. 
 Due to comments made by students on the survey, I made two other important 
changes in the survey instrument.  First was the decision to move the general 
delinquency scale closer to the beginning of the survey to separate it from the questions 
about sexual coercion.  Second was the decision to remove a potentially offensive item 
from the survey that was included in the Perceived Threats to Masculinity Scale:  “You 
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 have to fuck some women before they know who’s boss.”  Males in the pilot study 
reacted negatively to the word “fuck” in the survey and I did not want to run the risk of 
alienating respondents, so I eliminated the item with minimal harm to the scale overall.  
Because the Perceived Threats to Masculinity Scale was a new creation, I tested the 
reliability of the items and found that alpha for the scale was .74, and therefore, did not 
alter the scale prior to using it for the main study, except for the removal of this item.2   
Respondents in the pilot study were also asked to rate the believability of the 
vignette to ensure it was useful for the actual study:  “Please rate the story on how 
realistic it is.  (By realistic, we mean how likely in general it is to happen to anyone, if 
not necessarily to you).”  This statement was followed by a 5 point Likert-type scale in 
which 1 indicated not at all or very unrealistic, 2 indicated somewhat realistic, 3 
indicated neither realistic nor unrealistic, 4 indicated somewhat realistic, and 5 indicated 
very realistic.  Seven of the male respondents failed to answer anything on the last page 
on which this question was asked, but of the remaining eleven respondents, the mean 
for their scores was 3.72 and the median and mode were 4, which all indicate somewhat 
realistic.  Therefore, the vignette was retained as used in the pilot study. 
Sample and Participants 
 A closed-ended survey consisting of 136 questions was distributed to 298 males 
in seven introductory sociology courses with the permission of the instructors.     
Addressing the study to college students is considered appropriate because they are an 
extremely high-risk population for sexually coercive experiences (Forbes and Adams-
Curtis 2001).   The Introductory course was selected because it is a course students may 
                                                 
2 Alpha for the Perceived Threats to Masculinity Scale with the item “You have to fuck some women 
before they know who’s boss” included was .76. 
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 select from for a general education social science requirement even if they are not 
sociology majors.  Because students may also take an introductory course in either 
Anthropology or Psychology instead, college major was one of the variables controlled 
for in the study, as students attracted to sociology as their pre-planned major may have 
different attitudes and experiences.  The mean age of the respondents was 19.8 with a 
range of 18 to 31.3  Seventy-one percent of the sample were either freshmen or  
sophomores and eighty-two percent of the respondents were white.   
Protocol 
 
I had originally intended to collect data from Introductory courses in Sociology, 
Psychology and Anthropology, covering all three general education social science 
requirements, but the Institutional Review Board (IRB) would have required me to go 
through the Psychology department’s special system of recruiting and doing research 
outside class time.  This was not a problem, but because that department offers extra 
credit or grade incentives to students for participating in research, it was suggested to 
me by a member of the IRB that I should offer incentives as well in order to recruit 
students in the Psychology department in order to have my proposal approved.  I, 
therefore, revised my project to recruit subjects from within my home department of 
Sociology only, as this type of data collection had been approved by others in the 
department in the past, and I was familiar with the process and could explain it to the 
IRB if necessary. 
Instructors teaching Introduction to Sociology courses were sent an E-mail prior 
to the start of the Fall 2005 semester describing my study and asking their permission to 
administer the questionnaire in their courses.  All but one agreed to let me administer 
                                                 
3 Four respondents who were under age 18 were eliminated from the analysis, as will be discussed later. 
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 the survey to their students and scheduled a date on which it would be convenient for 
me to do so. 
I also collected data from female students that are not included in this 
dissertation, so both male and female students were given a survey instrument.  In some 
classes, I arrived at the beginning of the class period, and in some, I arrived at the end, 
depending on the instructor’s preference.  Upon my arrival to the class, I passed out the 
cover letter and read the recruitment script to the students.  Because it would be the only 
identifying data linking them to this research, respondents were not required to sign 
consent forms.  They then had the opportunity to ask questions, although none did at 
that time.  The Institutional Review Board required me to institute a unique procedure 
for students who did not want to participate:  all students were required to remain in 
class and take a survey.  Those students who did not want to participate had to wait 10-
15 minutes to submit their blank surveys so that no one in the room knew exactly who 
was and who was not participating.   
 The surveys took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.  Once they were 
completed, respondents placed them in an empty box at the front of the room, far away 
from where I was seated.  I was careful to have other information in front of me that I 
could read or work on, so that students would not be under the impression that I was 
watching them.  Occasionally, a student would approach me with a concern about a 
question in the survey or to clarify what a question meant, and I would do my best to 
reword the question while remaining neutral as to how he should answer.   
 Upon completion of the survey, students took a debriefing handout, which 
explained the purpose of the study again, apologized for asking for personal information 
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 and exposing them to the explicit content in the vignette (more on the vignette below), 
and provided the contact information for several counseling clinics in the area.   
 
Variable Measurement 
 
The survey measured the following independent variables:  hostile sexism, 
benevolent sexism, rape myth acceptance, strain, negative affect, and coping strategies.  
The following control variables were also included:  age, college year, race/ethnicity, 
religion, major, and traditional values.  The dependent variables for the survey were 
sexual coercion and proclivity to rape.   A general delinquency scale was also included.  
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for each of these variables.  Year in college is 
abbreviated CollYear, fundamentalist Protestantism is abbreviated FundProt, traditional 
values is abbreviated TradValue, perceived threats to masculinity is abbreviated 
ThreatMasc, dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained is 
abbreviated DisSatSex, thwarted attempt at sexual intercourse is abbreviated ThwartSex, 
negative emotional affect is abbreviated NegEmotAfft, the coping strategies variable is 
abbreviated  CopeStrat, benevolent sexism and hostile sexism are abbreviated 
BenSexism and HosSexism respectively, rape myth acceptance is abbreviated RapeMyth, 
past sexually coercive behaviors is abbreviated PastRapes and rape proclivity is 
abbreviated PropToRape. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Age 
 
 Students specified their age in an open-ended question.  These ages were coded  
 
directly as reported.  Four students who reported that they were 17 were dropped from  
 
the analysis because of their status as minors, which were excluded from the protocol  
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 participation description submitted to the IRB. 
 
 
College Year 
 
 Students were asked to specify their year in school, with 1 being Freshman, 2 
being sophomore, 3 being Junior, 4 being senior and 0 being other, with those reporting 
“other” being asked to specify their circumstances.  All students, however, reported that 
they were either freshmen, sophomores, juniors, or seniors. 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
 Students were asked to specify their race or ethnicity in a closed-ended question 
with the choices being Asian-American, Black/African-American, Latino/Hispanic, 
Native American/American Indian, White/European-American, Mixed Ethnic Heritage 
or Other.  Those who reported mixed heritage or something other than what was 
categorized here were asked to specify their racial heritage.  From these data, two 
dummy variables were created.  For the first dummy variable (Blacks), Blacks/African-
Americans were coded 1, and everyone else was coded 0.  For the second dummy 
variable (Other Non-whites), Asian-Americans, Latino/Hispanics, Native 
Americans/American Indians, Other and those of mixed ethnic heritage were coded 1 
and Blacks/African-Americans and Whites/European-Americans were coded 0.   
 
Religion 
 
 Although religion is generally not included as a control variable in studies of 
crime, this particular area of the country, and, indeed, the university has a high number 
of Fundamentalist Protestants.  Therefore, I wanted to control for this factor in my 
analyses.  The following question was asked regarding religion:   
What is your religion?  NOTE:  Protestant Fundamentalists take a strict 
interpretation of the Bible. 
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   -Protestant Fundamentalist 
  -Protestant non-Fundamentalist 
  -Catholic 
  -Jewish 
  -None 
  -Other _____________________ 
 
 Twenty-eight percent of the respondents indicated that they were 
Fundamentalist Protestant.  Students who merely specified that they were “Christian” 
were placed into an “Other Christian” category during analysis.  A dummy variable was 
created from this variable in which Fundamentalist Protestants were coded 1 and all 
other responses were coded 0.  Twenty-two missing cases were coded as non-
Fundamentalist Protestant. 
Major 
 
 Respondents were asked their major in an open-ended question.  A dummy 
variable was created from the responses.  If they indicated that their major was either 
Sociology, Psychology or Anthropology, they were coded 1, and all other responses, 
including “undecided,” were coded 0.  The decision to exclude other majors such as 
political science that are sometimes considered a social science was made due to 
university designations of these three majors—sociology, psychology and 
anthropology—as those that comprise the general education requirement for “social 
science.”  Three missing cases were coded as non-social science majors. 
Traditional Values 
 
 I used the moral traditionalism scale (Conover and Feldman 1985) to measure 
“individuals’ tolerance of modern moral standards and their evaluations of the impact of 
changing morés on society” (Shaver, Robinson and Wright 1999: 138).   Appendix A 
contains a full list of the items in the scale.  Individuals who are more traditional in their 
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 values should be predisposed to have more sexist attitudes, to believe rape myths, and 
males may be more likely to feel strain when male dominance is threatened at a societal 
level or when their masculinity is threatened at an individual level.  Responses were 
measured with a 6 point Likert-type scale with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being 
somewhat disagree, 3 being disagree, 4 being agree, 5 being somewhat agree, and 6 
being strongly agree.   Items were coded so that high numbers indicated more 
traditional values.  The scale was additive and composed of eight items.  Alpha in my 
study was .86.   
Hostile Sexism/Benevolent Sexism 
 Both hostile and benevolent sexism were measured using Glick and Fiske’s 22-
item Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1997).  Items measuring hostile 
sexism include, “Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist,” and 
“Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight 
leash.”  Items measuring benevolent sexism include, “Many women have a quality of 
purity that few men possess,” and “A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her 
man.”  Appendix B contains a full list of the items in the scale, along with which 
correspond with hostile sexism and which correspond with benevolent sexism.  Internal 
consistency reliability for both has been high in the past, with alphas in the .8 to .9 
range (Glick and Fiske 1997).  Dr. Peter Glick provided permission for me to use the 
scale in my research.  Responses were measured with a 6 point Likert-type scale with 1 
being strongly disagree, 2 being somewhat disagree, 3 being disagree, 4 being agree, 5 
being somewhat agree, and 6 being strongly agree.  In nine cases in the benevolent 
sexism scale and in eight cases in the hostile sexism scale, respondents failed to answer 
one item each in the scale.  Therefore, the mean for those items was imputed prior to 
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 creation of the scale.  Items were coded so that high scores indicated high levels of 
either benevolent or hostile sexism.  In my study, alpha was .76 for the benevolent 
sexism scale and .85 for the hostile sexism scale.  Both scales were additive. 
Rape Myth Acceptance  
 Many previous studies have used Burt’s (1980) Rape Myth Acceptance scale 
which has been criticized for psychometric considerations (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 
1994).  In terms of content validity, there is no clear articulation of the construct and its 
facets or why Burt (1980) measured some rape myths but not others or appeared to give 
more weight to some than others (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994).  Criterion-related 
validity issues include problematic and complex wording and colloquial phrases such as 
“fair game” and “necking” (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994).    
 In response, Lonsway and Fitzgerald developed an improved measure of rape 
myth acceptance (Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald 1999).   They combined all items on 
all scales previously used to study rape myth acceptance and gave the questionnaire to 
almost 800 individuals, rewording some questions for clarity.  Cluster analyses revealed 
seven components to the myths, and structural equation models revealed that rape myth 
acceptance was best characterized not as a unidimensional model or as a 
multidimensional model, but as a hierarchical model in which each component revealed 
in the cluster analysis helps contribute to the overarching construct of “rape myth 
acceptance.” 
 The full version of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (Payne, Lonsway, 
and Fitzgerald 1999) contains 45 items.  However, I used the short-form version of 20 
items, with a reported alpha of .87.  It measures the following myths:  “She asked for 
it,” “It wasn’t really rape,” “He didn’t mean to,” “She wanted it,” “She lied,” “Rape is a 
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 trivial event,” and “Rape is a deviant event.”  Responses were measured with a 6 point 
Likert-type scale with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being somewhat disagree, 3 being 
disagree, 4 being agree, 5 being somewhat agree, and 6 being strongly agree.   High 
scores indicated higher levels of rape myth acceptance.  Appendix C contains a full list 
of all 20 items used.  In seven cases, respondents failed to answer one item in the scale, 
and the mean for that item was imputed prior to the creation of the scale.  Alpha for this 
additive scale in the current study was .83. 
Strain  
 I measured three very specific types of strain:  (1) perceived threats to 
masculinity (a negative stimulus); (2) dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse 
(an obstructed goal) ; and (3) thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse in a particular 
situation (an obstructed goal).  I also measured each both objectively and subjectively, 
as described below.      
Perceived Threats to Masculinity 
 Because research suggested that only traditional definitions of masculinity that 
included violence would be predisposed to sexual aggression, this variable measured 
only perceived threats to traditional masculinity, as it was assumed that males who 
were less traditional would be less likely to feel threatened by any changes to gender 
roles.  Therefore, to measure the first type of strain, perceived threats to masculinity, I 
composed a scale containing items from the following previously written scales:  
Attitudes Toward Women (Spence and Helmreich 1972), Hostility Toward Women 
(Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1995), Hypermasculinity (Mosher and Sirkin 1984), 
Adversarial Heterosexual Beliefs (Lonsway and Fizgerald 1995) and Attitudes Toward 
Feminism and the Women’s Movement (Fassinger 1994).   Responses were measured 
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 with a 6 point Likert-type scale with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being somewhat 
disagree, 3 being disagree, 4 being agree, 5 being somewhat agree, and 6 being strongly 
agree.  The items included clearly specified a characterization of masculinity as 
something that is something separate and distinct from feminity (hence, traditional) or 
recognized a threat to this definition or both.  Some examples of these items include 
“Any man who is a man needs to have sex regularly,”  “I feel upset even by slight 
criticism from women,” and “When women enter the workforce, they are taking jobs 
away from men.”  I also created two of my own items:  “It was a lot better for everyone 
when there was less confusion about what being a man really means” and “Feminists 
are trying too hard to turn men into women and women into men.”  Sixteen items were 
used in this scale.  Appendix D contains a list of all items used.  After administering the 
survey to the respondents, however, eliminating two of the items (“Women should 
assume their rightful place in business and other professions alongside men” and 
“Lesbians have chosen a particular lifestyle and should be respected for it”) 
significantly improved the reliability of the scale to .84.  The scale was additive, and all 
items were coded so that higher scores indicate a greater agreement with the perception 
that traditional masculinity is being threatened.  The items for this scale were on the last 
two pages of the survey, and 53 respondents stopped filling out the survey before 
arriving at this section, likely due to running out of time to complete the survey.   
To compare those who did not respond to the questions for this scale to those 
who did, the non-responders (those who were coded as missing a score for the threats to 
masculinity scale) were coded as 1 and the responders were coded as 0.  Chi-square 
values for all of the demographic (control) variables were then obtained to determine if 
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 there was a difference between the responders and the non-responders.  The results are 
reported in Table 3.  There were no statistically significant demographic differences 
between those who did not complete the threats to masculinity scale questions and those 
who did.  Therefore, these 53 cases were eliminated from the analyses. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Dissatisfaction With Amount of Sexual Intercourse 
 The second type of strain was measured with the following statement along with 
a 6 point Likert-type scale with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being somewhat disagree, 3 
being disagree, 4 being agree, 5 being somewhat agree, and 6 being strongly agree.   “I 
am satisfied with the amount of sex that I have had in the past year.”   Because 
dissatisfaction is the independent variable of interest, I recoded the responses so that 
high numbers indicated more dissatisfaction rather than more satisfaction.  The mean 
was 2 (agree), and 74% of the respondents indicated that they were satisfied to some 
degree with the amount of sexual intercourse that they had been able to obtain.  The z-
scores of this variable were used in the analyses.  In five cases, respondents failed to 
answer this question; therefore, these cases were eliminated from the analyses. 
Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse 
 Finally, I measured the third type of strain using a vignette modeled on one from 
Willan and Pollard (2003) that has been updated and “Americanized”.4  Using vignettes 
requires a suspension of disbelief in research studies.  However, if men perceive 
something like this to be in the “realm of possibility,” it is possible to measure whether 
it could be perceived as a strain to an individual at a future time.  Agnew (2002: 610) 
                                                 
4 Willan and Pollard’s vignette (2003) was administered to British students and refers to “fifty-pence 
pieces” and “knickers.”  I have made substitutions using American terms where appropriate.   
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 refers to these as “vicarious strains”—strains that occur to the members of groups to 
which we belong or with which we identify:  “We are more likely to care about these 
others and to believe that their strains may befall us.”   
The value in using vignettes already tested is to ensure reliability in 
measurement.  In the vignette, two college students, Bobby and Heather, go on a date 
and end up at the male’s dorm room.  The woman states she has to leave soon, but then 
the couple begins kissing and removing clothing.  Eventually, the woman stops the 
activity before sexual intercourse can occur and says she has to go home.  The purpose 
of the vignette was to standardize a scenario in which the male respondents could 
potentially see themselves and then ask a series of questions relating to how just or fair 
the woman’s behavior was and what emotions such a situation would invoke.  Because 
the IRB members referred to this vignette as a “manipulation,” they appeared concerned 
with the explicitness of the description of sexuality and how sexually aroused and/or 
frustrated it would make the respondents.  Thus, the final version of the survey 
contained a vignette which did not contain as much sexual description as the original 
version.  This may have had an impact on the results, as I was unable to model it 
specifically after the vignette in the original study, and therefore, respondents may have 
been left with a more ambiguous impression about whether sexual intercourse was 
imminent because language was changed and “stages” leading to sexual intercourse 
were eliminated from the vignette.   Appendix E contains the vignette that was used in 
the study. 
 Ultimately, however, I created seven statements to measure expectations about 
what the respondents believe should have happened in the scenario and the range of 
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 emotions caused by the gap in expectations and what actually happened.  Appendix F 
contains a list of the items used for this scale.  Each was  followed by a 6 point Likert-
type scale with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 being somewhat disagree, 3 being disagree, 
4 being agree, 5 being somewhat agree, and 6 being strongly agree.   All items were 
coded so that high scores indicated that sex was expected to occur and that negative 
emotional affect would result in this situation if it did not, and the scale was additive.  
Five respondents failed to answer one of the questions for the scale.  Therefore, the 
mean was imputed for the item only prior to the creation of the scale.  Alpha for this 
scale was .75.   
Negative Affect 
 I included items for two emotional affect scales (“anger” and “negative 
emotional response” scales) developed by Sharp, Brewster and Love (2005) that asks 
respondents how they respond when bad things happen to them.  Appendix G contains a 
list of the items.  A 5 point Likert-type scale was used with 1 being never, 2 being 
rarely, 3 being sometimes, 4 being frequently, and 5 being always.  A factor analysis 
was conducted to determine which items belonged on which scale.  All items were 
entered into a principal-component analysis and the solution subjected to varimax 
rotation; two clear factors emerged, with “anger” being one of them.  Although in the 
research conducted by Sharp, Brewster and Love (2005), “frustration” and “resentment” 
were included in the anger scales, I included them with the other items in the negative 
emotional response scale because they loaded with the other emotions and the 
conceptual measures of these emotions:  depression, guilt, and anxiety.  Therefore, the 
“anger” scale contains the items:  “Blow up,” “Take it out on others,” and “Take it out 
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 on things.”   Alpha for the “anger” scale is .65.  Alpha for the negative emotional 
response scale is .82.  Both of these scales were additive. 
Coping Strategies  
 
 In order to determine the legitimate coping strategies that individuals use when 
they experience blocked goals and stressful life events, I used a list developed by 
Broidy (2001) that contains legal methods of coping from three types of coping 
strategies identified by Agnew (1992):  cognitive, behavioral, and emotional.  
Illegitimate strategies are not included, although some research has used scales that 
include illegitimate coping methods.  Broidy (2001) did not find evidence for three 
distinct coping strategies, but alpha was .71 in her analysis for a scale in which all items 
were combined.  Examples of the coping strategies included are “I ignore it and think 
about the goals I did accomplish” (cognitive), “I try to figure out where I went wrong so 
that I can change the outcome” (behavioral), and “I try talking to friends or family 
members to make myself feel better” (emotional).  Appendix H contains a list of all of 
the items used in the coping strategies scale.  I used a Likert-type scale with 1 being 
never, 2 being rarely, 3 being sometimes, 4 being frequently, and 5 being always.5     
 In a factor analysis, as expected, the coping strategies did not load into the three 
predicted factors:  cognitive, behavioral, and emotional.  They instead originally loaded 
onto five factors.  I tried using a three-factor solution and a two-factor solution, but 
                                                 
5 Both the coping strategies scale and the negative affect scale contained an item about withdrawal.  All 
negative affect and coping strategies items were preceded by the following lead-in:  “Sometimes bad 
things happen in our lives.  Which of the following do you do when bad things happen to you?”  The 
coping strategies item pertaining to withdrawal was “I am likely to withdraw from friends and family and 
spend most of my time alone until I feel better” and the negative affect item was “Withdraw (example:  
become quiet, withdrawn, don’t talk much, feel bad inside).  Because including both would have been 
redundant for respondents as all of these items were included together under this heading in the same 
section, only the negative affect item on withdrawal was included, although it was checked for reliability 
with both coping strategies and negative affect scales.  See descriptions of these scales for results.  
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 variables from all three types loaded sporadically on each factor in a way that did not 
make theoretical sense.  Therefore, I did as Broidy (2001) had done and summed all 
items into one scale.  Alpha for this additive scale was .65.  Eliminating items did not 
improve alpha to the level that Broidy found in her research. 
Past Sexually Coercive Behavior 
 I used a modified version of the Sexual Experiences Survey (Koss and Oros 
1982), which, without using the word “rape” or any language indicating force, examines 
the type of behavior used by the perpetrator to obtain unwanted sexual activity.  The 
original survey contained ten items:   
1.  Have you had sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse)  
when the woman didn’t want to because she felt overwhelmed by your continual 
arguments and pressure?   
2. Have you had sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse) 
when the woman didn’t want to because you used your position of authority (boss, 
teacher, camp counselor, supervisor) to make her?   
3.  Have you had sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse) 
when the woman didn’t want to because you threatened or used some degree of physical 
force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.) to make her?   
 4.  Have you attempted sexual intercourse (got on top, attempted to insert your 
penis) when a woman didn’t want to by threatening or using some degree of physical 
force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.) but intercourse did not occur?   
 5.  Have you attempted sexual intercourse (got on top, attempted to insert your 
penis) when a woman didn’t want to by giving her alcohol or drugs, but intercourse did 
not occur?   
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  6.  Have you had sexual intercourse with a woman when she did not want to 
because she was overwhelmed by your continual arguments and pressure?   
7.  Have you had sexual intercourse with a woman when she did not want to 
because you used your position of authority (boss, teacher, camp counselor, supervisor) 
to make her?   
8.  Have you had sexual intercourse with a woman when she did not want to 
because you gave her alcohol or drugs?   
9.   Have you had sexual intercourse with a woman when she did not want to 
because you threatened or used some degree of physical force (twisting her arm, 
holding her down, etc.) to make her?   
10.  Have you had sexual intercourse (anal or oral intercourse or penetration by 
objects other than the penis) with a woman when she did not want to because you 
threatened or used some degree of physical force (twisting her arm, holding her down, 
etc.) to make her?   
My goals in modifying the scale were to use items that both met my own 
definition of rape, and would also glean information with as little redundancy as 
possible.  As much as possible, I wanted to avoid having respondents misunderstand the 
questions and answer incorrectly or simply skip over them.  Therefore, I eliminated all 
of the questions about “sex play,” as my study is concerned with the act of rape itself, 
and those particular questions did not include any description of penetration.  I also 
eliminated all of the questions about attempted sexual coercion, as attempted rape is 
also not the focus of this study.   I eliminated the question about using a position of 
authority to acquire sexual intercourse.   Although I certainly consider this type of 
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 action coercion, the “force” involved in the scenario is at the level of a structural power 
imbalance, where the woman has a choice between unwanted sexual intercourse or 
other unpleasant consequences if she does not comply.  The coercion is designed to 
look like the woman has a choice because it is structural.  This is a less immediate type 
of coercion than the others, although certainly no less serious, but it does not meet my 
definition of rape.   I also eliminated the final question because my definition of rape 
includes all types of penetration to be rape.  This inclusive definition was provided to 
respondents, so that there was no need to have a separate question.  The other three 
questions in the survey were retained, although the wording was altered slightly to be 
more readable.  The question pertaining to alcohol and drugs was altered the most, as 
this question had been previously criticized for being vague because it was not clear 
whether the women were given alcohol or drugs with or without their consent or 
whether they were given alcohol or drugs in exchange for sex (Sommers 1994).  
Therefore, I changed the wording of this question to reflect both the literature and my 
definition of rape.  The final question read, “Have you ever had sexual intercourse with 
a woman who had been taking drugs or drinking and could not or did not resist or say 
that she didn’t want to?”  I also added two additional questions that tapped into rape 
myths and measured aspects of my definition that were not measured with these 
questions.   One of these asked if the men had had sexual intercourse with a woman 
when she did not want to because he felt it was useless to stop himself.  The other asked 
if the men had had sexual intercourse with a woman who said she did not want to, but 
he did not believe her.  Appendix I contains a final list of the six questions as given to 
the respondents.  
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 The questions required “yes” or “no” responses, and no was coded 0 and yes 
was coded 1.   Forty-three respondents failed to answer these questions; only five of 
these answered any questions later in the survey.6  To compare those who did not 
respond to the questions for this scale to those who did, the non-responders (those who 
were coded as missing a score for the past sexually coercive behaviors scale) were 
coded as 1 and the responders were coded as 0.  Chi-square values for all of the 
demographic (control) variables were then obtained to determine if there was a 
difference between the responders and the non-responders.  The results are reported in 
Table 4.  There were no statistically significant demographic differences between those 
who did not answer the questions about their past sexually coercive behaviors and those 
who did.  Thus all 43 cases were eliminated from the analysis.  
[Table 4 about here] 
To perform the principal analyses in this research, the yes responses were 
summed together to create a “Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors Scale” ranging from 0 
to 6.  Eighty percent of the respondents who answered this question had not committed 
any of the rapes.  Fourteen percent had committed one of the types of coercion, 3% had 
committed two, 2% had committed three, and 1% had committed four.  The most 
common format for sexual coercion occurred in conjunction with alcohol or drugs on 
the part of the female victim:  “Have you ever had sexual intercourse with a woman 
who had been taking drugs or drinking and could not or did not resist or say that she 
didn’t want to?”  Fourteen percent of all respondents answered that they had.   
Likelihood of Future Coercive Behavior  
                                                 
6 The 53 respondents who did not answer the questions pertaining to the Perceived Threats to Masculinity 
scale do not overlap with this number.  Therefore, a total of 96 respondents did not answer either or both 
of these sections of the survey. 
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 I asked the following question and included a 5 point Likert-type scale with 1 
being not likely at all, 2 being very unlikely, 3 being neither likely or unlikely, 4 being 
somewhat likely, and 5 being very likely:  “How likely would you personally be to rape 
a woman if you were assured that you would neither be caught nor punished?”  I based 
this question on one that was used by Malamuth (1981) in a series of studies designed to 
examine the proclivity to rape using a variety of independent variables.  I also asked the 
subjects to respond using a 6-point Likert scale with 1 being strongly disagree and 6 
being strongly agree to the following statement:  “If I knew I could get away with it, I 
could see myself forcing a woman to have sex.”  By changing the word “rape” to “force 
a woman to have sex,” I was able to compare the responses to the two.   Although I 
worried that the word “rape” could implant negative associations in respondents’ minds 
that might cause them to answer in ways that they believed to be socially acceptable, 
but did not actually reflect how they feel, there was little difference in the responses to 
the two.  Approximately 6% of the respondents indicated that they were neither likely 
nor unlikely, somewhat likely, or very likely to rape a woman if they were assured they 
would not be caught, indicating that they at least found the idea theoretically appealing 
to some degree.  Approximately 5% of the respondents agreed to some degree that they 
would force a woman to have sex if they could get away with it.    Therefore, the z-
scores of each item were summed together into a Propensity to Rape scale.  Z-scores 
were used due to the fact that the response categories were different for each question.  
Alpha was .73. 
Analysis 
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  After eliminating cases with either mostly missing data (three cases), underage 
respondents (four cases), dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse (four cases), 
the scale for perceived threats to masculinity uncompleted (54 cases) or the dependent 
variables (43 cases), there were 190 cases left on which to conduct analyses.  All 
variables were coded into SPSS version 12.0, and AMOS 4 software was used to 
compute all structural equation models (SEM).  The following chapter examines each of 
the three strain variables:  perceived threats to masculinity, dissatisfaction with amount 
of sexual intercourse, and thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse combined with the 
feminist theory variables (benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance) 
on both past sexually coercive behaviors and the propensity to rape. 
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 Chapter 6 
Rape-Specific Strain and Feminist Theory Variables:  Combined Models  
 
This chapter tests the hypotheses put forward in chapter 4.   Table 5 presents the 
correlations of all the study variables.  Year in college is abbreviated CollYear, 
fundamentalist Protestantism is abbreviated FundProt, traditional values is abbreviated 
TradValue, perceived threats to masculinity is abbreviated ThreatMasc, dissatisfaction 
with the amount of sexual intercourse obtained is abbreviated DisSatSex, thwarted 
attempt at sexual intercourse is abbreviated ThwartSex, negative emotional affect is 
abbreviated NegEmotAfft, the coping strategies variable is abbreviated CopeStrat, 
benevolent sexism and hostile sexism are abbreviated BenSexism and HosSexism 
respectively, rape myth acceptance is abbreviated RapeMyth, past sexually coercive 
behavior types used is abbreviated PastRapes and rape proclivity is abbreviated 
PropToRape.   
[Table 5 about here] 
Prior to running the analyses for the study hypotheses, however, I tested both the 
feminist and the traditional General Strain Theory models separately to determine how 
well each explained past sexually coercive behaviors and propensity to rape. 
Feminist Theory Model 
 Feminist theories contend that a culture that condones rape and denigrates 
women will socialize some men to accept attitudes and values that do the same.  
Therefore, in an individual level model, men who hold sexist attitudes and accept rape 
myths should be more likely to engage in rape behaviors and have a propensity to rape 
because they view these behaviors as acceptable (Figure 2).   The analyses associated 
with this model are intended to predict associations, as present attitudes may be unable 
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 to predict past behaviors.  Standardized path coefficients for these models were 
obtained through SEM.  Path coefficients and t values are displayed in Table 6.   
[Table 6 about here] 
 With regard to goodness-of-fit (GFI), the model examining benevolent sexism, 
hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance on past sexually coercive behaviors had a chi-
square of 1.41 (df = 1, p = .20), a GFI of .99, and an adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI) of 
.96. Goodness-of-fit (GFI) was exactly the same for the model examining benevolent 
sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance on propensity to rape:  chi-square is 
1.41 (df = 1, p = .20), GFI is .99 and AGFI is .96.   Benevolent sexism and hostile 
sexism are positively correlated, as expected based on previous research.  Furthermore, 
males who are higher in rape myth acceptance reported more types of rape behaviors 
used and reported a higher propensity to rape.  Only one of the types of sexism is 
correlated to rape, however.  Males who were higher in benevolent sexism reported 
more rapes, although neither type of sexism was correlated to the propensity to rape. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
General Strain Theory Model 
 The traditional General Strain Theory model hypothesizes that the strain causes 
the negative emotional affect, which then causes the deviance to occur.  Therefore, in 
this model, threats to masculinity, dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse, or 
thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse were predicted to cause anger or other negative 
emotional affect, which then was predicted to result in sexually coercive behaviors or in 
a propensity to rape (Figure 3).   
[Figure 3 about here] 
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 To measure the effectiveness of the traditional General Strain Theory model, 
standardized path coefficients for each model (twelve in all) were obtained through 
SEM.  With regard to goodness-of-fit (GFI), the model examining perceived threats to 
masculinity on past sexually coercive behaviors through anger demonstrated moderate 
strength:  chi-square was 5.55 (df = 2, p = .14), a GFI of .99, and an adjusted goodness-
of-fit (AGFI) of .95.  When substituting negative emotional affect for anger, the 
goodness-of-fit (GFI) indices were not quite as strong:  chi-square was 7.44 (df = 2, p = 
.06), GFI was .98 and AGFI was .93.  Perceived threats to masculinity did increase 
anger (Figure 4), but not negative emotionality (Figure 5).  Neither anger nor negative 
emotional affect was associated with the past sexually coercive behaviors (Figure 4 and 
5).  Coping strategies did not reduce anger (Figure 4) and were associated with 
increased negative emotional affect (Figure 5).   
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 5 about here] 
There models examining propensity to rape rather than past sexually coercive 
behaviors using perceived threats to masculinity as the strain variable were particularly 
weak.  With regard to goodness of fit (GFI), the model examining perceived threats to 
masculinity on propensity to rape through anger had a chi-square of 9.21 (df =2, p = 
.01), a GFI of .97 and an AGFI of .90.  The goodness-of-fit indices examining negative 
emotional affect on the propensity to rape were different than those for anger:  chi-
square is 14.52 (df = 2,  p = .00), GFI is .96 and AGFI is .87.  The same paths remained 
significant from Figures 4 and 5:  the strain variable increased anger (Figure 6), but not 
negative emotional affect (Figure 7).  Neither negative affect variable was related to an 
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 increase in sexually coercive behaviors (Figures 6 and 7).  Coping strategies had no 
effect on anger (Figure 6), but increased negative emotionality (Figure 7).   
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 With regard to goodness-of-fit (GFI), the model examining dissatisfaction with 
amount of sexual intercourse obtained on past sexually coercive behaviors through 
anger had a chi-square of 0.28 (df = 2, p = .96), a GFI of 1.00, and an adjusted 
goodness-of-fit (AGFI) of .99.  For dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse 
obtained on past sexually coercive behaviors through negative emotional affect, chi-
square is 1.21 (df = 2, p = .75), GFI is 1.00 and AGFI is .99.  The only significant paths 
in either model are between coping strategies and negative affect.  Though these models 
look very strong using only these statistics, a closer examination of the paths reveals 
that strain has no effect on negative affect, and neither of the negative emotional 
response variables leads to an increase in past sexually coercive behaviors used (Figures 
8 and 9), which is not what General Strain Theory predicts.  In fact, it appears that the 
strength of the model derives entirely from one path using coping strategies.  Coping 
strategies decrease anger (Figure 8), but they increase negative emotional affect (Figure 
9).    
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Figure 9 about here] 
The goodness-of-fit indices become weaker when propensity to rape is 
substituted for past sexually coercive behaviors.  The model examining dissatisfaction 
with amount of sexual intercourse obtained on propensity to rape through anger had a 
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 chi-square of 6.47 (df =3, p = .09), a GFI of .98 and an AGFI of .94.  The goodness-of-
fit indices become weaker still when negative emotional affect is substituted for anger 
in this model:  chi-square is 8.76 (df = 3,  p = .03), GFI is .98 and AGFI is .92.  Despite 
these goodness-of-fit differences between Figures 8-11, the same paths remain 
significant and in the same ways.  Once again, neither anger nor negative emotional 
affect have direct effects on rape propensity (Figures 10 and 11), and dissatisfaction 
with the amount of sexual intercourse has no effect on negative affect.  Coping 
strategies decrease anger (Figure 10) and increase negative emotional affect (Figure 11).   
[Figure 10 about here] 
[Figure 11 about here] 
 Finally, goodness-of-fit statistics were also obtained for models examining the 
third strain variable, perceived unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse.  These 
models demonstrated that Agnew’s theory was not a particularly good fit for these 
variables, as the goodness-of-fit indices for both were weak.  With regard to goodness-
of-fit (GFI), the model examining thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse on past 
sexually coercive behaviors through anger had a chi-square of 11.35 (df = 3, p = .01), a 
GFI of .97, and an adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI) of .91.  For thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse on past sexually coercive behaviors through negative emotional 
affect, chi-square is 16.27 (df = 3, p = .00), GFI is .97 and AGFI is .90.  Similar 
relationships to those when using “dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse” as 
the strain variable were found.  The strain variable in these models did not have an 
effect on either anger or negative emotionality (Figures 12 and 13), nor did anger or 
negative emotional affect have direct effects on past sexually coercive behaviors 
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 (Figures 12 and 13).  Coping strategies decreased anger (Figure 12) and increased 
negative emotionality (Figure 13). 
[Figure 12 about here] 
[Figure 13 about here] 
With regard to goodness of fit (GFI) for the model examining dissatisfaction 
with amount of sexual intercourse obtained on propensity to rape through anger had a 
chi-square of 6.10 (df =3, p = .11), a GFI of .99 and an AGFI of .95.  The goodness-of-
fit indices examining negative emotional affect on the propensity to rape were different 
than those for anger:  chi-square is 9.83 (df = 3,  p = .02), GFI is .98 and AGFI is .92.  
The findings for strain and negative emotional response are exactly the same as those 
for past sexually coercive behaviors:  coping strategies had no effect on anger (Figure 
14), but increased negative emotional affect.  Neither anger nor negative emotional 
affect had direct effects on past sexually coercive behaviors (Figures 14 and 15), nor did 
the strain variable have an effect on either anger or negative affect (Figures 14 and 15).   
[Figure 14 about here] 
[Figure 15 about here] 
 In summary, when it comes to perceived threats to masculinity as a strain 
variable, the traditional General Strain Theory Model does not appear to be a very 
efficient model for explaining rape.  Though the strain was associated with anger in one 
of the models despite the presence of coping strategies (the models using perceived 
threats to masculinity as the strain variable), anger was not linked to rape or the 
propensity to rape.  Therefore, in none of the models did strain lead to rape through 
negative emotional response.  These models did not examine the effect of the strain 
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 directly on the rape outcome variables, as that is not what the traditional version of 
General Strain Theory predicts.  Yet, by fusing the feminist theory model with the 
general strain theory model, it is hoped that a more thorough explanation can be 
developed. 
Basic Combined Model Tests 
For the combined model, each hypothesis was examined separately.   
 
H1.  Men who are under rape-specific strain (perception that their 
masculinity is threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual 
intercourse obtained, or the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse) are more likely to feel strain-induced negative emotions, 
holding demographics, traditional values, coping strategies, benevolent 
sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant. 
 
For this hypothesis, six OLS regression models were conducted using the three  
types of strain as the independent variables and the two types of negative affect as the 
dependent variables.  Table 7 shows the standardized coefficients for this hypothesis.  
The only type of strain to have an effect on emotional response was threats to 
masculinity.  Males who felt their masculinity was threatened were angrier than men 
who did not feel their masculinity was threatened.  Threats to masculinity did not have 
an effect on negative emotional affect.  The other two types of strain (dissatisfaction 
with amount of sexual intercourse and unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse) 
had no effect on either type of negative affect.   
[Table 7 about here] 
H2.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will experience higher 
levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional values, 
coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant.  
 
Table 7 also shows the results for this hypothesis.  Men higher in hostile sexism 
were angrier, but only in two of the models.  When threats to masculinity was examined 
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 as the strain variable, this relationship ceased to exist.  There was no relationship 
between negative emotional affect and hostile sexism. 
H3.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will experience 
higher levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional 
values, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance 
constant.  
 
Table 7 also shows the results for this hypothesis.  There was no relationship 
between benevolent sexism and either measure of emotion in any of the models.   
H4.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will experience 
higher levels of negative emotions, holding demographics, traditional 
values, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism. 
  
Table 7 also shows the results for this hypothesis.  Rape myth acceptance had no 
relationships with either measure of emotion.  Some of the other variables had 
significant effects, however, for all four of the above hypotheses.  Non-whites other 
than blacks were less angry than whites no matter which of the three types of strain was 
being examined, although when dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse was 
used, the inverse relationship between non-whites and anger was stronger.  
Fundamentalist Protestants were less likely to score high in negative emotional affect, 
but this relationship existed only when dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse 
was used as the strain variable.  The less traditional values held by the men, the more 
likely to report anger, but that relationship existed only when threatened masculinity 
was the variable under examination.  Coping strategies were also significantly related to 
negative emotional affect across all three types of strain.   
H5.  Men who experience rape-specific strains and subsequent negative 
emotional responses are more likely to report past sexually coercive 
behaviors, holding demographics, traditional values, coping strategies, 
benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant. 
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 For this hypothesis, six OLS regression models were conducted using the three  
types of strain and the two types of negative affect as independent variables and past 
sexually coercive behaviors as the dependent variable.  Table 8 shows the standardized 
coefficients for the three strain variables and anger, and Table 9 shows the standardized 
coefficients for the three strain variables and negative emotional affect.  In none of the 
six models did anger or negative emotional affect have an effect on the types of past 
sexually coercive behaviors reported.  The only type of strain to have an effect on 
negative emotional affect was unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse.  Males 
who felt that it was unjust that sexual intercourse did not occur in the vignette were 
more likely to report higher levels of sexually coercive behavior.  The relationship was 
stronger when negative emotional affect was included as the negative affect variable 
rather than anger.  The other two types of strain (threats to masculinity and 
dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse) had no effect on the past sexually 
coercive behaviors reported.   
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
H6.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will be more likely to 
report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, traditional 
values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, benevolent 
sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant.   
 
Table 8 demonstrates the relationship between hostile sexism and past sexually  
 
coercive behaviors, including anger as the negative affective state, and Table 9 looks at  
 
this relationship using negative emotional affect as the negative affective state.  Hostile  
 
sexism had no effect on the past sexually coercive behaviors in any of the six models,  
 
regardless of the type of strain or negative affect examined. 
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H7.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will be more likely 
to report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, 
traditional values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, 
hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant.     
 
Tables 8 and 9 also showed the relationship between benevolent sexism and  
past sexually coercive behaviors.   Across all six models, regardless of the type of strain 
or negative affect used, benevolent sexism was extremely significant.  Males higher in 
benevolent sexism reported more rapes. 
H8.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will be more 
likely to report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding demographics, 
traditional values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, 
hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism.   
 
Tables 8 and 9 also showed the relationship between rape myth acceptance and  
past sexually coercive behaviors.   Males higher in rape myth acceptance were also 
more likely to report rapes across all six models, but the strength of this relationship 
varied according to the type of strain and negative affect.  The strongest relationship 
between rape myth acceptance and past sexually coercive behaviors occurred when 
dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual intercourse was used as the strain variable and 
anger was used as the negative affect variable.  The weakest relationship occurred when 
perceived unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse was the strain variable and 
anger was the negative affect variable.  When negative emotional affect was the 
negative affect variable, there was no change in the relationship between reported past 
sexually coercive behaviors and rape myth acceptance across the three types of strain 
(Table 9).   
For hypotheses 5-8 (shown in Tables 8 and 9), the only demographic variable to 
have a significant relationship to the past sexually coercive behaviors was traditional 
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 values.  Across all six models, traditional values were linked to a lower likelihood of 
reporting past sexually coercive behaviors.    
H9.  Men who experience rape-specific strains and subsequent negative 
emotional responses are more likely to report a proclivity to rape, holding 
demographics, traditional values, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, 
hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance constant. 
 
For this hypothesis, six OLS regression models were conducted using the three  
types of strain and the two types of negative affect as independent variables and 
proclivity to rape as the dependent variable.  Table 10 shows the standardized 
coefficients for the three strain variables and anger, and Table 11 shows the 
standardized coefficients for the three strain variables and negative emotional affect.  In 
none of the six models did any of the strain variables have a direct effect on proclivity 
to rape.  Anger also had no effect on proclivity to rape.  Negative emotional affect, 
however, did have an effect on proclivity to rape.  The higher males were in negative 
emotional affect, the higher their rape propensity (Table 11).   
[Table 10 about here] 
[Table 11 about here] 
H10.  Men who report higher levels of hostile sexism will be more likely to 
report a proclivity to rape, holding demographics, traditional values, strain, 
negative emotional states, coping strategies, benevolent sexism, and rape 
myth acceptance constant.  
 
Table 10 demonstrates the relationship between hostile sexism and proclivity to  
rape, including anger as the negative affective state, and Table 11 looks at this 
relationship using negative emotional affect as the negative affective state.  Hostile 
sexism had no effect on rape proclivity in any of the six models, regardless of the type 
of strain or negative affect examined. 
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 H11.  Men who report higher levels of benevolent sexism will be more likely 
to report a proclivity to rape holding demographics, traditional values, 
strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, and rape 
myth acceptance constant.   
 
Tables 10 and 11 also show the relationship between benevolent sexism and  
proclivity to rape.   Across all six models, regardless of the type of strain or negative 
affect used, benevolent sexism had no effect on rape proclivity in any of the six models, 
regardless of the type of strain or negative affect examined. 
H12.  Men who report higher levels of rape myth acceptance will be more 
likely to report a proclivity to rape holding demographics, traditional 
values, strain, negative emotional states, coping strategies, hostile sexism, 
and benevolent sexism. 
 
Tables 10 and 11 show the relationship between rape myth acceptance and  
proclivity to rape.  Males higher in rape myth acceptance also reported a higher 
proclivity to rape across all six models.  The strength of this relationship was less, 
however, when threats to masculinity was used as the strain variable and negative 
emotionality was used as the negative affect variable (Table 11).   
For hypotheses 9-12 (shown in Tables 10 and 11), some of the other variables 
had significant effects as well.  Across all six models, blacks reported a higher rape 
propensity than whites.   This relationship was stronger when unjust thwarted attempts 
at sexual intercourse was used as the strain variable regardless of the negative affect 
(Table 10 and 11).    In the model examining unjust thwarted attempts at sexual 
intercourse as the strain variable and negative emotional affect as the negative affect 
variable (Table 11), coping strategies also reduced rape proclivity.   
H13.  Men who report higher levels of strain (perception that their 
masculinity is threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual 
intercourse obtained, or the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse), negative emotional affect (anger or negative 
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 emotionality), benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance 
will be more likely to report past sexually coercive behaviors, holding 
demographics, traditional values, and coping strategies constant. 
 
To test this hypothesis, six path analyses were conducted.  Tables 12-14 present 
the standardized coefficients for all paths to and from all study variables.   Table 12 
presents standardized coefficients using perceived threats to masculinity as the strain 
variable with two different path analyses using anger and negative emotionality 
included.  The only control variables to have a statistically significant effect on the 
strain variable are being black and having more traditional values.  Blacks perceive that 
their masculinity is more threatened than whites do.  In addition, those with more 
traditional values perceive that their masculinity is threatened, and the more that men 
feel their masculinity is threatened, the angrier they are.  Non-whites other than blacks 
are less likely to be angry than whites and blacks.  Males with less traditional values are 
angrier, however, than men with more traditional values.  The higher in traditional 
values men are, the higher in benevolent sexism they are, as are those who hold 
traditional values.  Non-social science majors are higher in hostile sexism.  Those with a 
social science major have better coping strategies, as do blacks.  Coping strategies do 
not reduce anger, but they are related to negative emotional affect.   Finally, three 
variables have a direct effect on the past sexually coercive behaviors:  traditional values, 
benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance.  The higher in benevolent sexism and 
rape myth acceptance men are, the more rapes they report.  In contrast, the more 
traditional in values men are, the fewer rapes they report.  There is an indirect path to 
the past sexually coercive behaviors through traditional values, however.  Men with 
more traditional values are higher in benevolent sexism, who also report more rapes.  
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 This appears to indicate that benevolent sexism functions as a rationalization for men 
with traditional values, as scoring high in traditional values alone is linked to fewer 
reported rapes. 
[Table 12 about here] 
Table 13 presents standardized coefficients using dissatisfaction with amount of 
sexual intercourse as the strain variable, and with two different path analyses using 
anger and negative emotionality included.  The only control variable to have a 
statistically significant effect on the strain variable is traditional values.  Those with 
more traditional values are less dissatisfied with the amount of sex that they have 
obtained.  All of the relationships between the demographic variables and traditional 
values and coping strategies, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism and rape myth 
acceptance are unchanged from Table 12 to Table 13.    Non-whites other than blacks 
are less likely to be angry than whites and blacks.  Men with more hostile sexist 
attitudes are also angrier than men with less hostile sexist attitudes.  Fundamentalist 
Protestants have less negative emotionality than men with other religious affiliations.  
Coping strategies do not reduce anger, but they actually increase negative emotional 
affect.   Similar to the model using threatened masculinity as the strain variable, the 
only variables to have a direct effect on the past sexually coercive behaviors are 
traditional values, benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance.  The higher in 
benevolent sexism and rape myth acceptance men are, the more rapes they report.  In 
contrast, the more traditional in values men are, the less likely they were to report 
sexually coercive behaviors.  Again, only one indirect path was significant:  there was a 
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 positive relationship between traditional values and past sexually coercive behaviors 
through benevolent sexism.     
[Table 13 about here] 
Table 14 presents standardized coefficients using unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse as the strain variable, and with two different path analyses using 
anger and negative emotionality included.  None of the control variables or the strain 
variable had a statistically significant impact on the strain variable in this model.  All of 
the relationships between the demographic variables and traditional values and coping 
strategies, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism and rape myth acceptance are unchanged 
from Tables 12 and 13 to Table 14.  Similar to the model using dissatisfaction with 
amount of sexual intercourse, however, non-whites other than blacks are less likely to 
be angry than whites and blacks.  Men with more hostile sexist attitudes are also angrier 
than men with less hostile sexist attitudes.  Coping strategies did increase negative 
emotional affect in this model, as they did in the previous two models using the other 
two strain variables as well.  The same three variables also have a direct effect on the 
past sexually coercive behaviors.  The higher in benevolent sexism and rape myth 
acceptance men are, the more likely they are to report a past rape.  In contrast, the more 
traditional in values men are, the less likely they are to report a past rape.  The strain 
variable, however, also has a direct effect on the past sexually coercive behaviors 
reported.  Men who agreed that the vignette was an unjust thwarted attempt at sexual 
intercourse and that they would have been upset by a similar incident were more likely 
to report past sexually coercive behavior.  The relationship is stronger when negative 
emotionality, rather than anger, is used as the negative affect variable.  Similar to the 
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 other models using the other strain variables, however, the only significant indirect path 
was between traditional values and past sexually coercive behaviors through benevolent 
sexism.   
[Table 14 about here] 
H14.  Men who report higher levels of strain (perception that their 
masculinity is threatened, a dissatisfaction with the amount of sexual 
intercourse obtained, or the perception of unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse), negative emotional affect (anger or negative 
emotionality), benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance 
will be more likely to report a proclivity to rape, holding demographics, 
traditional values, and coping strategies constant. 
 
To test this hypothesis, six path analyses were conducted.  Tables 15-17 present 
the standardized coefficients for all paths to and from all study variables.   All of the 
relationships between the demographic variables, traditional values, the strain variables, 
coping strategies, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and rape myth acceptance, and 
between these variables and the negative affect variables are unchanged from Tables 
12-14 and Tables 15-17.  Therefore, only the effect of these paths, both direct and 
indirect, on the new rape outcome variable—proclivity to rape—will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.   
Table 15 presents standardized coefficients using perceived threats to 
masculinity as the strain variable with two different path analyses using anger and 
negative emotionality included.   Possessing traditional values is not directly related to 
rape propensity as it was in the reported past sexually coercive behaviors scale, but the 
variable “black” is, indicating that blacks have a higher propensity to rape than whites.  
Benevolent sexism also no longer is directly related to the rape outcome variable, 
although rape myth acceptance remains directly related.  Those with a higher level of 
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 rape myth acceptance have a higher propensity to rape.  There were no indirect 
significant relationships in the models presented in this table. 
[Table 15 about here] 
Table 16 presents standardized coefficients using dissatisfaction with amount of 
sexual intercourse as the strain variable with two different path analyses using anger 
and negative emotionality included.  Similar to Table 15, both blacks and rape myth 
acceptance have positive direct relationships with rape propensity.  Negative emotional 
affect does as well, indicating that men who report more negative emotionality also 
report a higher proclivity to rape.  There are three indirect relationships to proclivity to 
rape through the negative emotionality variable.  Fundamentalist Protestants are lower 
in negative emotionality, which decreases their proclivity to rape.  Coping strategies, 
however, increase negative emotionality.  Social science majors and blacks have higher 
coping strategies, so there is a positive indirect relationship to proclivity to rape through 
coping strategies and negative emotional affect.   
[Table 16 about here] 
Table 17 presents standardized coefficients using unjust thwarted attempts at 
sexual intercourse as the strain variable with two different path analyses using anger 
and negative emotionality included.   The paths are similar to those with dissatisfaction 
with amount of sexual intercourse as the strain variable.  Blacks and men with a higher 
acceptance of rape myths report a higher proclivity to rape.  Men with higher negative 
emotional affect also report a higher proclivity to rape, and the same indirect 
relationships through the negative emotionality variable exist.  Coping strategies, 
however, were directly related to a decrease in the proclivity to rape in this model only 
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 indicating that the type of strain probably plays a role in whether coping is effective or 
not.   
[Table 17 about here] 
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 Chapter 7 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
 Overall, it appears that the variables derived from feminist theories of rape do a 
better job of predicting both past sexually coercive behaviors and the proclivity to 
commit rape than the variables drawn from the General Strain Theory literature.  The 
research in this dissertation suggests that Agnew’s (1992) traditional GST model, when 
combined with a feminist model, does not function as he hypothesized.  Strain, at least 
as operationalized herein, was not associated with past sexually coercive behaviors or 
rape propensity in any of the models through negative affect.  Strain and negative affect, 
however, did appear to make a difference separately when using the strain variable 
unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse.  This strain individually predicted a 
higher likelihood of reported past sexually coercive behaviors, while in the model using 
this strain variable, negative emotionality (but not the strain itself) predicted a higher 
proclivity to rape.   
Overall, only five variables had direct relationships with the past sexually 
coercive behaviors.  No matter which type of strain or negative affect was used, 
traditional values, benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance were linked to the past 
sexually coercive behaviors.  Men who held more traditional values reported fewer 
rapes, whereas men who held more benevolent sexist attitudes and more rape myth 
acceptance reported more rapes.  Unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse was the 
only strain variable to have a direct link to the past sexually coercive behaviors 
reported.  The more men felt the scenario in the vignette was unjust and that they 
themselves would be bothered if it had happened to them, the more likely they were to 
report sexually coercive behavior.  Yet it was a direct effect and did not go through 
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 either anger or negative emotionality.  Perceived threats to masculinity also increased 
men’s anger in models using past sexually coercive behaviors as the dependent, but this 
did not lead to an increase in reported sexual coercion. 
 Only four variables had direct relationships with rape propensity.  In every 
model, regardless of the type of strain or negative affect variable used, blacks reported a 
higher rape propensity than whites.  It is important to note, however, that when it comes 
to actually carrying out the act, as noted in the Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors Scale 
discussed above, there is no statistically significant difference between blacks and 
whites.  Rape myth acceptance was also linked to rape propensity across every model:  
men who report a higher belief in rape myths report a higher rape propensity.  No 
matter which type of strain was used, high negative emotional affect was also directly 
linked to high rape propensity—although the strain itself was never correlated with the 
negative affect in the models where rape propensity was the dependent variable.  In the 
model that examines negative emotional affect and unjust thwarted attempts at sexual 
intercourse, however, coping strategies were found to be associated with a decrease in 
rape propensity. 
More interesting nuances come in the examinations of how the strain and 
feminist variables interact with one another to explain rape outcomes.  All three types of 
strain measured were linked to rape myth acceptance, which is linked to past sexually 
coercive behaviors and to rape proclivity.  Unjust thwarted attempts at sexual 
intercourse were also linked to both hostile and benevolent sexism, both of which were 
either directly or indirectly related to past sexually coercive behaviors.  All of these 
findings may suggest that hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and rape myth acceptance 
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 are used by men who feel rape-specific strain to rationalize their sexually coercive 
attitudes and behaviors.    
Coping strategies are also linked to higher benevolent sexist attitudes (not 
shown), which is linked to an increase in the likelihood of past sexually coercive 
behaviors reported (not shown).  Coping strategies are also associated with an increase 
in negative emotional affect, which was directly associated with rape proclivity.  
Although these relationships may at first seem contrary to the literature, the coping 
strategies scale contains measures of denial (“I know it is not my own fault”) that may 
correspond to the rationalizations that studies of rapists have been found to use (e.g. 
Scully and Marolla 1984).  Men who score higher on the past sexually coercive 
behaviors scale may also be more likely in general to blame others for “bad things that 
happen in their lives.”  The coping strategies scale also contains a measure of peer 
support (“I try talking to friends and family to make myself feel better”).  Other 
research on acquaintance rape has established a high level of peer support for justifying 
rape under particular conditions (Schwartz et al. 2001; Schwartz and Nogrady 1996; 
Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).  Therefore, men who report more rapes may be more 
likely to surround themselves with people who support their behaviors.  It is, as a result, 
not as unexpected as it initially sounds for coping strategies, as they were measured in 
this study, to be indirectly associated with rape under certain conditions.   
There are several factors that are unknown about this relationship, however.  
First, it is not known why the relationship between coping strategies increases negative 
emotionality, but has no effect upon anger.  Second, it is not known why the positive 
relationship between coping strategies and benevolent sexism does not also exist 
 133
 between coping strategies and rape myth acceptance and between coping strategies and 
hostile sexism.  Finally, more clarification is needed about why coping strategies are 
associated with an increase in past sexually coercive behaviors, but are associated with 
a decrease in the proclivity to rape.  Clearly, the relationship between coping strategies 
and rape is an area that needs further research attention.   
 
Policy Implications 
 
 Agnew (2006: 16) argues that “saying that a wide range of crimes are committed 
in response to strains is not, of course, to justify or excuse such crimes.  Rather, it is an 
effort to better understand the causes of such crimes in the hope that we can prevent 
them.”  One of the goals of this study has been to glean information that can be useful 
for rape prevention programs by focusing on factors that may receive little or no 
attention.  
Unfortunately, programs aimed at preventing rape have had minimal 
effectiveness.  Breitenbecher (2000) evaluated a majority of the programs that exist to 
reduce rape rates and found that a majority are concerned with rape attitudes.  Although 
small but statistically significant attitude changes are found within many of the 
programs, longitudinal testing indicated that the change had regressed to pre-program 
levels in short periods of time.  Other studies indicate that rape prevention programs 
have no effect on the sexual assault rates (Breitenbecher and Gidycz 1998; 
Breitenbecher and Scarce 1999; Kaniasty and Norris 1992).  All of these studies 
evaluated programs that were targeted to mixed-sex audiences.  Most programs are 
targeted toward women only, however, which may reinforce male attitudes that allow 
them to deny responsibility for rape (Berkowitz 1992).  Women-only prevention 
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 programs also tend to emphasize techniques of avoiding rape that most women already 
know (e.g. avoid poorly-lit areas at night) (Rozee 1999; Stanko 1998), focus on 
techniques that will help prevent stranger rape, but ignore the types of rape women are 
more likely to face (Abbey et al. 1996; Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2004; Koss et al. 
1987, 1988; Laumann et al. 1994), and ignore what Stanko (1998) calls “the problem of 
men.”   
 Programs that target men only appear to be more successful than mixed-sex 
groups precisely because men may become defensive as gender differences become 
more pronounced and discussion becomes adversarial (Bachar and Koss 2001; 
Berkowitz 1992; Foubert and Marriott 1996).  Male-only rape prevention courses 
appear to allow men to reflect on their behavior and choices in an environment that 
allows them to feel safe (Berkowitz 1992; Lonsway 1996; Schewe and O’Donahue 
1996).  These programs have usually focused on either development of empathy for the 
victim or altering rape-supportive attitudes of the men.  Those programs that have 
utilized techniques to do the latter have reported more success, although the success is 
limited, particularly in groups such as fraternities (Berg, Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1996; 
Foubert and Marriot 1996). 
 This may be because rape myths (and sexism itself) are linked to larger social 
strains that go unaddressed by rape prevention programs.  Agnew (2006:  174) proposes 
reducing crime by “reducing (a) individuals’ exposure to strains conducive to crime, 
and (b) the likelihood that individuals will cope with strains through crime.”  One way 
to accomplish the first goal would be to change how women interact with men so that 
males are no longer strained by their behavior.  Yet, any type of prevention that focuses 
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 on the behavior of the woman in reducing strain is unlikely to be effective, because 
rapists use rationalizations that focus on the woman’s behavior to justify why sexual 
assault was not unwarranted (Scully 1991; Scully and Marolly 1994) and societal rape 
myths available for all members of society absolve perpetrators from blame no matter 
what action the woman takes (Burt 1991; Peterson and Muehlenhard 2004).  Therefore, 
any prevention that attempts to simply remove or alter women’s behavior to reduce 
strain will likely meet with minimal success. 
 Prevention programs should, instead, attempt to treat “subjective strain” by 
altering the way men perceive their relationships with women, sexual conquest, and 
their masculine status:  
Certain males may be upset because they believe that they are not being 
treated as ‘real men’… They may believe that their spouses are not 
sufficiently subservient to them.  Rather than changing the behavior of  
their spouses, we might attempt to alter their views about what it means to be a 
‘real man’ (Agnew 2006:  184). 
 
Agnew (2006) states that proposals have been made in many school curricula  
to put programs into action to challenge traditional concepts of masculinity in order to 
reduce criminal outcomes.  More specifically, this research shows that the right of 
women to say no to sexual intercourse should be addressed in the context of rape.   
 In terms of accomplishing Agnew’s (1996) second goal of reducing the 
likelihood that individuals will respond to strain with crime, emotional affect and 
coping strategies must also be addressed.  Because negative emotional affect (but not 
anger) was also related to rape outcomes, perhaps too much energy has been focused on 
anger when it comes to rape (e.g. Groth 1979), and more attention should be paid to 
emotions such as depression, resentment, guilt, and anxiety.   Thus men who have raped 
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 or are likely to rape may be less inclined to need anger management courses than 
courses that will introduce strategies for managing other types of emotions, particularly 
when they have been sexually rejected by a female.   Further research in this area is 
needed to understand the relationship between emotional affect and rape.  It is 
important, however, that whatever strategies are introduced are not regressive.  As 
found in this research, some of the coping strategies men used actually increased their 
rape outcomes, likely because it allowed them to deny or rationalize their behavior or 
socialize with people who helped them to do this (DeKeseredy and Kelly 1995; 
Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). 
 In addition to all of these tactics that support strain, a good rape prevention 
program should continue to address rape myths,  as this was the only variable that was 
directly related to both the reported past sexually coercive behaviors and to a proclivity 
to rape in my study.   Sexist attitudes should also be addressed.   Benevolent sexism was 
directly related to past sexually coercive behaviors.  Both types of sexism should be 
dealt with, as they are related to the view that “certain women” deserve to be raped, 
while others deserve to be protected, and perpetuate societal beliefs that some rapes are 
acceptable.   
 In summary, then, perpetrator-focused rape prevention programs should be 
targeted toward men in single-sex groups and should address the following, based on 
the results of this research: 
1. conceptions of masculinity that include misperceptions about sexual 
intercourse as conquest and the right of women to say no to sexual 
intercourse 
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 2. coping with strain over sexual rejection (including peer pressure to conform) 
in ways that do not allow for a denial of responsibility 
3. rape myths 
4. sexism, particularly including benevolent sexist beliefs 
5. coping with negative emotional affective states that are primarily 
internalized, such as depression and anxiety, in ways that do not allow for a 
denial of responsibility 
Limitations and Conclusions 
 This study has its fair share of limitations.  The most problematic is that it is a 
cross-sectional study, which does not allow for the establishment of when in time each 
of the variables that were measured occurred.   My goal for this research, however, was 
simply to establish whether these variables are associated with one another in a model 
that contains both mainstream criminology and what feminist theory has already 
uncovered about rape.    
Because my study was cross-sectional, my measure of negative affect was trait-
based (or dispositional) rather than state-based.  I asked how subjects generally 
responded to negative events in their lives, rather than how they responded to the 
specific strains I measured.  Research demonstrates that dispositional anger predicts 
situational anger (Mazerolle, Piquero, and Capowich 2003), so it is likely that men who 
usually get angry over events were likely to get angry over these particular strains.  
Although these individuals are also more likely to engage in deviance, the traditional 
relationship between strain, negative affect, and deviance was not found in my research.  
In fact, anger itself was never associated with rape outcomes. 
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  There are also some variables that I neglected to measure, mostly out of fear that 
the survey would be so long that respondents would cease to continue filling it out 
before reaching the end.  Although I asked about coping strategies, I did not ask about 
the availability or success of these strategies, nor did I ask about self-efficacy, social 
support, or social control, variables that might also influence whether or not a strained 
individual engages in deviance.   Future studies examining the relationship between 
strain and rape should include these variables to see how they change the relationship, if 
at all. 
 This study has been a preliminary test of the feasibility of two things.  First, it 
was a test of how well GST could explain the specific crime of rape.  Second, it was a 
test of how well a mainstream criminological theory such as GST could be combined 
with the findings of the feminist literature to explain a criminal outcome.  On both 
fronts, the research was moderately successful.  Although the traditional GST model 
was not effective, it has provided useful information, particularly concerning the 
associations between emotional states, coping strategies, and rape outcomes.  There are 
many ways that future studies using GST to explain rape could be expanded and 
improved.  Situational measures of anger over the particular types of strain measured in 
addition to the dispositional measures should be included, as well as measures of other 
pertinent variables to GST such as measures of social control and peer support, and 
attempt to establish time order, perhaps through longitudinal research.  In addition, a 
combined model of GST and feminist theory variables where the feminist variables are 
used to predict strain, strain to predict emotion, and emotion to predict rape outcomes 
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 might predict more than the model used in this dissertation, and may be a next step for 
research which includes the feminist variables. 
 The subject of rape continues to incite controversy in all arenas, including legal, 
social, political, and scientific.  This study has been an attempt to move beyond (but not 
away from) the abstract idea of a “rape culture” that alone cannot explain why only 
some men rape.  Social strain may be one reason why some men appear to be more 
susceptible than others to sexist and rape myth ideology.  Regardless of the 
disagreements surrounding definitions of rape, most individuals are abhorred at the 
thought of a rape and a majority of men are not rapists.   A more thorough explanation 
for why rape exists is a next step for feminist criminology, not to mention mainstream 
criminology that purports to be general in its orientation. 
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Appendix A 
 
Moral Traditionalism Scale 
 
 
1.  We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own 
moral standards, even if they are different from our own. 
2.  There is too much sexual freedom and loose living today.   
3.  Changes in lifestyles, such as divorce and men and women living together without 
being married, are signs of increasing moral decay.   
4.  The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society. 
5.  The world is always changing and we should accommodate our view of moral 
behavior to those changes. 
6.  There will always be some people who think and act differently, and there is 
nothing wrong with that. 
7.  Society should be more accepting of people whose appearances or values are very 
different from most. 
8.  This country would be better off if there were more emphasis on traditional family 
life. 
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Appendix B 
 
  Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
 
1.  No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless 
he has the love of a woman.  B 
2.  Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor 
them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”  H 
3.  In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.  B 
4.  Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.  H 
5.  Women are too easily offended.  H 
6.  People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a 
member of the other sex.  B 
7.  Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.  H 
8.  Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.  B 
9.  Women should be cherished and protected by men.  B 
10.  Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.  H 
11.  Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.  H 
12.  Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.  B 
13.  Men are complete without women.  B 
14.  Women exaggerate problems they have at work.  H 
15.  Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight 
leash.  H 
16.  When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about 
being discriminated against.  H 
17.  A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.  B 
18.  There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming 
sexually available to men and then refusing male advances.  H 
19.  Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.  B 
 167
 20.  Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide 
financially for the women in their lives.  B 
21  Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.  H 
22  Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture.  B 
 
H= hostile sexism item 
B= benevolent sexism item 
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Appendix C 
 
Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale:  Short-Form Version 
 
1.  Many women secretly desire to be raped. 
2.  If a woman is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting 
things get out of control. 
3.  If a woman is willing to “make out” with a guy, then it’s no big deal if he goes a little 
further and has sex. 
4.  Although most women wouldn’t admit it, they generally find being physically forced into 
sex a real “turn on.” 
*5.  Most rapists are not caught by the police. 
6.  If a woman doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say that it was rape. 
7.  Men from nice middle-class homes almost never rape. 
8.  Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at men. 
*9.  All women should have access to self-defense classes. 
10.  It is usually only women who dress suggestively that are raped. 
11.  If the rapist doesn’t have a weapon, you really can’t call it a rape. 
12.  Rape is unlikely to happen in the woman’s own familiar neighborhood. 
13.  Women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them. 
14.  A lot of women lead a man on and then they cry rape. 
*15.  It is preferable that a female police officer conduct the questioning when a woman 
reports rape. 
16.  A woman who “teases” men deserves anything that might happen. 
17.  When women are raped, it’s often because the way they said “no” was ambiguous. 
18.  Men don’t usually intend to force sex on a woman, but sometimes they get too sexually 
carried away. 
19.  A woman who dresses in skimpy clothes should not be surprised if a man tries to force 
her to have sex. 
20.  Rape happens when a man’s sex drive gets out of control. 
 
*Filler items that were not used in creating the scale 
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Appendix D 
 
Threats to Masculinity Scale 
 
1.  Women are responsible for most of my troubles. 
*2.  Women should assume their rightful place in business and all other professions 
alongside men. 
3.  I get a raw deal from most of the women in my life. 
4.  I feel upset even by slight criticism from women. 
5.  Feeling masculine is very important to me. 
6.  Feminists are a menace to this nation and the world.   
7.  If you don’t show who’s boss in the beginning of a relationship you will be taken 
advantage of later. 
8.  It is natural for one spouse to be in control of the other. 
9.  I am overjoyed that women’s liberation is finally happening in this country. 
10.  Feminists are trying too hard to turn women into men and men into women. 
11.  There are many jobs in which men should be given preference in hiring or being 
promoted over women. 
12.  It was a lot better for everyone when there was less confusion about what being a man 
really means. 
13.  Effeminate men deserve to be ridiculed.   
14.  In the work force, any gain by one gender necessitates a loss for the other. 
15.  Any man who is a man needs to have sex regularly. 
*16.  Lesbians have chosen a particular lifestyle and should be respected for it. 
17.  When women enter the work force they are taking jobs away from men. 
 
* These items not used in the final creation of the scale 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Vignette for “Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse” Strain Variable 
 
 
Please read the following story then respond to the statements that follow it 
regarding your opinions about what happened in the story.    
 
It’s 11:30 pm and Bobby is in Rio’s Nightclub, standing next to the cigarette machine with a group of 
friends.  He’s feeling confident about the way he looks in his casual button-down shirt and new jeans.  An 
attractive woman walks toward him and stops at the cigarette machine.  The machine, however, won’t 
accept one of her dollar bills.  Bobby reaches into his wallet and pulls out a newer, crisper bill and inserts 
it into the machine.  The woman smiles and introduces herself as Heather, gives Bobby her older dollar 
bill, and offers him a cigarette.  The two of them stand together and talk about each other’s courses and 
impending exams.  Bobby offers to walk Heather back to a party at the nearby residential halls where 
they both reside.  Heather accepts. 
 
At the party, Bobby and Heather sit together and talk about common interests in certain musical groups.  
They spend a couple of hours enjoying themselves and towards the end of the party, they set off together 
toward their own rooms.  They arrive at Bobby’s room first and he offers to make Heather some coffee.  
Heather accepts and comments that she can’t stay long.   Bobby plays some music performed by the 
groups he knows Heather likes as both of them sit on the bed.  While passionately kissing for a short 
duration, Bobby touches Heather’s breasts over her shirt and she then lets him touch them under her 
clothes. 
 
Bobby puts his arm around Heather’s shoulders and continues to passionately kiss and caress her as they 
both lie down on the bed.  Bobby removes her bra and blouse.  While kissing her breasts, he begins to 
stroke her thighs.  He removes his own jeans and underwear and Heather allows him to take off her skirt 
and underwear.  They lie back down on the bed and proceed with mutual caressing, continuing to 
passionately kiss one another. 
 
Bobby is about to proceed with sexual intercourse when Heather moves away from him and says it really 
is time to go.  Bobby asks her whether she would like to go to another party with him next week and she 
replies that she thinks it would be a great idea. 
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Appendix F 
 
Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse Scale 
 
1.  If a woman did this to me, I would be pretty angry about it. 
2.  Bobby should have let Heather know up front he wanted to have sexual intercourse. 
3.  It was unfair that Heather let Bobby touch her and take off her clothes but then stopped 
before sexual intercourse could take place. 
4.  Heather had a right to stop the activity from progressing any further. 
5.  If a woman did this to me, I would understand.   
6.  Heather was leading Bobby on.   
7.  Heather should have let Bobby know up front she didn’t want to have sexual 
intercourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 172
  
 
 
Appendix G 
 
Negative Affect Scale Items 
 
 
Sometimes bad things happen in our lives.  Which of the following do you do when 
bad things happen to you?   
 
1. Blow up (example: yell, scream, make idle threats, say harsh things to others) 
2.  Take it out on other(s) 
(example:  punching, hitting, throwing things at them) 
3.  Take it out on things 
(example: key a car, trash a room/apt, break a window) 
4.  Withdraw (example: become quiet, withdrawn, don't talk much, feel bad inside) 
5.  Shutdown (example: stop regular routines with friends and family, spend most your  
time alone) 
6.  Feel guilty 
7.  Feel resentful 
8.  Feel frustrated 
9.  Feel anxious 
10.  Feel depressed 
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Appendix H 
 
Coping Strategies Scale 
 
 
Sometimes bad things happen in our lives.  Which of the following do you do when 
bad things happen to you?   
 
1.  I try writing in a journal to make myself feel better. 
2.  I ignore it and think about the positive things in my life. 
3.  I realize or tell myself it wasn’t very important. 
4.  I tend to focus on it even more. 
 
5.  I know it is not my own fault. 
6.  I know I should have tried harder to prevent/avoid it. 
7.  I try to figure out where I went wrong so that I can change the outcome. 
8.  I try to avoid dealing with the problem. 
9.  I try to get some physical exercise to make myself feel better. 
10.  I try talking to friends or family members to make myself feel better. 
11.  I try talking to a therapist to make myself feel better. 
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Appendix I 
 
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever… 
1.  Been in a situation where you became so sexually aroused that you felt it was 
useless to stop yourself even though the woman did not want to have sexual 
intercourse? 
2.  Had sexual intercourse with a woman who said she didn’t want to but you didn’t 
believe her when she protested? 
3.  Had sexual intercourse with a woman when she didn’t really want to because she 
felt pressured by your continual arguments? 
4.  Had sexual intercourse with a woman who had been taking drugs or drinking and 
could not or did not resist or say that she didn’t want to?    
5.  Had sexual intercourse with a woman when she didn’t want to because you 
threatened to use physical force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.) if she didn’t 
cooperate? 
6.  Had sexual intercourse with a woman when she didn’t want to because you used 
some degree of physical force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 175
 NEGATIVE
EMOTIONAL
AFFECT
DEMOGRAPHICS
TRADITIONAL
VALUES
STRAIN
SEXISM
RAPE MYTH
ACCEPTANCE
COPING
STRATEGIES
RAPE
OUTCOMES
Figure 1.  Theoretical Model of Study Variables
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Figure 2.  Feminist Theory Variable Path Coefficients
chi-square=1.41
df=1
p=.02
Significant paths in bold.
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Figure 3.  Traditional GST Theoretical Model
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Figure 4.  Traditional GST Model using Perceived Threats to Masculinity, Anger, and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
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Figure 5.  Traditional GST Model using Perceived Threats to Masculinity, Negative Emotional Affect, and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
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Figure 6.  Traditional GST Model using Perceived Threats to Masculinity, Anger, and
Propensity to Rape
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Figure 7.  Traditional GST Model using Perceived Threats to Masculinity, Negative Emotional
 Affect, and Propensity to Rape
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Figure 8.  Traditional GST Model using Dissatisfaction with Amount of Sexual Intercourse, Anger and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
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Figure 9.  Traditional GST Model using Dissatisfaction with Amount of Sexual Intercourse, Negative Emotional Affect, and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
.10
 
184
 
 DISSATISFACTION WITH
AMOUNT OF
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
ANGER
COPING
STRATEGIES
PROPENSITY
TO RAPE
-.14
e1
e2
e3
.09
Figure 10.  Traditional GST Model using Dissatisfaction with Amount of Sexual Intercourse, Anger, and
Propensity to Rape
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Figure 11.  Traditional GST Model using Dissatisfaction with Amount of Sexual Intercourse, Negative
Emotional Affect, and Propensity to Rape
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Figure 12.  Traditional GST Model using Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse, Anger, and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
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Figure 13.  Traditional GST Model using Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse, Negative Emotional Affect, and
Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors
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Figure 14.  Traditional GST Model using Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse, Anger, and
Propensity to Rape
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Figure 15.  Traditional GST Model using Unjust Thwarted Attempts at Sexual Intercourse,
Negative Emotional Affect, and Propensity to Rape
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 Table 1. Feminist Theories About Rape  
   
   
 MACRO MICRO 
WHY RAPE EXISTS 1. Male-dominated society 1. Gender role socialization 
 2. Rape culture 2. Overconformity to masculine role 
   
GAINS FOR MALES Social control of women Individual superiority over victim 
  (rapists only) 
   
EFFECTS OF GENDER Reduction of rape rates Increase in propensity to rape 
EQUALITY   
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 Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for the Study 
Variables 
     
Range   
VARIABLES MEAN S.D. MIN MAX
     
Control Variables     
1 Age 19.80 2.02 18 31 
2 CollYear 2.03 0.91 1 4 
3 Major 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
4 FundProt 0.26 0.43 0.00 1.00 
5 Black 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
6 Non-white 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
7 TradValue -0.13 5.76 -13.55 16.91 
     
Strain Model Variables     
8 ThreatMasc -0.09 7.70 -19.77 19.66 
9 DisSatSex 0.00 1.00 -1.27 2.31 
10 ThwartSex -0.01 3.07 -6.93 7.50 
11 Anger 0.06 2.30 -3.60 7.08 
12 NegEmotAfft 19.73 4.69 8.00 35.00 
13 CopeStrat 0.03 4.99 -18.40 21.45 
     
Feminist Model Variables     
14 BenSexism -0.32 5.78 -22.14 15.27 
15 HosSexism -0.05 6.92 -23.47 19.56 
16 RapeMyth -1.25 8.35 -19.53 21.67 
     
Dependent Variables     
17 PastRapes 0.27 0.65 0 4 
18 PropToRape -0.04 1.72 -0.93 10.77 
     
     
N=190     
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Table 3.  Chi-square values for Demographic Comparisons between   
Responders and Non-Responders to Threats to Masculinity Items  
         
 Χ2 df p      
         
Age 10.97 12 0.53      
         
Year in School 5.90 4 0.21      
         
FundProt 0.23 1 0.87      
         
Blacks 0.69 1 0.41      
         
Other Non-whites 0.34 1 0.56      
         
Traditional Values 274.09 275 0.50      
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 Table 4.  Chi-square values for Demographic Comparisons between  
Responders and Non-Responders to Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors  
Scale        
        
 Χ2 df p     
        
Age 8.07 12 0.78     
        
Year in School 4.89 4 0.30     
        
FundProt 0.94 1 0.33     
        
Blacks 0.17 1 0.90     
        
Other Non-whites 0.26 1 0.64     
        
Traditional Values 277.27 275 0.45     
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 Table 5.  Correlation Matrix for the Study Variables         
                   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
                   
Control Variables                   
1 Age --
   
                  
2 CollYear  .539*** --                 
3 Major .077 .047 --                
4 FundProt -.115 -.043 -.045 --               
5 Black -.058 -.085 -.050 -.086 --              
6 Non-white -.065 -.090 -.067 -.111 .320*** --             
7 TradValue -.093 -.044 -.067 .411*** -.061 -.134 --            
Strain Model Variables                   
8 ThreatMasc -.093 -.096 -.055 .133 .125 -.023 .439*** --           
9 DisSatSex .146* .078 .018 .007 .129 .159* -.169* .123 --        
195   
10 ThwartSex -.120 -.049 .000 .037 -.008 .027 .126 .301*** .031 --         
11 Anger -.042 -.056 -.047 -.086 .049 -.132 .032 .380*** .080 .103 --        
12 NegEmotAfft .170 -.037 .034 -.162* .102 .059 -.102 -.009 .080 -.015 .221** --       
13 CopeStrat .028 .017 .147* -.023 .167* .112 -.024 -.148* -.036 .016 -.144* .449*** --      
Feminist Model Variables                   
14 BenSexism -.077 -.113 -.030 .063 .084 .050 .322*** .217** -.049 .184** .057 .072 .174** --     
15 HosSexism -.050 -.090 
-
.174* .089 .056 -.008 .328*** .702*** .069 .266*** .262*** -.027 -.152* .207** --    
16 RapeMyth -.142 
-
.161* -.009 .036 .160* .139 .077 .536*** .196** .315*** .133 -.006 -.168* .086 .423*** --   
Dependent Variables                   
17 PastRapes .094 .086 .067 -.026 -.005 -.044 -.080 .119 .004 .242*** .107 .760 -.029 .243*** .107 .228** --  
18 PropToRape -.060 -.045 .039 .031 .228** .170* -.042 .204** .176** .171** .091 .102 -.077 -.001 .148* .310*** .197** -- 
                
N=190,  *p< .05  **p< .01  ***p< .001 (2-tailed)               
 
 
 Table 6.  Path Coefficients and t Values for Feminist Theory Model 
Variations   
       
Path Coefficient t value     
Model 1 variables       
Benevolent Sexism→Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors 0.03*** 3.23     
Hostile Sexism→ Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors 0.00 0.50     
Rape Myth Acceptance→ Past Sexually Coercive Behaviors 0.02*** 3.24     
       
Model 2 variables        
Benevolent Sexism→Propensity to Rape -0.01 0.47     
Hostile Sexism→Propensity to Rape 0.00 0.40     
Rape Myth Acceptance→Propensity to Rape 0.06*** 4.31     
       
       
N=190,  *p< .05  **p< .01  ***p< .001 (2-tailed)       
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 Table 7.  Standardized coefficients for two types of negative affect by each type 
of strain          
          
Independent   Neg   Neg   Neg 
Variables  Anger Emtl Afct  Anger Emtl Afct  Anger Emtl Afct
          
AGE  -.025 .025  -.046 .009  -.027 .018 
          
YEAR IN COLLEGE -.031 -.055  -.026 -.057  -.026 -.050 
          
MAJOR  -.028 -.045  -.001 -.041  .000 -.038 
          
BLACK  .041 .008  .080 .006  .090 .003 
          
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP -.148* -.027  -.182** -.042  -.172* -.032 
          
FUND PROTESTANT  -.098 -.134^  -.123 -.148*  -.112 -.138^ 
          
TRADITIONAL VALUES -.175* -.086  -.022 -.040  -.042 -.059 
          
COPING STRATEGIES -.090 .474***  -.106 .473***  -.112 .474*** 
          
BENEVOLENT SEXISM .036 .000  .041 .002  .036 .007 
          
HOSTILE SEXISM -.006 -.012  .239** .032  .238** .045 
          
RAPE MYTH 
ACCEPTANCE -.134 .036  .002 .049  .006 .078 
          
Strain:          
MASC THREATENED .509*** .101       
          
DISSATISFACTION 
W/SEX    .086 .091    
          
THWARTED ATTEMPTS AT SEX      .043 .-048 
          
R2  .22 .24  .13 .24  .12 .24 
          
 N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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 Table 8.  Standardized coefficients for past sexually coercive behaviors by 
three types of strain and anger 
       
        
Independent        
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
        
AGE  .073  .087  .091  
        
YEAR IN COLLEGE .106  .110  .094  
        
MAJOR  .058  .060  .054  
        
BLACK  -.038  -.032  -.024  
        
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP -.075  -.064  -.077  
        
FUND PROTESTANT  .044  .055  .045  
        
TRADITIONAL VALUES -.221**  -.240**  -.225**  
        
COPING STRATEGIES -.035  -.037  -.048  
        
BENEVOLENT SEXISM .317***  .317***  .297***  
        
HOSTILE SEXISM .012  .014  -.012  
        
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE .243**  .257***  .198*  
        
ANGER  .064  .071  .056  
        
Strain:        
MASC THREATENED -.004      
        
DISSATISFACTION W/SEX   -.088    
        
THWARTED ATTEMPTS AT 
SEX     .168*  
        
R2  .18  .19  .21  
        
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001  
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Table 9.  Standardized coefficients for past sexually coercive behaviors by 
three types of strain and negative emotional affect 
    
        
Independent        
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
        
AGE  .069  .083  .088  
        
YEAR IN COLLEGE .109  .113  .097  
        
MAJOR  .060  .064  .058  
        
BLACK  -.034  -.026  -.018  
        
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP -.083  -.073  -.084  
        
FUND PROTESTANT  .049  .061  .052  
        
TRADITIONAL VALUES -.225**  -.238**  -.222**  
        
COPING STRATEGIES -.081  -.090  -.100  
        
BENEVOLENT SEXISM .320***  .319***  .299***  
        
HOSTILE SEXISM .013  .028  -.003  
        
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE .231**  .253**  .191**  
        
NEG EMOTIONAL AFFECT .086  .096  .096  
        
Strain:        
MASC THREATENED .020      
        
DISSATISFACTION W/SEX   -.090    
        
THWARTED ATTEMPTS AT 
SEX     .175**  
        
R2  .18  .19  .21  
        
 N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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Table 10.  Standardized coefficients for proclivity to rape by three 
types of strain and anger       
        
Independent        
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
        
AGE  -.026  -.039  -.016  
        
YEAR IN COLLEGE .034  .032  .028  
        
MAJOR  .073  .076  .075  
        
BLACK  .167*  .167*  .181**  
        
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP .105  .095  .103  
        
FUND PROTESTANT  .084  .074  .085  
        
TRADITIONAL VALUES -.100  -.065  -.083  
        
COPING STRATEGIES -.069  -.068  -.078  
        
BENEVOLENT SEXISM -.018  -.017  -.030  
        
HOSTILE SEXISM .022  .050  .039  
        
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE .213**  .220**  .207**  
        
ANGER  .041  .050  .052  
        
Strain:        
MASC THREATENED .072      
        
DISSATISFACTION W/SEX   .075    
        
THWARTED ATTEMPTS AT SEX     .102  
        
R2  .16  .16  .17  
        
 N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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Table 11.  Standardized coefficients for proclivity to rape by three 
types of strain and negative emotional affect   
        
Independent        
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
        
AGE  -.031  -.043  -.020  
        
YEAR IN COLLEGE .041  .039  .034  
        
MAJOR  .079  .082  .081  
        
BLACK  .170*  .171*  .186**  
        
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP .103  .092  .099  
        
FUND PROTESTANT  .101  .090  .101  
        
TRADITIONAL VALUES -.094  -.060  -.075  
        
COPING STRATEGIES -.146^  -.145^  -.161*  
        
BENEVOLENT SEXISM -.016  -.015  -.029  
        
HOSTILE SEXISM .023  .057  .044  
        
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE .202*  .213**  .195**  
        
NEG EMOTIONAL AFFECT .154*  .151*  .163*  
        
Strain:        
MASC THREATENED .077      
        
DISSATISFACTION W/SEX   .075    
        
THWARTED ATTEMPTS AT 
SEX     .112  
        
R2  .18  .18  .18  
        
 N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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 Table 12.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with perceived threats to masculinity as the strain variable and  
Past sexually coercive behaviors the as dependent variable        
         Past Sexually  Past Sexually 
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth  Coercive Neg Emtl Coercive 
Variables   Masc Threat Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  Acceptance Anger Behaviors Affect Behaviors
            
AGE   -.017 .021 .006 .036 -.065 -.025 .073 .025 .069 
YEAR IN COLLEGE  -.058 .019 -.092 -.085 -.103 -.031 .106 -.055 .109 
MAJOR   -.016   .158* .002 -.149* .019 -.028 .058 -.045 .060 
FUND PROTESTANT  -.051 .007 -.076 -.053 .013 -.098 .044 -.134^ .049 
BLACK   .149*   .154* .073 .061 .122^ .041 -.038 -.008 -.034 
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP -.022 .078 .059 -.003 .101 -.148* -.075 -.027 -.083 
TRADITIONAL VALUES  .461*** .006 .362*** .343*** .084 -.175* -.221** -.086 -.225** 
MASC THREATENED      
202
 .509*** -.004 .101 .020 
COPING STRATEGIES       -.090 -.035 .474*** -.081 
BENEVOLENT SEXISM         .036 .317*** .000 .320*** 
HOSTILE SEXISM       -.006 .012 -.012 .013 
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE      -.134 .243** .036 .231** 
ANGER         .064 --  -- 
NEG EMTL AFFECT       -- --  .086 
            
R2   .22 .06 .13 .14 .07 .22 .18 .24 .18 
            
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 13.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse as the strain 
variable and past sexually coercive behaviors as the dependent variable 
        
         Past Sexually  Past Sexually 
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth  Coercive Neg Emtl Coercive 
Variables   Dissat W/Sex Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  Acceptance Anger Behaviors Affect Behaviors
            
AGE   .148^ .021 .006 .036 -.065 -.046 .087 .009 .083 
YEAR IN COLLEGE  .015 .019 -.092 -.085 -.103 -.026 .110 -.057 .113 
MAJOR   .013   .158* .002 -.149* .019 -.001 .060 -.041 .064 
FUND PROTESTANT  .122 .007 -.076 -.053 .013 -.123 .055 -.148* .061 
BLACK   0.098   .154* .073 .061 .122^ .080 -.032 -.006 -.026 
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP .129^ .078 .059 -.003 .101 -.182** -.064 -.042 -.073 
TRADITIONAL VALUES  -.181* .006 .362*** .343*** 
203 .084 -.022 -.240** -.040 -.238** 
DISSAT W/SEX       .086 -.004 .091 -.090 
COPING STRATEGIES       -.106 -.088 .473*** -.090 
BENEVOLENT SEXISM          .041 .317*** .002 .319*** 
HOSTILE SEXISM       .239** .014 .032 .028 
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE      .002 .257*** .049 .253** 
ANGER         .071 --  -- 
NEG EMTL AFFECT       -- --  .096 
            
R2   .09 .06 .13 .14 .07 .13 .19 .25 .19 
            
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 14.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse as the strain 
variable and past sexually coercive behaviors as dependent variable 
        
         Past Sexually  Past Sexually 
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth  Coercive Neg Emtl Coercive 
Variables   Thwarted Sex Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  Acceptance Anger Behaviors Affect Behaviors
            
AGE   -0.123 0.021 0.006 0.036 -0.065 -0.027 0.091 0.018 0.088 
YEAR IN COLLEGE  0.024 0.019 -0.092 -0.085 -0.103 -0.026 0.094 -0.05 0.097 
MAJOR   0.017   .158* 0.002 -.149* 0.019 0 0.054 -0.038 0.058 
FUND PROTESTANT  -0.027 0.007 -0.076 -0.053 0.013 -0.112 0.045 -.138^ 0.052 
BLACK   -0.02   .154* 0.073 0.061 .122^ 0.09 -0.024 -0.003 -0.018 
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP 0.043 0.078 0.059 -0.003 0.101 -.172* -0.077 -0.032 -0.084 
TRADITIONAL VALUES  .132^ 0.006 .362*** .343*** 
204 0.084 -0.042 -.225** -0.059 -.222** 
THWARTED SEX       0.043 .168* 0.048 .175** 
COPING STRATEGIES       -0.112 -0.048 .474*** -0.1 
BENEVOLENT SEXISM          0.036 .297*** 0.007 .299*** 
HOSTILE SEXISM       .238** -0.012 0.045 -0.003 
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE      0.006 .198** 0.078 .191** 
ANGER         0.056 --  -- 
NEG EMTL AFFECT       -- --  0.096 
            
R2   0.03 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.21 
            
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 15.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with perceived threats to masculinity as the strain variable 
and proclivity to rape as the dependent variable        
            
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth  Proclivity Neg Emtl Proclivity 
Variables   Masc Threat Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  Acceptance Anger to Rape Affect to Rape
            
AGE   -.017 .021 .006 .036 -.065 -.025 -.026 .025 -.031 
YEAR IN COLLEGE  -.058 .019 -.092 -.085 -.103 -.031 .034 -.055 .041 
MAJOR   -.016   .158* .002 -.149* .019 -.028 .073 -.045 .079 
FUND PROTESTANT  -.051 .007 -.076 -.053 .013 -.098 .084 -.134^ .101 
BLACK   .149*   .154* .073 .061 .122^ .041 .167* -.008 .170* 
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP -.022 .078 .059 -.003 .101 -.148* .105 -.027 .103 
TRADITIONAL VALUES  .461*** .006 .362*** .343*** .084 -.175* -.100 -.086 -.094 
MASC THREATENED       .509*** .072 .101 .077 
COPING STRATEGIES      
205
 -.090 -.069 .474*** -.146^ 
BENEVOLENT SEXISM          .036 -.018 .000 -.016 
HOSTILE SEXISM       -.006 .022 -.012 .023 
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE      -.134 .213** .036 .202* 
ANGER         .041 --  -- 
NEG EMTL AFFECT       -- --  .154* 
            
R2   .22 .06 .13 .14 .07 .22 .16 .24 .18 
            
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 16.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with dissatisfaction with amount of sexual intercourse as the 
strain variable and proclivity to rape as the dependent variable 
        
            
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth  Proclivity Neg Emtl Proclivity 
Variables   Dissat W/Sex Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  Acceptance Anger to Rape Affect To Rape
            
AGE   .148^ .021 .006 .036 -.065 -.046 -.039 .009 -.043 
YEAR IN COLLEGE  .015 .019 -.092 -.085 -.103 -.026 .032 -.057 .039 
MAJOR   .013   .158* .002 -.149* .019 -.001 .076 -.041 .082 
FUND PROTESTANT  .122 .007 -.076 -.053 .013 -.123 .074 -.148* .090 
BLACK   0.098   .154* .073 .061 .122^ .080 .167* -.006 .171* 
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP .129^ .078 .059 -.003 .101 -.182** .095 -.042 .092 
TRADITIONAL VALUES  -.181* .006 .362*** .343*** .084 -.022 -.065 -.040 -.060 
DISSAT W/SEX      
206
 .086 .075 .091 .066 
COPING STRATEGIES       -.106 -.068 .473*** -.145^ 
BENEVOLENT SEXISM          .041 -.017 .002 -.015 
HOSTILE SEXISM       .239** .050 .032 .057 
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE      .002 .220** .049 .213** 
ANGER         .050 --  -- 
NEG EMTL AFFECT       -- --  .151* 
            
R2   .09 .06 .13 .14 .07 .13 .16 .25 .18 
            
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001      
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Table 17.  Standardized coefficients in the structural model of study variables with unjust thwarted attempts at sexual intercourse as the s
variable and proclivity to rape as the dependent variable 
   
     
Independent   Strain: Coping Benevolent Hostile Rape Myth Proclivit Neg Em Proclivi
Variables   Thwarted Sex Strategies     Sexism   Sexism  eAcceptanc Anger to Rape Affect to Rape
      
   5 7 6 8 0 
   3 6 8 0 34 
   9 0 5 8 81 
   3 2 5 ^ 01 
   ^ 0 * 3 * 
   1 * 3 2 99 
 4 2 3 9 5 
    3 2 8 12 
    2 8 * * 
   6 0 7 9 
    * 9 5 44 
   6 * 8 * 
     2 --  -- 
   -- --  * 
       
    2 7 4 8 
      
     
      
      
AGE   -.123 .021 .006 .036 -.06 -.02 -.01 .01 -.02
YEAR IN COLLEGE  .024 .019 -.092 -.085 -.10 -.02 .02 -.05 .0
MAJOR   .017   .158* .002 -.149* .01 .00 .07 -.03 .0
FUND PROTESTANT  -.027 .007 -.076 -.053 .01 -.11 .08 -.138 .1
BLACK   -.020   .154* .073 .061 .122 .09 .181* -.00 .186*
OTHER NON-WHITE GRP .043 .078 .059 -.003 .10 -.172 .10 -.03 .0
TRADITIONAL VALUES  .132^ .006 .362*** .343*** .08 -.04 -.08 -.05 -.07
THWARTED SEX   .04 .10 .04 .1
COPING STRATEGIES   -.11 -.07 .474** -.161
BENEVOLENT SEXISM       .03 -.03 .00 -.02
HOSTILE SEXISM   .238* .03 .04 .0
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE   .00 .207* .07 .195*
ANGER    .05
NEG EMTL AFFECT    .163
     
R2   .03 .06 .13 .14 .07 .1
 
.1 .2 .1
     
N=190       ^p < .10 (approaches significance),   *p < .05,   **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
